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ABSTRACT
Understanding Developments In Computer Technology;
A Pragmatic and Synthetic Interpretation
This thesis constructs a new concept of technology which It uses 
to explain developments In computers and their practical 
application.
The need for this reconceptuallsatlon Is demonstrated by a survey 
Illustrating the variability and contradictions between existing 
uses of the term ’technology*. In particular their tendency to 
emphasise either Its concrete or abstract attributes.
The possibility of using positivist principles as the basis for a 
comprehensive concept which can synthesis these two orientations 
Is examined and rejected.
Instead, the new concept Is constructed with Ideas drawn from the 
work of various non-posltlvlst theorists, principally Marx and 
Foucault. The result Is not a definitive list of characteristics, 
but a description of the relationships In which technology Is 
used and through which It changes.
In order to explore the potential of this concept, It Is used to 
develop an understanding of various aspects of computer 
technology. Firstly, historical events which led to the 
construction of the first modern computers are described and 
their Interpretation In terms of the synthetic concept of 
technology contrasted with ones derived from a positivist causal 
analysis.
In Its second application to computer technology, the synthetic 
concept Is used to Interpret changes In contemporary methods of 
developing commercial data processing systems. This discussion Is 
then reinforced and expanded through an Interpretation of 
developments In current research Into artlflcal Intelligence.
Finally some broader social Implications of the case being made 
by the thesis are examined. Limitations In Its argument for this 
purpose are seen to arise both from the methodology adopted and 
the narrow empirical domain which has been considered. 
Consequently new directions of research which will further 
validate Its conclusions are Identified.
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CHAPTER 1
THE NEED FOR A NEW CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGY 
THE PROBLEM OF 'TECHNOLOGY*
'Technology*, says Langdon Winner, *is a word whose time has 
come* (1). What was once a subject discussed only by those 
directly involved, and then only in technical terms, has now 
become a topic of everyday conversation and social debate. We 
have been awakened, argues Winner, to a realisation that it is an 
integral part of society. And yet, he suggests:-
Many of our standard conceptions of 
technology reveal a disorientation that 
borders on a dissociation from reality. (2)
This thesis will develop and demonstrate a concept of technology 
which explains that 'disorientation* and explores some of Its 
Implications. The significance of such a project cannot be 
underestimated In a society which Increasingly explains both Its 
Ills and the possibility of their resolution In technological 
terms (3).
The research from which the thesis has emerged began as an 
enquiry Into the social conditions In which technical knowledge 
develops. Its empirical focus was to be knowledge about the use 
of computers; In particular. It sought to explain how technology 
which was almost unknown forty years ago has become part of the 
everyday language and practices of commercial and Industrial
organisations. The research was to have been grounded in 
statistical evidence on factors such as the education and 
training received by those involved in developing and applying 
knowledge about computers. However, in undertaking this work two 
significant difficulties emerged. The first concerned the 
practical problems, for a part-time researcher, of collecting 
this type of information. In itself this difficulty may not have 
been insurmountable, but in considering possible solutions I was 
led to recognise that the very conditions which created these 
problems also represented a unique opportunity for a different 
form of research. This arose from my personal involvement in the 
work with which the study was to be concerned and gave rise to 
the possibility of looking at computer technology from the novel 
perspective of an expert participant. It seemed both practical 
and challenging, therefore, to redirect the emphasis of the 
research in order to explore the opportunities this methodology 
offered.
That decision was reinforced by the second difficulty arising 
from the original formulation of the research. This emerged from 
reading studies on management and organisations (Ü). The object 
of the reading was to devise a definition of technology which put 
into context the role of computers within commercial 
organisations. However it became clear that the term 'technology* 
was being used in many different ways; in some cases refering to 
machines, in others to methods and processes, and in others to 
knowledge about machines or methods and processes. Consequently, 
each use seemed to exclude some features of technology which were 
included in others. This reading, therefore, suggested a similar
disorientation in formal uses of the term 'technology* to that 
identified by Winner in its common usage and it was clear that 
there were fundamental questions to be answered about the nature 
of technology itself before the proposed project could be 
undertaken.
This need for a clearer concept of technology led to further 
reading concentrating this time on studies in which 'technology* 
was being used in non-organisational contexts. Once again it was 
the differences, rather than the commonalities, which were most 
apparent. It was to be expected that the emphasis placed on 
technology in different studies would vary. Hence, in some cases 
it constituted a central focus in the author's argument, and in 
others, it was simply part of the implicit background to a 
discussion of another topic. Even so, the initial consequence of 
this additional reading was not a clearer concept of technology 
but even greater variation, not to say confusion. In trying to 
understand the relationship between the different uses, however, 
it emerged that they fell into two main categories. In the first, 
'technology* constitued an independent variable with a specific 
relationship to the system of which it was a part. In the second 
category, it formed an integral and inseparable part of the 
system. Hence, in some uses technology assumed a concrete, 
objective and independent form, whilst in others it was an 
abstract and socially determined phenomenon.
It became the first task of the research, therefore, to clarify 
its use of the term 'technology* and the concept which underlay 
it. Of the uses already identified, none seemed adequate for this
purpose, giving rise to the need for a conceptualisation which 
both resolved their contradictions and encompassed the various 
attributes which collectively they ascribed to technology. As a 
result, the project of this thesis has become an enquiry into the 
nature of technology itself and constitutes an attempt to 
construct an alternative and synthetic concept which hopefully 
overcomes the limitations of those in other literature. Computers 
have remained the empirical focus of this enquiry as a means of 
demonstrating the value of the new concept in understanding the 
processes by which technology is developed and changed. This 
demonstration is based on the method of expert participation made 
available by my own involvement in the everyday world of 
commercial systems development. The conclusions to which it leads 
are not entirely novel, but as a basis for understanding 
technology, in particular the development and use of computers, 
it provides additional evidence for what still remains the 
largely undeveloped view that the content of technology must be 
understood in terms of the social context of its construction 
(5). At the same time it provides an opportunity to evaluate the 
use of a methodology not typically used, or even available, to 
most forms of social research.
DEVELOPING A NEW CONCEPT
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first 
reconstructs, in an idealised form, the search for a 
theoretically viable and fruitful conceptualisation of the term 
'technology*. The second part then addresses some problems raised 
by the development of computer technology, so providing empirical 
support for the new concept of technology constructed as a 
consequence of this search.
The search begins, in chapter 2, with a survey of the ways in 
which 'technology* is used in formal literature. This 
demonstrates the range and variation of the different uses and, 
as a basis for classification, locates them on a spectrum, 
ranging from those uses which emphasise the concrete nature of 
technology, in the form of tools and machines, to those which 
focus on its ideational or ideological role. Along this spectrum 
other meanings are identified which emphasise these two extremes 
to varying degrees. Around the mid-point are uses for which the 
essence of technology is seen to reside in knowledge per se. Far 
from reconciling the alternative emphases, however, these 
examples simply reinforce the dichotomy by defining knowledge 
itself in concrete or abstract terms. Of the uses included in the 
survey, some are found to be too wide and imprecise, but most 
limit the scope they ascribe to technology by tailoring it to the 
case being argued.
The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that technology 
exhibits more attributes then any single use adequately allows 
for. More fundamentally, none is found which provides a basis for
synthesizing the emphasis on concrete aspects of technology on 
the one hand and its abstract features on the other. However, the 
explanation for this persistent division is not seen to lie in 
the individual uses of the term, but in the conceptualisations 
from which they are derived. Hence, it is found that the 
concrete/abstract dichotomy operates not simply to diversify the 
uses of 'technology*, but as a represention of the theoretical 
division between those which employ a concept grounded in 
positivism and those which draw on alternative theoretical 
principles.
The next stage in the search, therefore, is an examination of the 
possibilities offered by these two alternative conceptualisations 
for creating a basis on which to build a synthesis of their 
separate inclinations. It begins, in chapter 3, with a 
consideration of the principles of positivism. These, it is 
argued, underlie both the concrete emphasis in popular notions of 
technology and those most commonly used in the literature. It is 
shown that these principles embody limitations which do not allow 
for the broader view of technology required to encompass its 
abstract features. These same limitations are also shown to 
preclude the possibility that positivism can be broadened by 
integration with another concept of technology which will enable 
them jointly to provide the synthesis being sought. It is 
concluded, therefore, that positivist principles do not provide 
an adequate basis on which to develop a study of computer 
technology.
Consequently, in chapter Ü, the search moves on to examine the 
principles underlying non-positivist approaches, beginning with 
the work of Marx (6). Although there is no specific definition of 
'technology* in Marx's writing, this very omission is seen to 
provide the possibility of an alternative to the positivist 
approach. Such a conclusion emerges not so much from the 
substance of Marx's writing as from the method of analysis which 
he applies (7). Although interpretations of his method differ, 
what becomes clear from reading Marx is that the machines, 
industrial methods and knowledge, which are typically taken to 
constitute technology in positivist definitions, cannot be 
understood as an independent parameter in the economic equation. 
Rather they must be seen as part of a complex web of 
relationships and entities which together constitute a society.
The resulting concept of technology is not encapsulated in a 
static definition but emerges from an understanding of its role 
in the social totality without which it has no existence.
This basic premise is developed by drawing on the work of a 
number of other theorists. These writers are not concerned 
primarily with technology, but the theoretical principles they 
develop are significant in this context. Their individual work is 
not described or discussed in depth; instead a selective 
presentation is used to generate ideas which contribute to the 
construction of a new understanding of the nature of technology. 
The outcome is not a definitive statement, but a description of 
the relationships within which technology originates and is 
changed. The resulting concept facilitates the incorporation of 
the various attributes of technology and relates them in a way
which bridges the concrete/abstract dichotomy. A key relationship 
in achieving this synthesis is that between technology as a 
resource and its application in situated action. As a resource it 
consists of possibilities and constraints which are imprecisely 
stated and whose full scope cannot be expressed in this form. In 
action, part of this resource takes a more concrete and definite 
shape. As a result, it is placed within boundaries which limit 
its scope and exclude some of the potential within the resource 
from which it is drawn. This relationship between technology as a 
resource and technology in action, therefore, is essentially 
pragmatic. The resource provides the means to meet a particular 
requirement in action and, in turn, the consequences of that 
application act back on the resource either by reinforcing it or 
changing it, depending on its practical value in the given 
context (8).
By the end of this first part of the thesis, therefore, two main 
themes emerge. One theme concerns the fundamental limitations 
inherent in positivism which circumscribe its potential for 
developing an adequate concept of technology as a social 
phenomenon. The second theme concerns the practical value of the 
synthetic concept of technology which has been constructed as an 
alternative. This is demonstrated by the facility of the new 
concept for providing a better understanding, both of the way 
technology is applied and of how it develops. At the same time 
this second theme reinforces the first by demonstrating the 
limitations created by the positivist/mechanistic concept of 
technology and the restraints this imposes on the use and 
development of technology.
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These two themes are developed in the second part of the thesis 
through an examination of computer technology. Chapter 5 begins 
by looking at the past with a discussion of some historical 
events which, in retrospect, are taken to be part of the 
historical origins of modern computers. Two interpretations of 
these events are offered which contrast a positivist, causal 
analysis with that suggested by the synthetic perspective. This 
illustrates the value of the letter's broad and pragmatic 
approach in which history is understood on its own terms and not 
through teleological reconstruction.
Chapter 6 considers some contemporary developments in commercial 
computing. It attempts to explain the nature of computer systems 
and the life-cycle of their development process and, in doing so, 
highlights the difficulties which are currently being experienced 
in controlling this process. It demonstrates, therefore, that the 
limitations of positivism, in the form of mechanistic models, not 
only exclude some possibilities for understanding technology but 
also constrain the way it is implemented in action. Even so, it 
is seen that positivist concepts are being applied both in 
explaining the difficulties of using computers and in prescribing 
appropriate remedies. In chapter 7. these issues are re-analysed 
in terms of the relationships described by the synthetic concept 
of technology. The difficulties are then seen to arise out of 
contradictions between the positivist/mechanistic principles 
being used and the nature of the reality with which they are 
dealing. Thus, it is argued, computer systems expose and are 
victims of the limitations and implications of the continued
application of the positivist concept of technology. This case is 
reinforced by reference to artificial intelligence, a form of 
computer development which demonstrates, in particular, the 
danger of responding to contradictory experience by constraining 
the representation of reality to that which can be reproduced in 
a computer system.
In the final chapter, the case for a synthetic concept of 
technology is reassessed. It is argued that the understanding of 
computer technology provided by the empirical study confirms the 
utility of that perspective and, in consequence, also supports 
the critical analysis of positivism and its mechanistic 
derivative. Finally, this chapter considers some of the broader 
social implications of this discussion and identifies further 
directions for study which can strengthen the theoretical case 
and provide additional empirical support for it.
10
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ITS EMPIRICAL FOCUS 
Expert Participation
The form in which this thesis is presented has been constrained 
by the methods available for its construction. These, in turn, 
reflect the circumstances in which the research has been 
undertaken. The single most important circumstance has been that 
this work has coincided with my full-time career in commercial 
computing. As a consequence, the methodology which might have 
been expected in research of this type has not been adopted. 
Instead, I have used my special situation to provide a new 
perspective on, what is to me, the real and practical world of 
computing. The basic motivation for this research, therefore, may 
be seen as an attempt to make the everyday world in which I work 
understandable through the application of the sociological 
principles I encountered at university. The content of the thesis 
reflects this practical undercurrent both in its pragmatic 
approach to methodology and in its conceptualisation of 
technology. Thus when my initial project, based on 'normal* 
research concepts and methods, proved impractical, I was led to 
change its direction and to capitalise on the one resource 
undisputably available to me, my own participation, experience 
and expertise in the world of computer technology.
The principal method used in preparing this thesis, therefore, 
has been a form of participant observation, although one which 
seems to be largely ignored in discussions of that method in the 
literature (9). One of the clearest discussions of the issues
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arising from participant observation is that offered by Collins 
(10). Studies using this method, he suggests, are typically 
located on a continuum varying between 'complete observation', 
which minimises the intrusiveness of the observer, and 'complete 
participation', which maximises involvement in the events being 
reported. Collins, however, offers an alternative classification 
in which the poles of this continuum are represented as the 
embodiment of contrasting philosophical positions (11). Complete 
observation in his view represents the positivist approach to 
participant observation which aims to maximise the objectivity 
and replicability of fieldwork reports. By contrast, complete 
participation aims to provide an interpretive understanding 
arising from subjective involvement. Thus, he argues, the 
continuum is in reality not a continuum but a range of 
compromises which take the researcher further away from the 
philosophical ideals represented by the polar opposites which 
Collins labels 'unobtrusive observation' and 'participant 
comprehension'.
The case for a more directly participant analysis of science is 
made by Woolgar (12). Although he is concerned with detailed 
empirical investigations of laboratory science, his emphasis on 
science as it happens rather than as it is reported, for example 
in interviews with participants after the event, reflects 
something of the emphasis of my own method. Through its deep 
participation in the culture which it seeks to understand 
therefore, the method adopted in this thesis may appear to be an 
implementation of Woolgar's idea and to approach the ideal of 
participant comprehension. However, as Pinch recognises (13).
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even the sociologist who is technically competent in the area of 
scientific research under investigation achieves, at best, a 
limited member status in the participants* culture. Consequently 
there is a crucial distinction between the methodologies 
discussed by Collins and Woolgar and that used in this thesis, 
which I have labelled 'expert participation' (111),
The essential difference lies in the initial motivation and 
principal interests of the researcher. The expert participant is 
primarily involved in events as a participant and observation 
(the role of sociologist) is secondary to this concern (15)» The 
researcher seeking participant comprehension, however 
successfully (s)he becomes part of the events being observed, is 
primarily motivated to participate for the purposes of 
interpretation. The distinction being made is similar to that 
which emerges in the discussion of expert systems in chapter 7.
In that discussion it is argued that whilst there is a quantitive 
relationship between degrees of competence (measured for example 
by the accumulation of knowledge and experience in applying it), 
the difference between a highly competent performer and an expert 
is QUALITATIVE. Competence in the end always maintains a 
dichotomy between the actor and the object of action whilst the 
expert is part of the act itself. The expert does not perform in 
a situation but is part of it. In the same way, the reseacher 
seeking participant comprehension, however competent (s)he 
becomes in the field being studied, can never be totally 
identified with the events being observed. The expert does attain 
this level of participation and cannot therefore be located on 
Collins' range of compromises between participant comprehension
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and unobtrusive observation.
The principal difference in practice, therefore, between the form 
of participation employed in this research and that more usually 
encountered has been the closeness of my involvement with the 
subject being studied. This has left me uniquely placed to 
analyse the changes occurring in computer technology and to take 
advantage of the methods of sociological analysis to illuminate 
them. It has made me an insider in the world of computers rather 
than an intruder who had first to become accepted and familiar 
with the technicalities and jargon of the field of study.
Similarly, it has avoided the possibility of a 'Hawthorne Effect' 
(16) whereby my presence as researcher inhibited or motivated 
those I was observing. There are, of course, dangers in this 
familiarity. In particular, I have had to be aware of the danger 
of accepting the assumptions which are a necessary part of 
everyday life in this environment. These dangers were lessened 
because I had worked with computers for seven years before taking 
my first degree so that the contrast between the assumptions used 
in that work, and the questions raised by sociological analysis, 
were brought sharply into focus whilst I was studying for my 
degree rather than afterwards. The subsequent research, 
therefore, has been a process of refining and developing the 
fruits of this meeting of contrasting epistemologies.
Even so there has been a sense of living a dual existence. 
Practical considerations mean that in my day-to-day work I employ 
the assumptions and legitimations appropriate to it; indeed I 
have been better able to do so because they have been made
m
explicit. The very clarification of the principles underlying the 
techniques used in computing has enabled me to apply those 
techniques more effectively. Only outside the workplace am I free 
to employ the alternative perspective developed in this thesis; 
to do so at work in anything but a superficial way would make me 
an outsider (17). Once the pragmatic nature of this duality was 
clarified in my own mind, there has been neither difficulty nor 
conflict in moving between these two roles nor in allowing each 
to inform the other. It is, after all, a common experience for 
people to take on a number of social roles (such as father, 
employee, team member), although less common for them to 
consciously differentiate them. Thus, in the words of Sumneri-
What research must bear in mind always is 
that an observation is partly determined by 
the appearances observed, partly by the 
observing ideologies and partly by the social 
relations under which the observation took 
place. (18)
All observation is a situated practice, but the duty of the 
'scientific* observer is to recognise the nature of this practice 
and the assumptions being employed. This I believe I have done. 
Only a critical consideration of the results of this research by 
others can determine whether I have been deluded in this 
confidence.
In addition to these 'ethical* considerations, the method used 
has presented a number of practical advantages and disadvantages, 
many of which revolve around what for the part-time researcher is 
the key factor, time. Time to do the work is inevitably an 
important consideration and in my own case this has varied with 
the competing demands of my full-time employment. The consequence
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has been long periods in which no work could be done on the 
thesis and an overhead in refamiliarising myself with each 
section as I took it up again. More significantly, however, the 
total period which has elapsed between beginning this work and 
concluding it has been considerably longer than would normally be 
expected for such a project and in that time there have been 
considerable changes in both the theoretical and the empirical 
domains which the thesis explores. In terms of its theoretical 
development, the main consequence has been an increasing 
isolation from the academic mainstream in which the issues raised 
by this work have been exercised (17). Even so, this has been 
less significant for the final result than the consequences for 
the empirical work.
The main feature in this context has been the rapid pace of 
change in computer technology and the constant stream of 
literature which has emerged to support it. There have been 
significant developments in all aspects of the subject including 
the equipment available, the types of system being developed, and 
the methods employed to develop them. This has created an almost 
irresistible temptation to continually take account of these 
changes, both in order to explain their occurrence and to use 
them as additional support for the case being argued.
Developments in the methods of designing and building computer 
systems, for example, have meant that, whilst the original target 
of this investigation was a relatively crude form of mechanistic 
thinking, it is now considerably more sophisticated. At the same 
time, the increasing evidence of contradiction and difficulty in 
applying mechanistic concepts in computing has led others to the
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type of questioning which first instigated my own work and thus 
detracted somewhat from its novelty. It can be seen, therefore, 
that the consequences of the protracted time-scale of this work 
have been mixed. On balance, I believe that the added empirical 
support for its arguments, and the development of my own 
experience in the new methods being used, provide advantages 
which outweigh any disadvantages which have been encountered 
(20).
Clearly, therefore, expert participation involves compromises 
both for the 'participant* in order to be able to comment on the 
field of study and for the 'sociologist' for whom there are the 
dangers of over-familiarity. Although these can be identified at 
an intellectual level, the implications of adopting this method 
and the resulting compromises are best revealed through their 
application in this thesis. The conceptualisation of technology 
which it develops is a realisation of the principles underlying 
the method which therefore becomes woven into the fabric of the 
argument. As a result it would do no justice to the method to 
identify parts of the thesis which derive primarily from 
participation and others which result from academic reflection.
On the contrary, the thesis is a consequence of the constant and 
undifferentiated interaction between these two states.
Computers as an Empirical Focus
If I were to rationalise the original decision to undertake 
research, I would probably talk about an interest in relating the 
things I had done at university to the work I do now. The 
original choice of empirical subject may, therefore, have been
17
fortuitous. Once I decided to engage in research, however, there 
were clear practical advantages in basing it on an area of social 
activity in which I was immediately involved. However, when a 
need to reconceptualise technology became the prime concern of 
the work, it was not clear exactly how this would relate to an 
empirical study of computer technology, or rather, what applying 
a new concept of technology to computers would reveal. In 
practice, computer technology has proved a particularly fruitful 
choice of subject with two important advantages for demonstrating 
the new concept.
The first advantage arises from the speed of change which 
computer technology has experienced over the past forty years. In 
this relatively short time, in historical terms, computers have 
moved from scientific obscurity to being a pervasive feature of 
industrial societies. This compression of the historical process 
of technological development (21) provides especially good 
material for demonstrating the synthetic concept for which change 
is a cornerstone of its potential for explaining how technology 
has developed. The opportunities provided by the speed of change 
have not been the only benefit of computers as an empirical 
subject. Even more important perhaps, is the nature of computer 
technology itself which differs from other forms of technology in 
two significant ways. Firstly, it does not provide a physical 
force but a logical one, a technology for the mind rather than 
the body. Thus the principal applications of computers do not 
replace or supplement human physical capabilities but are 
concerned with the products of their mental capacity. They do 
not, for example, lift heavier weights or increase the speed of a
18
production-line (22), but they do process data untiringly and at 
great speed.
As a result, another important difference between computers and 
other forms of technology is that computers reverse the tendency 
to specialisation found in traditional technology. Rather than 
limiting their functions to those required by a particular 
process, they succeed by adaptability and flexibility. The 
consequence of this difference is that they do not fit easily 
into existing models of technology which are based largely on 
physical and mechanistic concepts. Any attempt to understand the 
nature of computer technology, therefore, necessarily shows up 
the limitations and weaknesses of these models which never the 
less continue to dominate everyday orientations to the world 
including those employed in computer technology. It is the 
resulting contradictions experienced in developing computer 
systems which can explain the disorientation identified by Winner 
and which, through its empirical focus on computers, this thesis 
is able to demonstrate and explain.
Some Consequences of the Methodology and its Subject 
The consequences for the thesis of its particular mode of 
research and its subject matter are demonstrated in the final 
form it takes, in particular, in the balance between its 
theoretical and empirical elements. It will be seen, for example, 
that much of the theoretical debate is based on literature 
available at the end of the 1970*s, although the more recent 
interest in Foucault has added an important dimension to that 
aspect of the thesis. By contrast, much of the empirical evidence
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is very recent and drawn, not from academic literature, but from 
professional journals and promotional material. The role of the 
theoretical work in this arrangement is to extract ideas and 
concepts in order to generate a working hypothesis on which an 
empirical investigation can be undertaken. The latter, by 
maximising the advantages of my particular method of research, 
has sought to confirm the practical value of that hypothesis and 
provide a basis for its further application and development.
Perhaps the most obvious evidence of the pragmatism of this 
approach is the way existing literature has been used. This is 
typified by the survey of uses of 'technology* which sought to 
establish the need for a new conceptualisation of technology. The 
examples used in the survey were those originally identified in 
the context of organisational and managerial studies supplemented 
by further reading undertaken in the search for clarification of 
the concept of technology. For this purpose it was assumed that 
the use of 'technology', or a similar term, was sufficient to 
warrant inclusion. It was not the object of this survey to 
provide a complete reference guide to the different uses of 
technology, but to:-
a) demonstrate the limited nature of most usages, definitions and
concepts of 'technology', and
b) identify a possible basis for a more adequate concept.
The survey does not claim to be comprehensive, therefore, nor 
does it undertake a detailed description or critique of the 
various works to which it refers (23). None-the-less, it has
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proved sufficient for the first of these purposes in that it 
demonstrates the variety of uses and some of the limitations that 
this variety has created. The resultant classification based on 
an emerging pattern of usage, suggests that these examples are 
also sufficent to demonstrate the different facets of technology 
which have to be accounted for by the synthesising concept. The 
basis of categorisation, therefore, is very simple. If its 
principal purpose had been a detailed analysis of the uses of 
’technology*, it could have adopted a more sophisticated basis 
for this purpose (24). For the objectives outlined above, 
however, this single dimension is sufficient to demonstrate the 
dichotomy between uses of ’technology* grounded in positivist 
principles and those which are not. It is on these two 
alternatives that the search for a suitable basis for a new 
concept has been concentrated.
In using texts in this way, the researcher always leaves open the 
possibility of criticism based on other texts or alternative 
interpretations. However writers, like speakers, have an audience 
and a purpose in communicating. Their work is constructed to 
convey a message and must employ usages and meanings understood 
by that audience either by explicit definition or the indexical 
interpretation of shared concepts. Only where a work is seeking 
to deviate from common usage is it likely to discuss fundamental 
meanings, and even then they must be expressed in terms and 
categories familiar to the audience. On this basis, it has been 
assumed that in finding a sufficient number of terms and ideas 
which are in common use, the survey of uses identifies the range 
of possibilities available and the theoretical assumptions which
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will typically underlie similar texts.
Similar considerations apply to the use of texts in constructing 
the synthetic concept. Here the writers discussed are more 
concerned with theory and less with the practical issues which 
exercised most of those included in the survey of uses. 
Consequently they are more likely to examine the concepts being 
used. Once again, however, the purpose is not to enter into a 
detailed debate on the theoretical validity of their positions, 
but to range selectively through them, identifying their 
underlying direction and concerns and extracting ideas and 
concepts for my own use. This approach may be considered less 
ambitious than the alternative, but it reflects the pragmatism 
pervading this thesis. It is based on the assumption that any 
text may be considered not only as a statement by the writer, but 
as a resource which the reader can approach with a personal 
project. Thus any completed text becomes part of the public 
domain where its interpretation is indexical to the context in 
which it is used. Just as new ways may be found to use existing 
technology, so texts may be employed in ways not intended by 
their originators.
The final justification for the treatment of other texts in this 
thesis must be its success in employing them as a resource to 
stimulate and develop a new concept of technology. Consequently 
the use made of them should judged within the totality of the 
argument presented by this thesis, and not in terms of their 
original context, from which they has been extracted. The 
critical concern should not be the interpretation of the original
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works, but the adequacy of the concept of technology which they 
have been used to construct.
It will be clear from this description of the thesis and its 
methodology that both owe a great deal to the circumstances in 
which the research has been undertaken. The original motivation, 
the subject matter and the methodology are all a direct 
consequence of my position as a part-time researcher and 
full-time computer professional. The need for a new concept of 
technology and the possibility of demonstrating it derive from 
the, originally, fortuitous choice of computers as an empirical 
focus. The balance between theory and empirical demonstration, 
and the pragmatism which this typifies, reflect the underlying 
practical concern of the research with my daily working 
environment. The limitations of its conclusions and the potential 
for further development are also a result of its particular 
format. I believe that these circumstances have created an 
opportunity for a novel form of research and an unusual, but 
viable, perspective. The final judgement of their merit, in 
keeping with their pragmatic origins, must be based on how useful 
they prove to be as a resource for others in developing their own 
understanding of technology.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1
1. Winner L. ’Autonomous Technology:
Technics-Out-of-Control as a Theme in Political 
Thought’, 1977» MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., p. 4
2. . Ibid. p. 8
3. In discussing a report on NATO’s propored use of nuclear
weapons, the Sunday Times (5/2/85) quoted Sir Frank 
Cooper, one of its authors, as saying that:-
Technology is a two-edged sword, 
and if it goes unchecked the whole 
of space will become a 
battle-ground by the end of the 
century. We want to see that 
stopped. On the other hand, in the
event of a war in Europe, it does
offer us the chance of buying more 
time and thus lessening the chance 
of a nuclear exchange.
The conclusion of the report was that NATO should 
reject plans for a ’controlled step-by-step escalation’ 
using large and vunerable weapons platforms like ships 
and tanks, and concentrate on small but highly accurate 
missiles which could reduce the advantage of numbers 
held by the Warsaw Pact countries. The argument 
therefore is concerned entirely with the appropriate 
technology to use and assumes that the solution must be 
stated in those terms.
4. e.g. Woodward J. ’Industrial Organisation: Theory and
Practice’, 1965» Oxford University Press, London:
Blauner R. ’Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker 
and his Industry’, 1964, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago
5. see for example Pinch T.J. and Bijker W.E. ’The Social
Construction of Facts and Artefacts: or How the 
Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology 
might Benefit Each Other’, in Social Studies of 
Science, Vol. 14 No.3, Aug. 1984
6. This use of the term non-positivist is not meant to
imply a homogeneity in the various positions which do 
not adopt positivist principles.
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of Marx’s method for understanding his work, e.g. 
Cleaver H.M. ’Reading ’’Capital” Politically’, 1979. 
Harvester Press, London: Qodelier M. ’Structure and 
Contradiction in ’’Capital’” in Blackburn R. (Ed.) 
’Ideology in Social Science’, 1972, Collins, London: 
Althusser L. ’For Marx’, 1977. New Left Books, London
8. This pragmatic resource/action relationship applies
equally to the concept of technology itself, i.e. the 
concept is a resource to be used in understanding 
technology.
9. see e.g. Spradley J.P. ’Participant Observation’, 1980,
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York.
10. Collins H.M. ’Spoonbending:Concepts and Practice of
Particapatory Fieldwork’ in C. Bell & H. Roberts (Eds) 
’Social Researching: Problems, Politics and Practice’, 
1984, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London
11. A similar argument is developed in chapter 2 of this
thesis with regard to uses of the term ’technology’.
12. Woolgar S. ’Laboratory Studies: A Comment on
the State of the Art’ in Social Studies of Science,
Vol. 12 No.4, Aug. 1982)
13. Pinch T.J. ’Confronting Nature’, 1986, D Reidel,
Dordrecht
14. The term ’expert observation’ could perhaps have been
used with equal justification. It is the element 
’expert’ which is significant for the present purposes.
15. This role is not the same as that of ’engineer
sociologist’ (see Bijker W.E, et al (Eds.) ’The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions 
in the Sociology and History of Technology’, 1987. MIT 
Press, Cambridge Mass.) where the engineer necessarily, 
but unconsciously, undertakes a sociological analysis 
of the environment in which a technological artefact 
will be used. The expert participant deliberately 
engages in analysis of the events in which (s)he 
participates directly.)
16. see Pugh D.S. et al ’Writers on Organisations’, 1971.
Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 127-8
17. It would also possibly make me unemployed.
18. Sumner C. ’Reading Ideologies’, 1979. Academic Press,
London, p. 226
19. An indication of more recent work in the sociologies of
science and technology is given in the brief review of
the literature in Pinch T.J. and Bijker W.E. 1984 op 
cit.
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20. It is perhaps ironic that one of the practical
advantages of these developments has been the 
availability of home micros for word processing without 
which it may not have proved practical to complete this 
thesis.
21. see Mumford E. & Ward T.B. ’Computers: Planning for
People’, 1968, BT Batsford Ltd., London for the 
comparative rates of development for motor cars, 
aircraft and computers.
22. Computers may, of course, be indirectly responsible for
such physical forces, for example by controlling robot 
machines.
23. Indeed the use of ’technology’ is so pervasive that any
comprehensive survey would be impossible.
24. see e.g. Burrell Q. & Morgan G. ’Sociological Paradigms
and Organisational Analysis’, 1979. Heinemann, London. 
They use two dimensions, one defined by the 
subjective/objective debate in sociology and the other 
by what they call the sociologies of regulation and 
radical change.
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CHAPTER 2 
MEANINGS OF TECHNOLOGY 
THE MULTIPLICITY OF MEANINGS
In Its original, seventeenth century usage, ’technology* was a 
generic term for the ’industrial arts’ referring to the skills 
used in production and management. In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, where the term was used at all, it had a 
more concrete and precise meaning usually rendered as machines, 
factories or engineering. Since then, in Winner’s words:-
In a dialectic of concepts that Hegel would 
have appreciated, the word has come to mean 
everything and anything; it therefore 
threatens to mean nothing. (1)
Such ambiguity and variation can be expected in the 
conversational use of a term which refers to a pervasive feature 
of society, but in the case of technology, there is an equally 
bewildering diversity of meanings employed by those who have used 
the term more formally. This chapter presents a representative 
survey of these latter uses to demonstrate their variety and 
contradictions (2). It does not offer a detailed examination or 
criticism of each one, nor of the discussions in which they are 
used, rather it illustrates the range of attributes which 
collectively they ascribe to technology. In the process it 
identifies a dichotomy between those uses which emphasise the 
concrete features of technology and those concerned with its 
abstract nature. It also shows that many of the meanings ascribed
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to technology have been constructed to support a particular 
argument without establishing a full understanding of its 
different aspects. This survey will demonstrate, therefore, why 
the construction and demonstration of a new concept of technology 
has now become the principal objective of this thesis, when in 
its original project the definition of technology was simply to 
be an introduction to the main discussion.
In order to present this survey, it was necessary to provide some 
basis for classifying the different uses of technology. However, 
the variety of these uses is reflected in the number of ways they 
have been classified. Aron, for example, identifies two general 
classes, the first being concerned with ’the tools and products 
of industrialisation’ and the second with ’any rationalization of
an activity with a view to manipulation or planning  ..’ (3).
Hence one reflects the concrete implementation of technology and 
the other its abstract form.
Rapp on the other hand suggests four categories (4):-
a) the ’engineering’ perspective which equates technology with
machines,
b) a philosophy of culture approach which sees it primarily as
a way of thinking,
c) a critical approach typified by the Frankfurt School,
d) the systems theory approach which emphasises the balance of
nature.
His first two categories may be equated with Aron’s whilst the
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others recognise differing socio-political views of technology. 
As Rapp comraents;-
This overview, which is by no means 
exhaustive, already shows the many ways in 
which technology can be interpreted and 
evaluated. (5)
Gendron (6) provides a third classification which he bases on 
different evalutions of the social impact of technology. His 
first category, the utopian view, sees technology as a 
progressive and liberating force. The second, dystopian, view 
portrays it as a dangerous and disruptive element, at least in 
modern industrial societies. The final category, which Gendron 
identifies as socialist, argues that in itself technology is 
neither beneficial nor harmful and it is only through its 
application that it takes on these characteristics. Each of these 
views implies a different form of political action. Utopians 
argue that any potential dangers of technology can be contained 
by making suitable adjustments to existing social and political 
institutions. Dystopians, however, argue that technology and 
society are so intimately related that the harmful use of 
technology can only be ended by a radical change in the society 
which determines how it is used. The socialists adopt a middle 
course, agreeing that technology may prove harmful in its present 
use, but maintaining a distinction between technology and society 
so that their solution is to change society in a way which will 
lead it to use the existing technology in a more satisfactory 
way.
The various meanings given to technology and their 
classifications both tend to reflect the interests of the writers
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using them and the argument they are presenting. This thesis is 
no different. It identifies and classifies uses of ’technology* 
in pursuit of its own objective of a comprehensive understanding 
of the phenomenon. Initially, it does not locate these different 
uses in discrete categories but on a continuum whose poles 
represent concrete and abstract extremes of emphasis. Ultimately, 
however, it recognises that no single use adequately spans both 
these aspects and Identifies them as two distinct classes of 
meaning.
The concrete, essentially positivist, class is characterised by a 
concern with the instrumentality of technology and treats it as 
an independent variable in a social equation. Typically it 
focuses on specific areas of application rather than on 
technology as a whole, supporting the idea of multiple 
technologies each defining an area of specialisation and 
expertise. There is a close relationship between technology and 
science which encourages the view that technology is independent, 
neutral and objective. Any harmful outcomes are portrayed as the 
responsibility of those using the technology rather than a 
feature of the technology itself.
The abstract class of meaning emphasises the totality of 
technology and characterises it as a mode of reasoning and 
orientation to the world. Its instrumentality is not denied but 
is not seen as a significant feature. Technology is treated as an 
integral part of a society and is typically described in terms of 
its own domination of social processes or as a tool of a dominant 
class or group. Questions are directed, and criticisms levelled.
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not at specific instruments and techniques but at the general 
processes which construct and reproduce them.
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CONCRETE VIEWS - TECHNOLOGY AS THINGS 
Organisational Analysis
Typical of the concrete view of ’technology’ is its use by 
writers on management and organisation for whom it represents an 
analytically separate variable in a causal relationship. Sayles 
(7). for example, examines the inter-relatedness of formal and 
informal structures in organisations and distinguishes four types 
of workgroup based on the levels of skill and interpersonal 
interaction they involve. His interest is not so much in the 
formal structures within these groups as with their relationship 
to the technological and organisational setting in which they 
exist. In defining these relationships, Sayles identifies 
technology as the determining factor. According to Silverman 
however:-
It is difficult to see how this analysis, 
based on workers drawn only from ’mass 
production’ industries, can be given any 
general validity. (8)
Blauner (9). on the contrary, specifically examines industries 
based on different types of technology. His basic thesis is that 
technology itself, rather than any specific implementation of it, 
is an alienating factor in modern industry. The degree of 
alienation varies according to the technological basis of the 
work being done so that craft work is the least alienating and 
assembly-line work the most alienating. Like Sayles, therefore, 
Blauner sees technology as the determining factor and argues that 
the social organisation of the factory is a consequence of the 
technology in use.
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Woodward (10) also studies different industries. Her interest is 
in formal organisation which she also sees as being determined by 
the technology in use. She categorises industries in terms of the 
complexity of their technology with small-batch production as the 
least complex and process control industries as the most complex. 
She identifies the structural features typical of each category 
and concludes that there is a common organisational form 
appropriate to industries with a similar level of complexity. 
Those which contradict this rule will tend to be less successful 
than others which conform to it.
In spite of its use as a determining factor in these various 
studies, this view of technology has a number of practical 
difficulties. According to Perrow:-
The foremost has been the measurement (and 
thus the definition) of technology itself. To 
be pure, and to keep the concept independent 
of structure, we should focus upon 
characteristics that are measured 
independently of human behaviour ..  (11)
According to G allie, attempts to do this have been noticeably 
unsuccessful^
...... within a perspective which regards
technology as a crucial variable there is no 
conceivable way of accounting for the very 
striking differences in worker attitudes 
uncovered by the different studies. (12)
Despite this criticism, such studies, with their quasi-scientific 
approach, have proved popular with managers. Rose believes this 
is because both the managers and the studies, in spite of the 
letter’s apparent objectivity, are part of the history of 
capitalism and share in its assumptions and objectives (13).
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An attempt to overcome the problems of using technology as an 
independent variable is to be found in Pfeffer’s ’Organisational 
Design’ (14), He reviews the literature on technology and 
organisation and concludes that it has converged to the point 
where the major role of technology is seen to be its influence on 
the forms of control within an organisation (15). He proposes to 
develop this argument further in order to free technology 
entirely from a causal framework. As an alternative to the 
reified model of organisations necessitated by that framework, he 
adopts an ’action frame of reference’. This focuses on the 
personal projects and resources of individuals within the 
organisation rather than treating the whole organisation as a 
single entity to which interests and goals may be attributed. 
Technology then becomes one resource available to the members of 
an organisation and is determined by them rather than being a 
determining factor. As a result it becomes a much more amorphous 
feature of the organisation.
Whether we define technology as what occurs 
in the transformation process, as the 
connections between actions and consequences, 
or as the methods and mechanisms for 
accomplishing organisational tasks, it is 
clear that technology is more than the 
organisation’s machinery. Indeed, a close 
examination of these definitions may reveal 
that technology is the organisation’s 
activities. Anything that goes on in an 
organisation can, at some level, be related 
to the organisation’s work and tasks, and 
therefore, can be considered part of the 
organisation’s technology. (16)
Thus Pfeffer only overcomes the difficulties inherent in defining 
technology as an independent variable by allowing it to be 
totally absorbed into the concept of organisation. As a
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consequence, his argument becomes indistinguishable from a 
general theory of action (17).
Technology as Objects
While organisational studies have tended to define technology in 
terms of industrial production, other studies are primarily 
concerned with the objects which are being produced. Price, for 
example, defines technology as:-
...... that research where the main product
is not a [scientific] paper, but instead a 
machine, a drug, a product, or a process of 
some sort. (18)
Price is stressing the concrete nature of technology to support 
his argument that it does not simply represent the practical 
application of science but has a distinct development path of its 
own with a different type of result. Hence, whilst the principal 
outcome of scientific research is its published results, 
technological research creates new products. Science and 
technology, therefore, each derives new knowledge from that 
already available within its own domain, and follow distinct, if 
inter-related, paths of development.
Lawless also includes the output of research in his definition of 
technology:-
For the purposes of the study, ’technology’ 
was broadly defined to include all varieties 
of applied physical and biological science 
and engineering, and also basic research that 
might soon lead to a proposed technological 
development. (19)
He uses this definition to discuss a number of cases in the
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United States where an uncritical acceptance of technology has 
been shaken by the revelation of dangers inherent in its use. His 
examples of such ’technological shock’ include drugs, chemicals 
and industrial pollution. This concentration on concrete 
instances of technology is not unusual in attempts to create 
general awareness in a non-technical audience. It focuses 
attention and provides an object for action. By contrast, an 
abstract concept of technology is an elusive object for both 
protesters and critics. Those who take that path, as we shall see 
later in this chapter, are usually left with no basis on which to 
take action. Thus most anti-technological criticism is directed 
against specific targets such as an airport or nuclear 
installation (20). Lawless acknowledges that his own definition 
is geared to his particular argument. As a result, however, it 
focuses on easily identifiable, ’shocking’ events and does not 
entail any discussion of other consequences of technology such as 
structural unemployment or long-term environmental pollution 
which are less concentrated and immediate.
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THE MIDDLE GROUND - TECHNOLOGY AS KNOWLEDGE 
The ’Socialist* View
Like Lawless, Ackroyd et al (21) also highlight specific 
implementations of technology to present their argument. They 
define technology as:-
...... any device or method which exploits
knowledge from any of the sciences from 
physics to psychology. (22)
The particular implementations of technology which interest them 
are those used by the security forces in Ulster and range from CS 
gas and rubber bullets to methods of information analysis and 
interrogation. Their aim is:-
to show that the development of this 
more novel technology - the technology of 
political control - is the result of powerful 
social and political processes, and is itself
part of these processes ..  Developments
occur when they serve the purposes of those 
who control the resources which can put the 
technology to use, rather than when the basic 
scientific knowledge becomes available. (23)
Hence, they argue, technology develops not as the result of 
autonomous change or new scientific research, but when it suits 
the purposes of those who have the power and resources to 
implement it. In its role in political repression, therefore, 
technology is part of an equation which includes factors such as 
legislation and public opinion and which aims to maximise control 
whilst minimising resistance and the danger of a backlash. The 
essence of their argument is that the dominant groups in British
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society want to retain and increase their political control.
Events in Northern Ireland have given them the opportunity to 
introduce anti-terrorist legislation and test new technology for 
this purpose in a way which has the support of the majority of 
the population.
The meaning given to technology by Ackroyd et al contains 
features which place it closer to the centre of the 
concrete/abstract continuum than those prviously discussed.
Firstly technology is associated with broader moral issues 
characterised by its good and harmful effects. Furthermore this 
moral element is not simply added to an otherwise neutral 
technology when it is implemented, but is a consequence of the 
social structure within which the technology is created, and is 
built into it and shapes its form. A second feature is that the 
meaning of technology has been broadened to include methods and 
knowledge although these still take concrete form, for example in 
the use of psychology to develop interrogation techniques. The 
third feature is that technology is no longer seen as an 
independent variable but is discussed in relation to other social 
forces. It has become one aspect in a social equation which 
cannot be altered at will and which is not independently 
determined. Rather it must be balanced, for example by public 
acceptability. The argument as it is stated clearly implies that 
in a different society, not only would this technology of 
political control not be used in this way but that it could never 
have been created.
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However it is not clear how relevant this argument is to 
technology as a whole and to what extent the authors would apply 
it to other concrete forms of technology such as industrial 
processes. A radical change in a society’s basis of economic 
production is of a different order from changing the form of 
political control. The industrial basis of Germany was not 
changed in 1945 even though its previous political organisation 
was replaced by two alternative forms in the post-war partition. 
Similarly it is not clear to what extent the knowledge from which 
technology is developed is itself a specific outcome of the 
political structure of society. The implication is that it would 
be fundamentally unchanged in a society with a different form of 
political control.
The argument offered by Ackroyd et al would seem, therefore, to 
be a version of what Gendron describes as the ’socialist’ view of 
technology. In this view the knowledge from which technology is 
derived is considered neutral and only to acquire moral values 
through its use to create technology, that is in the direct 
application of knowledge. Gendron’s objective in examining 
technology is to identify the extent of its impact on society and 
in particular how far it is a force for good or harm. As we saw 
above, he identified three basic views of technology. The 
’utopian’ and ’dystopian’ views represent technology as 
intrinsically good and harmful respectively, at least as it is 
found in modern industrial societies. Both are rejected by 
Gendron in favour of the ’socialist’ view which he bases on his 
reading of Marx which he summarises as followsi-
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...... all major economic transformations and
hence all major social transformations are 
the result of the dialectical interaction of 
productive forces (technology) and production
relations ... Growth in technology (growth
in the productive forces) is determined by 
production relations; production relations 
are in turn transformed by growth in 
technology. (24)
So, like Ackroyd et al, Gendron identifies a link between a 
society and the form its technology takes. Similarly he defines 
technology in terms of both knowledge and objects although his 
focus is on economic production rather than forms of political 
control.
A technology is any sytematized practical 
knowledge, based on experimentation and/or 
scientific theory, which enhances the 
capacity of society to produce goods and 
services, emd which is embodied in productive 
skills, organisation, or machinery. (25)
Thus, although Gendron’s definition demonstrates a move away from 
the concrete pole by including skill and organisation as well as 
machinery in its definition, it remains firmly grounded in the 
concreteness of positivism and the scientific method derived from 
it.
The sarnie may be said of the work of D & R Elliott even though 
they stress the significance of social environment even more 
emphatically.
It is not the existence of ’technology’ 
itself that is the problem, but rather the 
precise forms of contemporary technology. As 
such the question of ’technology’ is 
inseparable from questions of social,
economic and political structure ..
technology is not an independent variable; it 
is part of the network or system of
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interdependent parts that we call ’society*. 
(26)
Hence the choice of technology becomes one between systems of 
values which define its use.
It is inevitable then that all aspects of 
technology - machines, buildings, transport 
systems and communications systems - reflect 
the particular beliefs as to the type of 
social and psychological relations that 
should exist between men and between men and 
the environment they live in. (27)
Thus they argue that:-
 .. our whole social and economic,
cultural and political system is permeated by 
technology. It is not just a matter of 
hardware and physical systems. (28)
They are not as forceful as Ackroyd et al in seeing dominant 
groups as determining the form of technology, although they 
recognise its role in reinforcing the dominance of existing 
groups within society. Even so, they argue, the interaction 
between technology and society allows variations in the 
directions which technology may be developed which in its turn 
implies the possibility of ’very different social, economic and 
political structures.’ (29). The current structure of industrial 
societies, they suggest, encourages acceptance of the mediation 
of experts in determining the direction to be taken and hence the 
values embodied in our society. Their answer to this domination 
is an alteration in the franchise on the assumption that exposure 
to alternatives will lead the electorate to adopt different 
values and hence different uses of technology.
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The Tendency to Confusion
The work of Ackroyd et al, Gendron and the Elliotts illustrates 
that definitions of technology near the centre of the 
concrete/abstract continuum typically emphasise the knowledge 
used to create technological objects. However this can create its 
own difficulties. A tendency to confuse technology as instruments 
and technology as knowledge is seen by Fores (30) as the most 
common reason for its variable use by economists. Freeman makes 
the same point arguing that:-
[Technology] is one of the expressions which 
suffers from immense confusion in its use. 
Sometimes it is used exclusively in the 
original meaning of the word; a body of 
knowledge about techniques. At other times it 
is used to describe the actual physical 
hardware used for production. (31)
Bell illustrates this dual use of the term in ’The Coming of 
Post-Industrial Society’ (32). Societies, he argues, consist of 
three elements, social structure, polity and culture. These 
represent three axial principles along which societies can 
develop; the allocation of resources, the form of participation 
and the nature of self-fulfillment. He recognises no necessary 
correlation between developments occuring in these three spheres; 
they may overlap, but they may also contradict each other. 
Societies, therefore, can be studied from a number of distinct 
viewpoints and for his own work Bell chooses social structure in 
the form of economic production. This focus, he believes, will 
avoid distinguishing between the United States and the Soviet 
Union which would not be the case in a study of polity or culture 
but which is necessary in view of his concern with the 
transformation from industrial to post-industrial economies which
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he believes both societies will experience. The key to this 
transformation is a change in the role of knowledge where 
knowledge is defined as:-
......a set of organised statements of facts
or ideas, presenting a reasoned judgement or 
an experimental result, Nhich is transmitted 
to others through some communication medium
in some systematic form ... Knowledge is
that which is objectively known, an 
intellectual property ...... (33 - author’s
emphasis)
Although technology is another key concept in his argument, it is 
not explicitly defined. The reader is left therefore to determine 
the meaning given to it from the various indications provided. 
One such indication is in Bell’s comment that:-
The terms pre-industrial, industrial, and 
post-industrial societies are conceptual 
sequences along the axis of production and 
the kinds of knowledge that are used ......
Along the axis of production and technology, 
both the Soviet Union and the United States 
are industrial societies and thus somewhat 
congruent. (34)
So it would seem that we can equate ’technology’ with the ’kinds 
of knowledge that are used’ in production and that Bell is 
describing a concrete conception of technology in which its 
essence is knowledge. Such knowledge, once created, can become 
the property of experts and professionals.
However, at another point in his discussion. Bell treats 
technology and knowledge as separate categories:-
We have said that technology is one axis of 
the post-industrial society; the other axis 
is knowledge as a fundamental resource. (35)
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The explanation for these differences is that Bell uses 
’technology* to represent two entirely separate concepts which 
are distinguished by their relevance to the historically distinct 
industrial and post—industrial phases of social development. Bell 
uses a change in the character of knowledge from practical to 
theoretical to distiguish between these phases but the 
consequencess of this change for the meaning of technology are 
implicit in his discussion rather than clearly defined. In the 
case of industrial societies. Bell is arguing, the main axis 
along which development occurs is production and knowledge about 
it. This leads him to a concrete perspective on technology which 
is seen to develop through experience and the piecemeal 
innovation of new machines and methods of production. 
Post-industrial societies are characterised by a new 
relationship.
The concept ’’post-industrial society” 
emphasises the centrality of theoretical 
knowledge as the axis around which new 
technology, economic growth and the 
stratification of society will be organised 
...... (36)
Science and technology combine in a new way to produce ’the 
systematic development of research and the creation of new 
science-based industries’ (37). Technology is no longer typified 
by machines but by the application of theoretical knowledge in 
the form of general principles. It does not simply represent ways 
of doing things but a way of looking at them, an epistemolgy. So 
when Bell talks of ’knowledge’ he means ’science’ and the 
distinction he is making is between the ’unscientific’ 
development of technology (industrial) and its development in a
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‘scientific* way (post-industrial). Thus, in post-industrial 
societies the key institutions are concerned with teaching and 
research, and the basis of stratification is skill.
Bell’s dual use of ’technology’ reflects his willingness to 
fragment his view of societies, both historically and 
structurally. His creation of strict categories however makes it 
difficult to give a meaningful explanation of the transition 
which has occured. Rather he is obliged to treat this as a 
pre-ordained path of development which all industrial societies 
will experience. Similarly, he can only explain the development 
of the non-economic aspects of society in terms of their own 
internal dynamics and not by relating them directly to changes in 
economic production. Thus he offers no basis for discussing the 
implications of technology, as an epistemolgy, for the cultural 
or political spheres of society, nor for bridging the 
concrete/abstract schism in the meanings of technology.
Knowledge and the Development of Technology
Unlike Bell, others using the idea of technology as knowledge 
have been more explicit in their use of the term. A number of 
examples are to be found among those whose interest is in the way 
technology develops. Freeman, for example, bases a discussion of 
the economics of research and development on a definition of 
technology provided by Mansfield;-
Technology is society’s pool of knowledge 
regarding the industrial arts. It consists of 
knowledge used by industry regarding the 
principles of physical and social phenomena 
(such as the properties of fluids and the 
laws of motion), knowledge regarding the 
application of these principles to production
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(such as the application of genetic theory to 
the breeding of new plants), and knowledge 
regarding day-to-day operations of production 
(such as the rules of thumb of the 
craftsmen). (38)
Freeman's object is to make a distinction between the basic 
knowledge embodied in technology and the knowledge of how to 
apply it. Thus he argues that new technology may be the result of 
either the creation of new knowledge or new ways of applying 
existing knowledge. Hence the broad knowledge-based definition 
offered by Mansfield suits his purpose.
Johnston is also interested in the way technology develops. He 
acknowledges the role of external factors in explaining the 
direction of technological change, but emphasises a dynamic 
within technology itself. To support his case, he adopts a 
definition based on Kuhn's concept of paradigm.
In the context of this paper a technological 
paradigm is a set of guiding principles 
accepted by practitioners in a particular 
field of technology. (39)
A paradigm, he argues, consists of three elements, beliefs and 
principles (including basic knowledge), exemplars (how the 
paradigm has operated successfully in the past), and techniques 
derived from previous experience. A paradigm therefore has an 
epistemological dimension which provides a framework in which 
knowledge and applications develop. It also has psychological and 
sociological dimensions which define both the mental world in 
which the technologist works and the social norms of that world. 
These constrain the technologist to define problems and seek 
solutions for them within the paradigm. Thus, as with Kuhn's
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scientific paradigm, most technological change consists of new 
uses and combinations of existing knowledge with major 
paradigmatic changes occuring only infrequently.
Both Freeman and Johnston, therefore, have broken away from a 
simplistic identification of technology with machines and 
industrial processes but their uses of the term still retain a 
concreteness which allows technological knowledge and its 
implementation to become the domain and property of particular 
groups. The meanings they give to technology are far removed from 
a simplistic identification of technology with machines and 
industrial processes but they are framed to establish their 
individual cases and neither has sought, except superficially, to 
encompass a broader social perspective which could explain the 
constraints on the direction of change or its wider social 
significance. The internal momentum of established technology, as 
I shall argue (40), is one moment of technological change, but a 
full understanding of that process requires elements not 
contained in this kind of definition.
Another theme in discussions of how technology develops is the 
distinction between technology and science. Kuppers makes this 
distinction on the basis of the 'criteria of relevance' applied 
by the different institutions responsible for developing new 
knowledge. Both science and technology, he suggests, apply the 
same core of knowledge. The differences in their development must 
therefore be explained by their different objectives in using 
that knowledge. Hence he argues:-
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Truth on the one hand and efficiency on the 
other are general relevance criteria for the 
domains of science and technology. (41)
Within the research environment, the function of criteria of 
relevance is to select the problems and questions to be resolved 
and hence the knowledge to be developed. Although technology is 
defined in terms of knowledge, the emphasis is once again on its 
application to concrete cases. Thus, Kuppers argues, whether the 
original requirement is generated internally or externally, the 
resulting technology must operate in the real world and cannot 
afford the simplifying assumptions with which science can define 
experimental situations or mathematical models. Because of this, 
scientific and technological developments occur within distinct, 
if related institutional frameworks.
Layton (42) also distinguishes between scientific and 
technological knowledge in terms of the research communities and 
institutions which generate it. Science, he argues, values 
'knowing' while technology values 'doing'. Such distinctions 
naturally reinforce the idea that the essence of technology is 
its practical implementation in concrete form. Even so, like 
Kuppers, Layton includes a social element in his discussion by 
arguing that for innovation to occur there must be not only 
technical capability but also the social will to develop it. In 
other words the result must be relevant to broader social 
interests. In spite of his emphasis on practicality, however, 
Layton limits his definition to fundamental knowledge and 
excludes technique, that is knowledge about how to use 
technology.
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Thus Layton demonstrates that even where technology is defined as 
knowledge, the term knowledge itself may result in differing 
emphases and be ascribed different attributes. Indeed, in another 
article he uses it in a different way himself. In this case his 
argument is that science and technology exist as independent 
intellectual activities, each with a significant component of 
independent knowledge and that technology cannot therefore be 
seen simply as the practical implementation of scientific 
knowledge. Consequently he defines technology as:-
  a spectrum, with ideas at one end and
techniques and things at the other, with 
design as a middle term. (43)
So, like Bell, Layton adapts his use of 'technology', in this 
case by adding ideas and technique, to fit the context in which 
he is using it but without offering any global framework to 
relate their differences.
Technological Knowledge as Power
A different orientation to the idea that the essence of 
technology is knowledge is offered by those who see it primarily 
as a resource in power relationships either within organisations 
or in society as a whole. Frequently this is associated with the 
role of professionals and experts. The concept of expertise is a 
natural implementation of the positivist division of knowledge 
into distinct disciplines and the concept of rationality this 
implies (44). Rapp presents the argument thus:-
When discussing the meaning of technological 
actions or the criteria of technical 
decision-making, we cannot avoid a
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'humanistic' reflection on values. If, on the 
other hand, the issue is one of determining 
the range of technically possible solutions 
for a given problem or of predicting the 
physical consequences of any particular 
technological decision, it is only the 
scientist or engineer who can completely 
inform us. (45 - author's emphasis)
Nelkin, however, suggests that the area of conflict is frequently 
one of uncertainty so that '(t)echnical expertise is a crucial 
political resource in conflicts over science and technology'
(46). Hence the different sides employ the testimony of experts 
to support their separate cases. Even so, she argues that this 
reflects an emphasis on technical efficiency as a key criterion 
in the decision-making process. Thus political decisions, which 
she sees as ones involving conflicting economic or moral 
interests, are put 'within the province of experts' (47). Nelkin 
believes that this is contrary to democratic values and 
identifies an increasing unwillingness to accept experts' 
decisions as presenting a growing challenge to technical 
authority and a reassertion of the democratic process.
Like Nelkin, Commoner (48) also highlights the division of 
technical knowledge into areas of expertise. The principal 
consequence, he suggests, is that no single body of knowledge 
encapsulates the full implications of technological decisions. 
Inherent faith in technology itself means that the resolution of 
any problem arising from the unintended consequences of previous 
technology takes the form of further technological action. This 
series of 'fixes' is creating an increasingly unbalanced 
ecological environment which must ultimately lead to a failure of 
the ecological system. However, it is not possible, according to
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Commoner, to avoid this by superficial changes to technology 
through the démocratisation of decision-making. Rather the whole 
epistemological basis which it represents (including its 
scientific underpinning) must be changed from reductionism to an 
holistic view. Commoner believes that this is only possible as 
part of a change in the nature of industrial societies themselves 
(49).
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ABSTRACT VIEWS - TECHNOLOGY AS EPISTEMOLOGY 
Although Commoner still concentrates on the concrete 
implementation of technology, his argument embraces two elements 
which hint at its abstract aspects. Firstly, he recognises its 
epistemological role which goes beyond the direct application of 
specific knowledge and secondly, he proposes an holistic 
alternative which recognises that technology is part of an 
inter-related social whole. Berger et al in a study of 
modernization demonstrate these characteristics in their view of 
technology. They define modernization as:-
  the growth and diffusion of a set of
institutions rooted in the transformation of 
the economy by means of technology. (50)
For them this is not simply a question of new institutions; it 
requires a change in consciouness. Thus, although they do not 
define technology, it is clear that its essential feature for 
them is not the machines or methods it provides but the knowledge 
it employs, and more specifically the weiy of thinking embodied in 
that knowledge. They distinguish between the bodies of knowledge 
required for the execution of a task, and 'the "habits" of 
thinking that pertain to them' (51). Specific knowledge may not 
be directly applicable outside a limited 'technical' sphere and 
yet can involve ways of thinking which may be implemented in a 
wider context. Hence the knowledge required to find errors in a 
computer program has a limited application, but the method of 
ordered investigation it involves might be used in other social 
contexts such as playing Hide and Seek. In this way, a cognitive
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style may become part of a symbolic universe in which the 
knowledge associated with it is not used.
In so-called developed or advanced industrial 
societies, in which technological production 
provides the economic foundation of society 
as a whole, these carry-over effects are 
massive. (52)
Thus, they argue, in the process of modernization the 
consciousness transferred is that associated with the technology 
which is part of that process (53).
A similar point is made by Mowshowitz:-
  science and technology have furnished
more than mere tools for use in dealing with 
the world; they have fostered a disposition 
to view the world in a certain way, and to 
act in accordance with that vision. The tools 
insist on being used in particular ways. (54)
A general concern with social change leads Mowshowitz to a broad 
definition of technology:-
From the viewpoint of social history, 
technology involves the utilization of energy 
and materials in controlled situations to 
modify and organise man's physical and social 
environment. (55)
He focuses his attention on the significance of information in 
modern societies. The increasing complexity of these societies 
and the consequent specialisation and interdependence of their 
institutions, he suggests, makes information a vital element in 
co-ordinating activities within them. He describes the way in 
which complexity has changed the nature of industrial 
organisations, work and government, and suggests that its 
implementation in hierarchical structures supports claims to
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expertise and the need for centralized control. Thus he 
concludes, computers, as one specific implementation of 
technology, are simply tools in the 'subtle process of 
democratizing psychic violence' (56).
One of the best known exponents of the view that technology is a
way of thinking which dominates industrial societies is Jacques
Ellul. He ignores its concrete implementation entirely and 
rejects the term technology because of its use by others to
represent it. He talks instead about technique.
The terra 'technique", as I use it, does not 
mean machines, technology, or this or that 
procedure for attaining an end. In our 
technological society, technique is the 
totality of methods rationally arrii^ed at and 
halting absolute efficiency (for a given .stage 
of development) in field of human
activity ...... Technique is not an isolated
fact in society (as the term technology would 
lead us to believe) but is related to every 
factor in the life of modern man; it affects 
social facts as well as all others. (57 - 
author's emphasis)
Ellul recognises that technique, in the sense of applying 
appropriate means to achieving specified ends, has always been a 
human characteristic. What concerns him is a change in its nature 
during the development of industrial societies. In its new form, 
he argues, it is concerned with finding a single, 'best' method 
in each situation and with applying this approach to more and 
more areas of social life to the point where it becomes the 
epistemolgy of all action.
Ellul identifies the characteristics of technique as:-
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a) the assumption that there is always one best way,
b) self-augmenting, its state at any time implying the need for
further development,
c) being an integral part of society,
d) a whole whose parts are inextricably linked in a way that 
makes it impossible to dispose of individual ones,
e) universal, not limited by the racial, political or economic 
characteristics of a society,
f) being the standard of judgement rather than its object,
g) being autonomous of social constraints and circumventing
natural ones.
Once the point is made that technology is inherent in society and 
imbued with social values, anyone offering an alternative must 
either justify a claim that what they propose is genuinely 
value-free, or accept that new technology will imply new values. 
Habermas takes the former line (58). The latter alternative is 
characterised by Edge's comment that:-
AT (alternative technology) began with the 
realization that advanced, capital-intensive 
Western technology was 'non-neutral': but the 
alternative is not a 'neutral' technology - 
it is a technology committed to different 
values^ (59 - author's emphasis)
Ellul evades the need to make this choice by arguing that his 
work is descriptive rather than prescriptive and makes no 
judgement on the situation he is describing.
However, whilst Ellul claims to be neutral in the debate on 
technological domination, members of the Frankfurt School have 
developed it as a cornerstone in their political stance. An
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indication of their line of argument is given by Heidegger (60).
He recognises what he calls the 'instrumental or anthropological' 
concept of technology but emphasises that its essential nature in 
modern societies is as a way of 'revealing'. He distinguishes 
therefore between traditional technology which employed nature in 
the forms in which it presents itself and modern technology which 
changes nature in order to exploit it. Like Ellul, he sees this 
as a fundamentally new way of viewing the world with significant 
consequences for the discussion of technology.
Because the essence of technology is nothing 
technological, essential reflection upon 
technology and decisive confrontation with it 
must happen in a realm that is, on the one 
hand, akin to the essence of technology and, 
on the other, fundamentally different from 
it. (61)
Heidegger believes that the appropriate area of confrontation is 
art.
Perhaps the most politically influential exponent of the 
Frankfurt School's argument has been Herbert Marcuse, at one time 
a student of Heidegger (62). His ideas were particularly popular 
with participants in the student movements of the 1960's. Marcuse 
describes his position as follows:-
The analysis is focused on advanced 
industrial society, in which the technical 
apparatus of production and distribution 
(with an increasing sector of automation) 
functions, not as the sum-total of mere 
instruments which can be isolated from their 
social and political effects, but rather as a 
system which determines a priori the product 
of the apparatus as well as the operations of
servicing and extending it ..
Technological rationality has become 
political rationality. (63)
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The habit of thinking involved in modern technology, he argues, 
has come to dominate all other forms of thinking in industrial 
societies. By becoming the measure of validity, it has been able 
to stifle all other epistemologies. Hence when MacIntyre (64) 
criticises his argument for being 'only loosely supported by an 
appeal to evidence', Marcuse might respond that MacIntyre is 
making the very assumption as to what constitutes a valid 
argument which Marcuse is criticising. Marcuse believes that the 
only solution to the domination of technological values is their 
complete replacement. However, he is so convinced of the 
domination of technological thinking that he sees little hope of 
establishing an alternative except through the mechanism of 
'utopian' thought which breaks through the one-dimensional 
technical world to negate the negation it represents.
Marcuse's argument is essentially philosophical, but it is given 
empirical expression in Noble's 'America by Design' (65) which is 
strongly influenced by the ideas of the Frankfurt School. Noble's 
object is to explain the failure of the proletarian revolution in 
the United States which he does in terms of the domination of 
technological thinking. His introduction summarises the argument 
as follows:-
This social process called technology, 
moreover, does not exist simply for itself, 
in a world of its own making. It is, rather, 
but one important aspect of the development 
of society as a whole. Since those who 
comprise society are at the same time the 
human material of which technology is 
composed, technology must inescapably reflect 
the contours of that particular social order 
which has produced and sustained it. And like 
any human enterprise, it does not simply
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proceed automatically, but rather contains a 
subjective element which drives it, and 
assumes the particular forms given it by the 
most powerful and forceful people in society,
in struggle with others ..  The primary
thesis of this book is that the history of 
modern technology in America is of a piece 
with that of the rise of corporate 
capitalism. <66)
Noble's argument is directed therefore at a specific 
technological society and not at modern technology as a general 
category. He develops his argument by demonstrating how the 
American science-based industries (especially the chemical and 
electrical industries) were increasingly dominated during their 
formative stage by a few large corporations which were able to 
dictate what research was done, what standards were adopted and 
the content of technical education. Technology did not develop, 
therefore, from an inner imperative, but was steered in 
directions which corresponded with the interests of a dominant 
group. Noble is not proposing a conspiracy theory; he is arguing 
rather that the nature of capitalism constrains choices in 
particular directions, in this case making certain technological 
decisions more likely than others.
By the end of his book. Noble is clearly talking about technology 
primarily as a way of thinking (67). Unlike Ellul, his concern is 
not with the dominance of technological thinking in itself but 
with the way it reinforces the dominance of capitalism, in 
particular that those responsible for developing and using 
industrial technology have been trained to do so in a way which 
furthers that dominance. This is particularly true in the science 
based industries which are not grounded in the traditional milieu 
of small entrepreneurs each developing his/her own technical
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knowledge.
From the outset, therefore, the engineer was 
at the service of capital, and, not 
suprisingly, its laws were to him as natural 
as the laws of science. (68)
Within the limits of the evidence he offers. Noble makes a strong 
case, but he draws that evidence from only one country and for a 
period ending in 1930. He does not deal therefore with national 
differences in capitalist development nor with the substantial 
changes in the nature of both capitalism and science-based 
industry since 1945. Because of his concentration on the abstract 
nature of technology he does not make clear the implications of 
the situation he describes for the machines and processes which 
are developed. He does point out that:-
Even in his strictly technical work the 
engineer brought to his task the spirit of 
the capitalist. His design of machinery, for 
example, was guided as much by the capitalist 
need to minimize both the cost and the 
autonomy of skilled labour as by the desire 
to harness most efficiently the potentials of 
matter and energy. (69)
However, he makes it clear that his main concern is with 
technology as an 'essentially human phenomenon' and not its 
concrete forms. Even so, this comment strikes a discordant note 
within the context of his overall argument. The implication of 
his statement is that technology involves a 'technical' element, 
the most efficient use of the potentials of matter and energy, 
and a social one, the minimization of cost and labour autonomy. 
What he does not acknowledge is that efficiency is itself a 
measure of the results of a process and is therefore defined in a 
specifically capitalist/technological way. The notion of
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efficiency he uses therefore embodies the very way of thinking he 
is criticising.
If this implication were carried through to his main theme it 
would leave him in a position similar to Gendron whereas Werskey 
(70) includes him with Marcuse and Braverman as providing an 
effective critique of the vulgar Marxist neutrality of technology 
thesis by identifying the critical feature of technology as its 
role in giving a theoretical underpinning to capitalism. However 
his concept of technology, according to Werskey, is still 
essentially 'technicist' and fails to embrace Marx's broader 
concept of 'forces of production'. As a result he shares 
Marcuse's pessimism about the possibility of undermining 
capitalism and is:-
...... (tauto-)logically obliged to deduce
that there is no (longer?) contradiction, 
only correspondence, between the forces and 
relations of production that have come to 
prevail in the United States. (71)
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SUMMARY
The use of 'technology* to refer to the fundamental epistemology 
or ideology of a society, takes this review close to the abstract 
extreme of the continuum being explored. At this point the 
specific forms taken by technology and the results of 
technological action, which were the concern of other uses of the 
term, are now seen as insignificant compared with its broader 
social role. Although far from comprehensive, therefore, this 
review has demonstrated the range of meanings attributed to 
technology and the numerous shadings of emphasis between them. It 
has located the different uses on a concrete/abstract continuum 
where those tending towards the concrete pole identify technology 
with machines, processes and knowledge (in a form where it can be 
the property of specific individuals or groups) and those 
favouring an abstract interpretation are principally concerned 
with technology as an epistemology.
The object of this chapter has not been to make a detailed 
examination of these various views, but to indicate the range of 
meanings, implicit and explicit, and the variety of their 
contents. Many of the uses described exclude attributes of 
technology which are to be found in others and in some cases the 
attributes ascribed to technology by different authors are 
contradictory. Frequently this can be explained by a definition 
being tailored to the argument of which it is part. However, the 
object of the chapter has not been to criticise any particular 
use in detail, but to illustrate a general argument that none is 
sufficiently broad to encompass all those attributes which 
severally they ascribe to technology. Even those which
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acknowledge the breadth of meaning which can be given to the 
term, emphasise either its concrete or abstract characteristics, 
and none has demonstrated the significance of the two for each 
other in a useful synthesis of their contrasting attributes.
Having demonstrated this variety and the concrete/abstract 
dichotomy, the next objective of this thesis is to construct a 
basis for a comprehensive synthesis of these two basic 
orientations. That task will proceed in two stages. Firstly it 
will examine the potential for such a synthesis in the positivist 
principles which typically underlie the concrete conceptions of 
technology described above. This approach will be shown to be 
inadequate for the purposes of the thesis and will be rejected. 
The second stage therefore will seek to construct the synthesis 
from a non-positivist position. The work of a number of writers 
will be used to derive a comprehensive conceptualisation of 
technology which takes account of both its concrete and abstract 
elements. The remainder of the thesis will then demonstrate the 
understanding to be afforded by that synthetic concept.
62
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
1. Winner L. 'Autonomous Technology:
Technics-Out-of-Control as a Theme in Political 
Thought', 1977, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass, p. 10
Technology is not the only concept to experience this 
phenomenon, see for example Larrain J. 'The Concept of 
Ideology', 1979, Hutchinson, London.
2. The confusion over formal uses of 'technology' is
complicated by the use of other terms dealing with 
similar phenomena, for example 'technical' (Aron R. 
'Progress and Disillusion: the Dialectics of Modern 
Society', 1972, Penguin, Harmondsworth), 'technics'
(Mumford L. 'The Myth of the Machine: Technics and 
Human Development', 1967. Seeker and Warburg, London), 
and 'technique' (Ellul J. 'The Technological Society', 
1965, Jonathan Cape, London). For the purpose of this 
survey these have been treated as references to the 
same global phenomenon whilst recognising the authors* 
reasons for using different terms.
3. Aron R. 1972 op cit. p. 15
4. Rapp F. 'Analytical Philosophy of Technology', 1981, D
Reidel, Dordrecht
5. Ibid. p. 19
6. Gendron B. 'Technology and the Human Condition', 1977,
St. Martin's Press, New York
7. Say les L.R. 'Behaviour of Industrial Work Groups',
1958, Wiley, New York
8. Silverman D. 'The Theory of Organisations', 1970,
Heinemann, London, p. 104
9. Blauner R. 'Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker
and his Industry', 1964, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago
10. Woodward J. 'Industrial Organisation: Theory and
Practice', 1965, Oxford University Press, London
11. Perrow C. 'Complex Organisations: A Critical Essay',
1972, Scott Foresman, Glenview, p. 168
12. Gallie D. 'In Search of the New Working Class', 1978,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 34
63
13. Rose M.J. 'Industrial Behaviour - Theoretical
Developments since Taylor', 1975, Allen Lane, London.
Organisational theory has proved a fruitful ground for 
examining theoretical assumptions, see for example 
Burrell G. and Morgan G. 'Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisational Analysis', 1979, Heinemann, London.
14. Pfeffer J. 'Organisational Design', 1978, AHM,
Arlington Heights 111.
15. e.g. Edwards R.C. et al (Eds.) 'Labour Market
Segmentation'. 1975. D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington 
Mass. and Woodward J. 'Industrial Organisation:
Behaviour and Control', 1970, Oxford University Press, 
London
16. Pfeffer J. 1978 op cit. pp. 94-5
17. Godelier makes a similar comment with regard to one
commonly adopted definition of economics:-
Here, however, we come upon a 
paradox, since the very 
subject-matter of economics as 
defined by the majority of 
present-day economists is nothing 
else than the subject-matter of the 
formal theory of purposive action 
(Godelier M. 'Rationality and 
Irrationality in Economics', 1972,
New Left Books, London, pp. 12-13)
18. Price D.J. 'Science and Technology: Distinctions and
Interrelationships' in Barnes B. (Ed.), 'Sociology of 
Science', 1972, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 172
19. Lawless E.W. 'Technology and Social Shock', 1977,
Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, p. 8
20. see for example Nelkin D. 'Science, Technology, and
Political Conflict: Analyzing the Issues' in Nelkin D. 
(Ed.), 'Controversy: Politics of Technological 
Decisions', 1979. Sage, London
21. Ackroyd C. et al 'The Technology of Political Control',
1977. Penguin, Harmondsworth
22. Ibid. p. 19 (footnote)
23. Ibid. p. 20
24. Gendron B. 1977 op cit. p. 236
25. Ibid. p. 23
64
26. Elliott D.A. & R. 'The Control of Technology', 1976,
Wykeham Publications, London, pp. v-vi
27. Ibid. p. vii
28. Ibid. p. 3
29. Ibid. p. 49
30. Fores M. 'Technological Change and Innovation' in Bowe
C. (Ed.), 'Industrial Efficiency and the Role of 
Government', 1977. HMSO, London
31. Freeman C. 'Economics of Research and Develpment' in
Spiegel-Rosing I. & Price D.J. (Eds.), 'Science,
Technology and Society', 1977. Sage, London, p. 225
32. Bell D. 'The Coming of Post-Industrial Society', 1974,
Heinemann, London
33. Ibid. pp. 175 & 176
34. Ibid. p. 11
35. Ibid. p. 212
36. Ibid. p. 112
37. Ibid. p. 196
38. Freeman C. 1977 op cit. p. 225
39. Johnston R.D. 'The Internal Structure of Technology' in
Halmos P. (Ed.), 'The Sociology of Science', 1972, 
University of Keele, p. 122
40. see chapter 4.
41. Kuppers G. 'On the Relation between Technology and
Science' in Krohn W. et al (Eds.), 'The Dynamics of 
Science and Technology', 1978, D Reidel, Dordrecht, p. 
118
42. Layton E. 'Conditions of Technological Development' in
Spiegel-Rosing I. & Price D.J. (Eds.), 'Science,
Technology and Society', 1977, Sage, London
43. Layton E. 'Technology as Knowledge' in Technology and
Culture Vol. 15/1 Jan. 1974, pp. 37-8
44. see chapter 3 for a discussion of this characteristic of
positivism and chapters 7 and 8 for one on expert 
computer systems and their implications.
45. Rapp F. 1981 op cit. p. 3
46. Nelkin D. 1979 op cit. p. 15
65
47. Ibid. p. 9
48. Commoner B. 'The Closing Circle', 1972, Jonathan Cape,
London
49. Dickson offers a variation of this view which begins
from a need to radically change society and recognises 
the similarly radical consequences for technology: see 
Dickson D. 'Alternative Technology', 1974, Fontana, 
London.
50. Berger P. et al 'The Homeless Mind', 1973, Random
House, New York, p. 9
51. Ibid. p. 15
52. Ibid. p. 39
53. Berger et al are discussed further in chapter 3.
54. Mowshowitz A. 'The Conquest of Will', 1976,
Addison-Wesley, Reading Mass., p. 8
55. Ibid. p. 10
56. Ibid. p. 245
57. Ellul J. 1964 op cit. p. xxxiii
58. This will be discussed in chapter 4
59. quoted in Lipscombe J. & Williams B. 'Are Science and
Technology Neutral?', 1979, Butterworths, London, p. 37
60. Heidegger M. 'The Question Concerning Technology' in
Krell D.F. (Ed.), 'Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings',
1978, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London
61. Ibid. p. 317
62. It must be recognised that the Frankfurt School
encompasses a number of expressions of this view. See 
for example Habermas J. 'Toward a Rational Society', 
1971, Heinemann, London
63. Marcuse H. 'One Dimensional Man', 1972, Abacus, London,
pp. 13 & 14
64. MacIntyre A. 'Marcuse', 1970, Fontana, London
65. Noble D.F. 'America by Design', 1977, Knopf, New York
66. Ibid. pp. xxii-xxiii
67. see Werskey G. 'Review of "America by Design'" in
Radical Science Journal No. 8, 1979
68. Noble D. 1977 op cit. p. 34
66
69. Ibid. p. 34
70. Werskey G. 1979 op cit.
71. Ibid. p. 115
67
CHAPTER 3
THE POSSIBILITY OF A POSITIVIST SYNTHESIS 
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CONCEPT
The last chapter surveyed a number of uses of 'technology' and 
found that each emphasised either its concrete or abstract 
attributes. This chapter begins the search for a 
conceptualisation which synthesises these alternative 
orientations. To this end it offers a critical assessment of the 
possibility that this synthesis can be based on positivist 
principles. In particular, it discusses the mechanistic 
epistemology derived from positivism which underlies the 
commonsense meanings given to technology in modern industrial 
societies and those discussed in the last chapter which displayed 
an inclination to its concrete attributes.
This discussion will be developed in two phases. Firstly, it will 
describe various facets of mechanistic thinking and demonstrate 
their mutual support for each other. Subsequently, the 
limitations this imposes on the possibility of a synthesis of the 
concrete and abstract aspects of technology will be identified. 
Two central points will emerge from this discussion. The first is 
the key role in mechanistic thinking played by its assumption 
that any whole can be fully defined in terms of discrete 
components and their relationships within the whole. This, it 
will be argued, excludes the possibility that the whole may have
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attributes or potentials which cannot be identified in this way 
and are uniquely relevant to the composite whole. The second 
point to result from this discussion is the assumption in 
positivism, based on its claim to objectivity, that it 
constitutes the only valid basis for obtaining and assessing 
scientific knowledge. This assumption will be seen to preclude 
the possibility of overcoming the limitations identified in the 
first point. As a result, positivist/mechanistic principles will 
not be found to offer a basis for a synthetic concept of 
technology.
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PRINCIPLES OF THE POSITIVIST VIEW OF TECHNOLOGY 
The Idea of Wholes and the Resolution of Complexity 
Although methods and terminology derived from the mechanistic 
concept of technology have become commonplace in popular 
literature and conversation, that concept is far from simplistic. 
On examination it will be found to consist of a number of 
principles and assumptions which together contribute to a complex 
entity. Berger et al (1) list its main elements as:-
a) the idea that wholes can be broken into discrete components,
b) the idea that a whole can be (re)constructed from a number
of parts in a rational, controllable and predictable way,
c) the assumption of maximisation i.e. most gained for least
effort is best,
d) the separation of means from ends,
e) the abstraction of action into an end in itself.
The principle of wholeness contained in the first two elements is 
the key to mechanistic thinking. It states that any totality can 
be reduced to a number of discrete and basic elements whose 
relationships with each other, and with the whole, can be fully 
and precisely defined. The corollary of this principle is that 
the same parts can be reassembled so that the original whole is 
reconstructed, or that they can be rearranged to produce a 
predictable alternative. There is no place, therefore, for the 
idea that a whole may embody elements which are unique to itself 
and cannot be derived from its constituents, or which are context 
dependent in any fundamental sense. The whole must always be a 
simple aggregate of its parts.
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This approach is typified by functional engineering where 
individual components, with known inputs and outputs, are 
arranged in different sequences to create ’machines*. These may 
in turn become part of larger machines or processes. The division 
of labour applies this same principle to processes involving 
people. By reducing tasks to a series of separate operations, 
individuals may specialise in a limited part of the whole 
process. Like the elements of a machine, therefore, they need 
only be concerned with their immediate inputs and outputs and 
have no need to understand the process in its entirety.
This particular view of wholes gives rise to a number of other 
notions whose integrity is dependent on its assumptions. It 
leads, for example, to a specific view of complexity and methods 
of dealing with it. Mechanistic thinking does not, in itself lead 
to complexity; indeed one of the criteria for judging a 
scientific theory is its simplicity (2). None-the-less, so many 
features and institutions of modern Industrial societies are both 
larger and more complex than those in other types of society, 
that according to Mowshowitz-;
Contemporary society exhibits a prodigal 
degree of complexity in its division of 
labour, interdependent functions, and large, 
mobile populations. Our economic, political, 
and cultural affairs are conducted as 
large-scale enterprises which require 
specialized structures for coordination and 
control. (3)
Furthermore, as these structures develop and create new demands 
for coordination, so they make possible even greater size and 
complexity through what has become a self-perpetuating process.
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Hence Pollard (4) identifies the growth in the size of industrial 
units as a major stimulant to the development of new management 
techniques. Mowshowitz highlights the political implications of 
this same tendency.
In the context of social development, the 
argument from complexity is used to support 
the contention that consolidation of power in 
centralized bureaucracies is both natural and 
essential to the preservation of society.
This justification for the concentration of 
authority feeds on the widespread acceptance 
of the expert as the arbiter of complex 
problems. (5)
The principal method applied in the mechanistic resolution of 
complexity is that of ’divide and conquer*. In other words, a 
complex situation is reduced to a series of simpler ones whose 
individual resolution will amount to a total solution of the more 
complex whole. This approach is clearly grounded in the concept 
of wholes identified above without which it would not be possible 
to assume that the original whole can be reconstructed. In the 
same way, the proliferation and increasing complexity of 
knowledge in industrial societies has led to specialisation, the 
demarcation of academic disciplines and the establishment of 
areas of expertise.
The mechanistic resolution of complexity therefore gives rise to 
a specific notion of ’problem* which limits the knowledge and 
expertise applicable to any situation. Identifying a problem 
brackets out questions and makes assumptions which define a 
limited search area for its solution. Kuhn (6) uses the concept 
of paradigm to describe how the formulation of ’problems* in 
science is constrained within a specific set of assumptions with
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significant consequences for the knowledge resulting from their 
resolution. Others show how the concept of ’problem* is employed 
by sources external to science in determining directions for 
research (7). In the social sciences for example, the research 
which attracts funding is that directed towards solving social 
’problems* such as racial unrest, industrial performance and 
crime. Here, as in the natural sciences, the formulation of the 
problem may mask the assumptions being made. Thus if unemployment 
is defined as a problem, the measure of a solution is its ability 
to reduce the numbers of unemployed and yet this excludes 
consideration of alternatives which question the definition of 
unemployment as a problem, for example the argument that what is 
needed is a policy for increased leisure (8).
Efficiency
This approach to complexity is supported by another feature of 
the mechanistic view which Berger et al call ’the assumption of 
maximisation* and which I shall call ’efficiency*. The term 
efficiency is derived directly from mechanics where it is applied 
to any process transforming energy from one form to another. In 
such a process some of the force input is absorbed in doing the 
work of transformation so that the energy embedded in the output 
is necessarily less than that originally input. Efficiency is a 
measure of the energy lost and is defined as the ratio of useful 
work done to the total force applied. In riding a bicycle, 
therefore, this would be the ratio of energy expended to the 
distance travelled and pedalling with the brakes on would be 
singularly inefficient.
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In its broader role within the mechanistic epistemology, however, 
the term efficiency has undergone a significant change. This is 
characterised in market economics by the fact that output is no 
longer measured in terms of useful work done. Instead, the 
measure is the market value of the resulting commodity and the 
output of a process is expected to increase in value not 
decrease. Efficiency therefore becomes the ratio between the 
change in the market value of the output and the costs of its 
production. The role of management is to manipulate these 
variables to maximise efficiency, that is the increase in value, 
for example by changing labour costs through the use of a new 
machine or a change in rates of pay.
Applying this concept of efficiency to the division of labour was 
seen by Babbage (9) to provide a number of benefits;-
a) the costs of training are reduced because each worker only 
needs knowledge of a limited part of the production process,
b) the individual worker will perform a task better, i.e. more
productively, because he/she is skilled in only one 
operation,
e) the less skilful operations can be performed by workers paid
the appropriate rate for the level of skill required rather 
than craftsmen being paid for work not requiring their 
skills.
Babbage’s main preoccupation, as we shall see in chapter 5. was 
with the construction of calculating machines. In this activity, 
mathematics and engineering provided the principles on which his
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designs were based. In his discussion of industrial organisation, 
the application of the same mechanistic ’principles of 
generalization’ is quite explicit;-
The present volume may be considered as one 
of the consequences that have resulted from 
the Calculating-Engine, the construction of 
which I have been so long superintending.
(10)
Quantification
Directly related to the concept of efficiency is that of 
quantification. As Sklair notes in discussing the measurement of 
efficiency in terms of an increase in monetary value.
This type of cost-benefit analysis ... is
consistent with a basic tenet of 
techno-economism, namely that all worthwhile 
things are measurable and all important 
problems can be solved by its methods. (11)
Hence Giddens comments that:-
In Weber’s view, rational book-keeping 
constitutes the most integral expression of 
what makes the modern type of capitalist 
production dissimilar to prior sorts of 
capitalistic activity such as usury or 
adventurers’ capitalism. The circumstances 
which Weber details as necessary to the 
existence of capital accounting in stable 
productive enterprises constitute those which 
Weber accepts as the basic prerequisites of 
modern capitalism ..  (12)
Double-entry book-keeping typifies the disposition to quantify 
both as a monetary measure of efficiency and as a means of 
managing large and complex organisations. It is no coincidence 
that Babbage was both an advocate of the principles of 
industrialism and a founder member of the Statistical Society in 
England.
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This concern with quantification is rooted in the origins of 
mechanistic thinking in the natural and physical sciences.
However the significant feature in the present context is the 
disposition to apply it to areas of study with no direct 
relationship to this origin. Boudon, for example, believes that 
he can justify its use in the social sciences by an appeal to the 
’scientific* status it denotes.
In what follows, we have done our best to 
illustrate one of the essential functions of 
mathematics - perhaps the essential function 
- which is clarification. When a discipline 
achieves scientific maturity, this is almost 
always correlated with at least partial 
mathematization. (13 - author’s emphasis)
Rationality, Prediction and Control
Not all organisations in industrial societies are engaged in 
commodity production with its direct measure of efficiency in 
terms of monetary value. However, their efficiency is still 
assessed, if not quantitatively, then in terms of their 
rationality. The mechanistic concept of rationality is concerned 
with the application of appropriate means to the achievement of 
ends and is encompassed in the fourth principle listed by Berger 
et al. For action to be rational the actor must have a clear 
objective and choose the most efficient means of achieving it. 
This always assumes that the actor can predict the consequences 
of the action proposed. Positivist science formalises this 
rationality in axiomtic causal relationships in which the result 
of changing any one parameter can be calculated in terms of its 
effect on the others. However this ability to predict the 
consequences of change is not an end in itself. It is one step
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towards being able to control the process of change and to 
manufacture desired situations. Indeed some would argue that the 
facility to control is a necessary component of any knowledge 
claiming to be scientific (14).
When mechanistic rationality is applied outside the natural and 
physical sciences these elements of predictability and control 
still feature. The introduction of the factory system had the 
objective of regulating the quality and quantity of production in 
a way which was not possible with domestic workers. Its 
development through the division of labour has provided a means 
of both predicting the level of output and controlling the 
labourer (15), for example through the concentration of 
information in the hands of managers (l6).
Organisations may also attempt to exert control on external 
factors, for example, by political lobbying, advertising and 
sponsorship of sympathetic individuals and organisations. The 
same objective is also manifest in the tendency towards company 
mergers and the growth of multinationals. Two types of merger can 
be explained directly in terms of the increasing external control 
they offer. On the one hand, where companies operating in the 
same market merge, there is a tendency to monopoly which 
minimises the uncertainty of competition. On the other hand, the 
integration of companies at different stages in the same chain of 
production aims to reduce uncertainty by controlling either 
suppliers or markets. Another aspect of control and risk 
minimisation in industry is the increasing role of the state in 
the economy where it has been both a financier and a guaranteed
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market without which some risk ventures may not have been 
undertaken. The state also reduces costs to industry by 
redistributing social costs such as pollution and training (17).
In maximising their ability to predict and control, organisations 
are applying the mechanistic concept of rationality by ensuring 
that the means they adopt are those most likely to achieve their 
end. Thus if:-
  one understands rationality to be the
effective, logical ordering of technological 
parts, then systems which seek to control 
their own ends are the epitome of the 
rational process. (18)
The part played by the assumption of control in the cognitive 
style of industrial societies is also demonstrated in 
relationships between people and nature. Mechanistic thinking 
encourages the view that nature exists to meet human needs and 
should, where necessary, be changed to achieve this. Much of the 
impetus for technological innovation has been derived from the 
urge to ’control*, ’tame’ or ’modify’ nature. A central feature 
of the industrial revolution in ninteenth century Britain was 
increasing control over sources of mechanical power which 
replaced the uncertainty of wind, water and the direct 
application of human muscle-power with the steam engine, whose 
power and performance were both predictable and controllable.
However, application of the mechanistic principle of control has 
not been limited to industrial machinery or processes; it has 
also been applied to relationships between people, converting 
*..  spontaneous and unreflective behaviour into behaviour
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that is deliberate and rationalized.’ (19). Thus job training 
often involves instruction in how to deal with people, and bodies 
of knowledge have developed around the notion of social 
engineering. Work on artificial intelligence also assumes a 
mechanistic model of human expertise and thought processes (20). 
The mechanistic rationality and its predilection to control have, 
therefore, become deeply ingrained in the social fabric of 
industrial societies. Indeed, as Winner (21) points out, fears of 
autonomous technology arise precisely because of the belief that 
people should be able to control those things they have created.
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THE POSITIVIST ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
This discussion has not been concerned with the various forms of 
positivism, nor has it engaged in theoretical analysis and 
critique. Rather it has identified the key components of the 
positivist view of technology in order to assess the practical 
possibilities of constructing a synthetic definition from it 
(22). This discussion has concerned itself, therefore, not with 
the philosophical principles of positivism, but with the 
mechanistic paradigm derived from them. It is this paradigm which 
informs not only many formal uses of ’technology*, but also its 
commonsense meaning in modern industrial societies.
This mechanistic concept of technology has not always been the 
dominant commonsense view. Aristotle, for example, represented 
technology as knowledge of both how and why things occur. Only in 
more recent times has a distinction been made between technology 
and science, that is between principles and their manifestation 
in the world, with the result that the role of technology has 
been redefined as the practical application of the knowledge 
resulting from science. Layton (23) traces this schism to Galileo 
whose main contribution to science, he suggests, was to show that 
all machines are based on the same principles of force and that 
these principles can be expressed mathematically (24). Thus 
science has become the formal investigation and expression of the 
axiomatic laws of nature whose existence is unaffected by their 
application.
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During the seventeenth century this idea of an objective and 
mechanistic world was established philosophically by Pascal and 
scientifically through the success of Newton’s physics. The 
mechanistic view banished mankind from the centre of the world 
stage and, at the same time, led to a differentiation between the 
natural forces which are the object of scientific study and final 
causes which are the subject of faith and religion. Burtt gives 
some indication of the extent and significance of the change this 
represented when he says that it led to new conceptions of 
reality, causality and the human mind and that:-
These changes have conditioned practically 
the whole of modern exact thinking. (25)
A more recent shift in the meaning of technology was discussed in 
the work of some of the writers considered in the last chapter 
who differentiated between traditional and modern technology
(26). The year 1945 is often taken to be a critical point in this 
transition. Prior to that date there was ample evidence of the 
increasingly significant role of mechanistic principles both as a 
way of thinking and in their concrete application, but the Second 
World War concentrated and accelerated many of these developments
(27). Among the resulting changes was the establishment or rapid 
expansion of industries based on science and technology such as 
electronics, motor vehicles, aircraft and chemicals. Machines 
became part of the everyday working experience of an increasing 
number of people both on the factory floor and through the 
development of domestic and office machinery such as washing 
machines and computers. At the same time there was an increase in 
the size and complexity of organisations especially those in 
industry and the state.
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However, the main consequence discussed by authors like Heidegger 
and Ellul is not the concrete implementations of technology, but 
the final establishment of the mechanistic concept of technology, 
and its underlying positivist principles, as the cognitive style 
of modern industrial societies. The cognitive style of a society 
embodies the principles applied to the acquisition and 
application of knowledge. In some societies there may be 
different styles for different spheres of social activity such as 
religion, science and personal interaction. This shift in the 
meaning of ’technology’, however, is typically seen to involve 
the infusion of mechanistic thinking into every sphere of 
society.
It is possible to identify numerous ways in which this cognitive 
style pervades the social life of its host societies. Lipscombe 
and Williams (28) demonstrate how everyday metaphors reflect an 
’engineering mentality’ and Ziman (29) shows how its assumptions 
are built into education. The work of E.W. Taylor (30) assumed 
that workers could be treated like machines, and although the 
application of his ideas has lost some of its original starkness. 
Rose (31) argues that they still represent the basis of 
management thinking. On a wider scale Habermas (32) believes that 
the centralised state has had to rely increasingly for its 
legitimation on its claim to fulfil the role of technical expert 
in the maintenance of the complex social system.
Underlying this pervasive tendency within mechanistic thinking is 
the assumption, inherent in positivism, that it promotes
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knowledge which is free of subjective and socially imposed 
values. Consequent on this assumption is a claim to be the only 
valid basis for obtaining and assessing ’scientific* knowledge. 
Hence the various facets of the mechanistic model derive their 
legitimacy from an assumed independence from normative influences 
and the corresponding assumption that they represent the natural 
mode of human thought. This principle of neutrality arose 
originally both from the political expediency of identifying 
distinct spheres of concern for science and religion (33) and 
from the desire of scientists to represent their findings as 
objective truths of the natural world. Hence Lipscombe and 
Williams quote Galileo as saying that;-
  the conclusions of natural science are
true and necessary, and the judgement of man 
has nothing to do with them. (34 - emphasised 
in original)
The translation of this principle to technology allows the 
knowledge used in its construction to assume an objective status 
whilst the ends to which it is applied may still be socially 
determined. The idea of neutrality has been translated almost 
without modification, therefore, from its original application in 
the physical and natural sciences to every sphere of knowledge 
which invokes mechanistic thinking.
This argument is developed by Berger et al in ’The Homeless Mind’ 
(35) in which they distinguish between the knowledge relevant to 
a particular task and the cognitive style associated with it. The 
significance of this distinction is that while technical 
knowledge may not be transferable from its immediate domain of 
application, its cognitive style may be carried over into other
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spheres of activity. According to Berger et al this is what has 
happened with the cognitive style of ’technological production’ 
which has been subject to massive carry over from work 
situations, where it is appropriate, into non-work situations 
where it is not. Thus it has become part of the symbolic universe 
of people not directly applying the knowledge associated with it 
and has become an established world view with its own dynamic 
independent of specific social institutions.
Thus we see that the mechanistic concept of technology is 
grounded in a set of interrelated concepts which together define 
appropriate means of acquiring and expressing knowledge. They 
also define the status of that knowledge and the reality which it 
represents. Whilst Berger et al are critical of the transfer of 
mechanistic thinking to non-work situations, they accept its 
validity in technical and production activities (36). The purpose 
of this chapter, however, is to examine that assumption. As the 
last chapter showed, the positivist/concrete view has typically 
led to a concrete conception of technology. The question to be 
answered, therefore, is whether it can also account for the 
abstract nature of technology and therefore produce a 
comprehensive understanding of it.
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LIMITATIONS OF THE MECHANISTIC VIEW OF TECHNOLOGY 
Overview
The following discussion will argue that the principles of 
mechanistic thinking described above embody limitations which 
preclude them as a basis for a synthetic concept of technology. 
The discussion is presented in three parts. Firstly, it offers 
evidence from the sociology of knowledge that positivist 
assumptions about the special status of scientific knowledge, 
arising from its claim to objectivity, cannot be sustained in 
practice because the methods used to obtain that knowledge employ 
the same cultural resources as other forms of social interaction 
and their results must therefore be ascribed a similar status.
The second part of the discussion illustrates that not only do 
the methods of scientific research not conform to positivist 
principles, but that the resulting knowledge may itself question 
the validity of the mechanistic model of nature. The final part 
then shows that inherent in the principles of positivism, and its 
mechanistic derivative, is the assumption that only knowledge 
resulting from the application of its principles and conforming 
to them is valid scientific knowledge. The contradiction between 
this assumption and evidence from the sociology of knowledge and 
the results of scientific research constitutes the case for 
rejecting positivism as a basis for the construction of a 
synthetic concept of technology.
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The Sociological Evidence
Sociological studies of scientific knowledge are especially 
significant in identifying the limitations of
positivist/mechanistic principles because they address a subject 
which both epitomises their application and provides the basis of 
their relevance to technology. Mulkay (37) identifies two 
contrasting views presented by the sociology of science. The 
first he calls the ’Customary View of Science’.
This is the dominant perspective which treats 
science as a special sociological case. 
Scientific knowledge is regarded as 
epistemologically unique - as consisting 
basically of observation statements which 
have been firmly established by the 
controlled, rigorous procedures of scientific 
method. The corpus of certified scientific 
knowledge is thought to represent, with 
increasing accuracy and completeness, the 
truth about the physical world. (38)
The second view is a result of the growing evidence which 
contradicts the first and presents:-
  an alternative perspective which
argues that the procedures and conclusions of 
science are, like all other cultural 
products, the contingent outcome of 
interpretive social acts. It is argued that 
the empirical findings of science are 
intrinsically inconclusive and that the 
factual as well as the theoretical assertions 
of science depend on speculative and socially 
derived assumptions. It is also suggested 
that the general criteria by which scientific 
knowledge-claims are assessed (such as 
consonance with the evidence, replicability, 
and the like) have no meaning until they are 
interpreted in terms of the scientists’ 
particular intellectual commitments and in 
relation to specific interpretive and social 
contexts. (39)
Hence, this new view rejects the positivist assumption of special 
status for the content of scientific knowledge and its consequent
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exclusion from sociological analysis. The key to this rejection 
is the treatment of knowledge-claims and the assumption that the 
criteria used in assessing them are objective and consistent in 
every case. This assumption is based on the belief that the 
subject matter of science is a physical world whose truths can be 
progressively revealed by the process of scientific examination. 
However, as Mulkay argues, claims to scientific knowledge are 
typically made for theoretical interpretations of observations 
rather than the observations themselves and yet the meaning of 
those observations may be subject to different interpretations.
We cannot say, therefore, that scientific knowledge is ’based on 
a direct representation of the physical world’ because there is 
’nothing in the physical world which uniquely determines the 
conclusions of [the modern scientific] community’. As a result, 
it ’necessarily offers an account of the physical world which is 
mediated through the available cultural resources; and these 
resources are in no way definitive’ (40). Once this foundation is 
removed from science, Mulkay suggests, there is no reason to 
treat the knowledge it offers as a special category which is not 
amenable to sociological analysis.
This argument has a direct relevance to the discussion of 
technology in that the fundamental knowledge on which technology 
is based is attributed the same status as scientific knowledge 
and may even be presented as evidence of the validity of that 
knowledge (41). Mulkay vigorously challenges this second claim, 
arguing firstly, that there is no necessary link between 
successful technology and basic scientific knowledge, and 
secondly, that even where such a link does exist, this does not
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grant any validity to the scientific knowledge. However, 
positivist science is obliged to reject this argument because the 
methods by which most scientific observations are made themselves 
involve the use of technological instruments. If these were not 
based on sound scientific principles, then clearly their results 
could not form the basis of scientific knowledge. Indeed, some of 
the case studies reported by Mulkay, which support the new 
sociology of science, demonstrate quite clearly that negotiation 
over the adequacy of scientific developments is often really 
about the adequacy of the technological instruments being used. 
There is even a case for arguing that modern scientific research 
requires such complex technology that what is really being 
assessed in many cases is the technology itself. Thus, Pinch 
points out, the instruments which todays scientists treat as 
unquestioned ’black boxes’ are themselves the outcome of a 
process of negotiation and closure. Thus:-
In a way the black boxing of instruments can 
be seen to be what scientists are aiming 
towards. Problematic social links between an 
evidential context and an instrument not only 
become frozen but such instruments can be 
used to establish new evidential contexts or 
make further links in the networks of 
evidential contexts and pieces of apparatus. 
(42)
Two examples cited by Mulkay are based on studies by Collins. The 
first concerns the development of a particular type of laser 
called a ’TEA laser’. The study of its development shows how, in 
the initial stages, interaction between various groups attempting 
to construct a laser had to be personal rather than formal 
because their members could not formulate clear ’principles of
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construction* (43) which if adopted would enable the replication 
of previous results. Indeed, some scientists who successfully 
constructed a laser were still unable to communicate how their 
results could be reproduced. In the second example Collins 
discusses research into gravitational waves. In this case there 
was broad agreement on the basic theory and the type of 
instrument needed to detect the waves. Consequently it might be 
argued that the scientists were engaged in a standard attempt to 
replicate or refute each other’s knowledge claims. Collins 
illustrates, however, that, in practice, the research process 
involved negotiation on how those knowledge claims could be
assessed and there was considerable discussion ’..  to
establish what should count as a ’’working gravity wave 
detector”.’ (44).
These examples conform to Aspinall’s generalised description of 
the development of new technology in which the first stage of 
development, which he calls ’infancy’, involves intuitive and 
pioneering work including a search for settled principles of 
design. In the next, ’adolescent’ stage:-
The inventions best fitted to serve the most 
important uses survive, and definitive forms 
for accepted devices become extant. At some 
time during adolescence, the collection of 
inventions reaches the status of a body of 
knowledge, which becomes the basis for 
design. Design criteria and principles of
good practice begin to emerge. (45)
Another example discussed by Mulkay is Wynne’s study of Barkla’s 
work on X-ray emissions (46). Initially this revolved around a
particular low-intensity emission whch Barkla called the
J-phenomenon. At first his ideas and experimental results were
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accepted by other physicists, but subsequently they were subject 
to increasing criticism as other experimental results 
contradicted them. Although Barkla revised his own theoretical 
position over time, he was still unwilling to accept the 
judgement of his peers and became increasingly isolated from the 
scientific community. What is significant about this case for the 
new sociology of science, is not whether Barkla’s theory was 
’correct’, but that its rejection was not the consequence of an 
objective discussion of its theoretical validity or experimental 
results, as the scientific method requires. Instead it took the 
form of personal attacks and misrepresentations of his ideas 
together with the exercise of institutional power by withholding 
academic recognition and resources from anyone associating with 
him.
For the purpose of this chapter, the important aspect of the 
debate is Barkla’s rejection of the accepted experimental 
technology and his consequent challenge to fundamental positivist 
principles. Many of the results which contradicted his own were 
obtained with an instrument called a spectrometer. Barkla argued, 
however, that the rays he was interested in were of such low 
intensity as to be unmeasurable by this instrument. He therefore 
continued to use an older, if less technically sophisticated 
method. Furthermore, he argued:-
  heterogeneous X-ray beams do not
always behave as a simple linear sum of 
individual wavelength components (a basic 
premise of orthodox spectrometer analysis), 
but rather as an ’organic whole’. (47)
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As a result:-
He continued to reject the use of the 
spectrometer and some of the scientific 
assumptions associated with that technique.
He maintained that the fashionable research 
technology forced nature to fit 
preconceptions built into the design of the 
major instrument and that the discovery of 
fundamental results was sacrificed for highly 
precise routine measurements. (48)
It will be clear, therefore, how violently Barkla’s ideas 
contradicted scientific orthodoxy and the mechanistic principles 
identified earlier in this chapter.
The sociological demonstration of the limitations of 
positivist/mechanistic principles rests, therefore, on the 
argument that scientists themselves do not apply the scientific 
method required by those principles. Instead, they are involved 
in a social process from which emerge agreed principles supported 
and maintained by social mechanisms including mores and 
sanctions. As a result, legitimacy based on the assumption of 
objectivity, and thus the claim of a special status for 
scientific knowlege, are not sustained in practice.
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The Scientific Evidence
Sociological studies show that the research process of science 
does not conform to the positivist model. There is also evidence 
that the results of research cannot always be explained using the 
mechanistic model of nature. One of the most compelling examples 
of this phenomenon is provided by atomic physics. Scientists 
working in this field have been forced to recognise the 
explanatory limitations of Newton’s mechanistic model of nature 
and in its place have adopted an alternative view in the form of 
the quantum and relativity theories. These represent nature as an 
inherently unstable and constantly changing whole whose 
relationships are intricately interwoven.
Quantum theory thus reveals a basic oneness 
of the universe. It shows that we cannot 
decompose the world into independently 
existing smallest units. As we penetrate into 
matter, nature does not show us any isolated 
’basic building blocks’, but rather appears 
as a complicated web of relations between the 
various parts of the whole. These relations 
always include the observer in an essential 
way. (49)
Thus the Cartesian dualism of subject and object is transcended 
and, as Capra is concerned to point out, there are significant 
parallels between this new conception of nature and traditional 
mystical thinking.
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Quantum theory forces us to see the universe 
not as a collection of physical objects, but 
rather as a complicated web of relations 
between the various parts of a unified whole. 
This, however, is the way in which Eastern 
mystics have experienced the world, and some 
of them have expressed their experience in 
words which are almost identical with those
used by atomic physicists ... The idea of
’participation instead of observation’ has 
been formulated in modern physics only 
recently, but it is an idea which is well 
known to any student of mysticism. (50)
Physics is not the only scientific sphere in which the 
mechanistic model is proving inadequate for expressing complex 
and abstract ideas. Mathematics too has begun to evolve new 
approaches, some of which question the adequacy of existing 
methods and representations for expressing some types of 
complexity. One area in which this has occurred is the field of 
catastrophe theory which is concerned with modelling situations 
where continuous causes have discontinuous and divergent effects. 
Such situations occur in the natural world when waves break on 
the shore-line, and in the social world when political unrest is 
translated into war. Commenting on the originator of catastrophe 
theory, Zeeman says:-
Thom was forced to invent catastrophe theory 
in order to provide himself with a canvas 
large enough to display the diversity of his 
interests. Ever since the disappearance of 
natural philosophy from our universities and 
the fragmentation of mathematicians into pure 
and applied, our canvases have steadily been 
growing smaller and smaller. At least 
catastrophe theory marks a revival of natural 
philosophy, to be enjoyed once again for a 
while at any rate. (51)
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Zeeman himself argues that;-
Human behaviour is infinitely more complex 
and more mysterious and more delicately 
beautiful than could ever be explained by any 
analysis. (52)
Thom sees his work as beginning to question the assumption that 
knowledge must be presented mathematically; indeed he doubts 
whether this is possible in many cases.
Thinking by numbers using statistics and 
computers is analysis, while thinking by 
pictures, drawing the graph and identifying 
the catastrophe, is synthesis. Synthesis is 
more important because it gives us concepts 
which we can grasp (or see) and upon which we 
can build further. (53)
Another area of mathematics exploring similar concepts is the 
theory of fractals. This begins from the apparently irrational 
concept of curves of infinite length where however fine the 
detail displayed, greater detail can always be revealed. The 
coastline is frequently cited as a natural example of this 
phenomenon. One application of this concept is the Mandelbrot set 
which represents the area in a two-dimensional plane defined by 
the behaviour of a simple function applied repeatedly to points 
on that plane. Durham (54) also describes the use of such ideas 
in a study of the occurrence of chaotic behaviour in continuous 
events. Modelling such events mathematically, he explains, can 
sometimes result in chaotic results simply from the use of 
discrete time steps. However in some cases, research suggests 
that any model will be unsatisfactory because the object of study 
is itself intrinsically unstable. One such example is a double 
pendulum which for certain energy values ’becomes skittish and 
seemingly unpredictable’ (55).
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Like Thom, researchers in the field of fractals find graphical 
representations of their ideas more appropriate than numerical 
ones. Durham reports one researcher’s comment on using existing 
mathematical techniques;-
”Very soon,” said Peitgen, ”we noticed that 
our intuition failed completely.”
An attempt to get a feel for the problem involved some 
experiments in computer graphics. According to Peitgen:-
”When we did this, our intuition really 
exploded.” (56)
Hence Durham suggests:-
They believe that their images, by boosting 
the power of human intuition, may lead to a 
better understanding of such varied phenomena 
as magnetism, weather and ecology.
But their pictures also show how mathematical 
models can disintegrate into chaos. The 
message is that some phenomena may for ever 
lie beyond the reach of computation. (57)
The final outcome of this type of work is yet to be realised. 
Predictably it is meeting resistance from ’conventional’ 
mathematicians and even its proponents are trying to locate it 
within the existing mathematical paradigm. However it does 
indicate once again that the limitations of positivist thinking 
are being experienced and recognised as such.
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The Positivist Assumption of Sole Legitimacy
The evidence of sociology and scientific research, therefore, 
shows that the positivist and mechanistic models have limitations 
as a means for explaining both the research process and its 
results. In particular, the assumption of causality cannot deal 
adequately with abstract and complex relationships or which those 
involving discontinuity. A key factor in these limitations is the 
mechanistic concept of wholes. This view does not allow wholes to 
have characteristics not contributed by their constituent parts, 
and yet, the need for such a possibility has been indicated both 
by the abstract meanings given to technology discussed in the 
last chapter, and the evidence presented in this one.
In spite of these contradictions, it is necessary for positivism 
to assume that its principles provide the only valid form of 
'scientific* argument and this has led it to demonstrate an 
antagonism to any other cognitive style. In Offe's words:-
The social imagery of the achieving society 
is dominated by the abstract notion of 
'efficiency*. This implies not only the 
repression of those practical desires which 
cannot demonstrate any functional 
contribution to the overall system of 
achievement, but also discrimination against 
any attempt to challenge the criteria of 
achievement and efficiency through the 
framework of concepts of use value. (58 - 
author's emphasis)
As Cotgrove (59) observes, criticisms of its dominant 
epistemological role are only aired by minorities.
Those criticisms which are made often counter positivism's claim 
to objectivity by emphasising the significance of social context
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in the development of knowledge. As well as being applied to 
science (60), this argument has been applied to subjects as 
diverse as art (61), mathematics (62) and education (63). One 
form of this argument suggests that the creation of knowledge 
does not follow a natural and preordained path but is directed by 
specific interests.
Hence, the growth of knowledge should not be 
thought of as the result of random learning 
about reality, but as the correlate of the 
historical development of procedures, 
competences and techniques relevant in 
various degrees to the ends or objectives of 
cultures or sub-cultures. (64)
Once the notion of interest is introduced, there arises the 
possibility that knowledge will be distorted because it
  is created, accepted or sustained by
concealed, unacknowledged, illegitimate 
interests. (65)
This in turn raises the question of how the distortion of 
knowledge is to be recognised and which interests, if any, are 
legitimate.
One answer to this question has been to accept that any 
definition of legitimate interest must ultimately be based on 
value judgements (66). Others, however, continue to seek a 
neutral rationality. Lukacs (67) argues that capitalism (which we 
may see as one political implementation of
positivist-industrialism) has been able to dominate industrial 
societies because it divides them into a number of independent 
spheres. As a result the laws of economics have been able to 
function as an autonomous body of pure, natural laws forming a
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closed system, and, at the same time, to inform all other aspects 
of society. The alternative he believes is grounded in historical 
materialism and he argues that:-
  as far as m&thod is concerned,
historical materialism was an epoch-making 
achievement precisely because it was able to 
see that these apparently quite independent, 
hermetic and autonomous systems were really 
aspects of a comprehensive whole and that 
their apparent independence could be 
transcended.
This semblance of independence, however, is 
no mere 'error* simply to be 'corrected* by 
historical materialism. It is rather the 
intellectual and conceptual expression of the 
objective social structure of capitalist 
society. To annul it and to transcend it 
means, therefore, to transcend capitalist 
society - in thought. (68 - author's 
emphasis)
Thus Lukacs sees no alternative to capitalism but its complete 
replacement. By 'in thought', he means that this should be 
achieved by the use of historical materialism to revitalise 
proletarian class consciousness. Habermas (69) has also sought to 
define a neutral rationality. He has developed a concept of 
systematically distorted communication through which, he argues, 
it is possible to identify the distortion in speech which results 
from the imposition of interest. Natural rationality therefore 
can be achieved by countering illegitimate interest and achieving 
undistorted communication.
The tendency of mechanistic thinking to divide knowledge into 
manageable parts is countered at both the theoretical and 
practical levels with the notion of 'totality* in which allowance 
is made for the possibility that the whole may have attributes 
which are not derived from the simple summation of its parts. At
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the theoretical level, Ellul applies this concept to technology 
when he argues that:-
The technical phenomenon cannot be broken 
down in such a way as to retain the good and 
reject the bad. It has a "mass" which renders 
it monistic. (70)
Totality is also a key theoretical concept in dialectical thought 
(71) and for those who emphasise the structuralist aspect of 
Marx's work this is crystalised in his distinction between 
appearance and reality (72). At a more practical level, totality 
is found in the environmentalist arguments which maintain that 
the segmentation of knowledge leads to interference with the 
balance of nature without a full understanding of the 
implications of those actions. Furthermore, when unexpected 
consequences result, these are formulated into another 'problem' 
whose resolution requires a 'technological fix' by another group 
of experts. The result is a progression from one problem/crisis 
to another in an attempt to counteract the increasing imbalance. 
This, it is argued, is not a consequence of the specific type of 
technology used in each case but the nature of technology itself 
and its artificial division of knowledge (73).
Medicine is one particular area in which the role of interest and 
differentiation have been studied extensively, in part at least 
because it epitomises those concepts of professionalism and 
expertise which are fundamental to the cognitive style of modern 
industrial societies. Various studies have sought to demonstrate 
the social nature of the development of both the currently 
dominant institutional form of medicine and of its knowledge 
(74). Its view of the body as a complex machine, epitomised by
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medical specialisation and 'spare-part surgery*, is contrasted 
with the alternative concern for totality and the related 
reluctance to interfere in natural systems which is to be found 
in homeopathy and Eastern medical practices. These treat each 
person as a unique mental/physical whole and treatment consists 
of stimulating the system's own resources to counter its ills and 
restore its natural balance. This involves different notions of 
'problem' and wellness (efficiency) from the causal
symptom/diagnosis/prognosis method of established Western medical 
practice. None the less, we can expect the latter to remain 
dominant, not least because it is now proving amenable to 
computerisation in the form of expert systems (75).
The Status of Positivist Knowledge
These criticisms of positivism do not necessarily undermine the 
value of the knowledge it has generated. The limitations of 
mechanistic models are well recognised by scientists and 
mathematicians (76). Hence those exploring atomic physics and 
fractals remain within the scientific community. The objects of 
their study lie at the extremes of knowledge and they would 
accept that in everyday life, the effects of, say, relativity are 
so small as to be insignificant. Consequently the mechanistic 
model provides an adequate basis on which to act in most 
circumstances. What their work does show, however, is that there 
are limitations to its possibilities. It is only a convenient 
means for ordering and explaining experience, not a definitive 
description of nature.
100
However this position does create two consequences for the 
knowledge generated by positivist methods. Firstly its validity 
cannot be considered unquestionable and secondly, it must be 
recognised that other practices may also provide Valid' 
knowledge. Thus we are led to reassess present evaluations of 
existing knowledge. Illich (77). for example, argues that 
medicine has now gone too far in over-specialisation and 
intervention, to the extent that it is counter-productive 
resulting, for example, in new forms of treatment devised solely 
to counter the effects of others in the medical equivalent of the 
technological fix. Mulkay also suggests that some of the success 
used to legitimise the status of modern medical knowledge should 
be attributed to other causes. Thus he points out that most 
infectious diseases were already on the decline before the 
introduction of sulphapyridine although the latter is often 
considered to be a major contributing factor in that decline 
(78).
If positivist principles do not confirm the validity of 
knowledge, however, we are faced with the suggestion that all 
knowledge is relative and the consequent circularity when this 
argument is applied to itself. However, as Mulkay points out:-
  when faced with the 'trap' of
relativity, we can always choose to revise 
our conception of validity instead of 
abandoning a sociological approach to the
creation of knowledge ..  [this] inclines
more towards some form of hermeneutic 
analysis than the kind of causal analysis 
which traditionally gives this problem a 
misleading appearance of insolubility. (79)
In other words the problem of relativity is itself a consequence
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of positivism and becomes a non-problem if freed from that 
constraint. If the principles of positivism cannot supply the 
basis on which to develop a synthetic definition of technology, 
therefore, we need not be deterred from exploring other, 
non-positivist possibilities and this the next chapter will do.
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SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the possibility 
of constructing a synthetic concept of technology from positivist 
principles. The nature of those principles, in the form of the 
mechanistic model, were identified and shown to create the 
mutually supporting set of ideas on which the commonsense concept 
of technology is typically based. The key principle in this 
concept, it was suggested, was a view of the nature of wholes 
whereby any object can be reduced to its basic elements and 
reconstructed without any change to its composition. Arising on 
this foundation are specific ideas of complexity and ways of 
dealing with it, together with particular notions of problem and 
efficiency, and hence of rationality and the function of 
quantification. These ideas are bound together by the assumption 
of objectivity which legitimises the argument that together they 
represent the one valid means of obtaining 'scientific' 
knowledge, that is knowledge unbiased by subjective
interpretation. As a result positivism is antagonistic to any
alternative epistemological position.
However, the possibilities offered by positivist models were 
shown to be limited by these principles. The sociology of 
knowledge shows that scientific research itself is not conducted 
according to those principles whilst the results of research in 
physics and mathematics both show that the mechanistic mode of 
expressing ideas is inadequate for explaining nature as it is now 
being experienced. These new concepts are more akin to modes of
thinking which emphasise the totality of nature, the complex and
constantly changing relationships of its constituents, and the
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inadequacy of concrete concepts. The conclusions of this argument 
were not found to invalidate existing knowledge. Rather they 
redefined it as the consequence of a pragmatic process of 
negotiation during which working principles and hypotheses are 
agreed. The status of this 'knowledge' is the same as any 
resulting from a social process and consequent on the cultural 
resources available to that process. However the principles of 
positivism do not themselves allow for this interpretation. If 
positivism can neither encompass these ideas, nor accept the need 
to adopt alternatives to its own epistemology, then we must 
conclude that it cannot form the basis for the synthetic concept 
of technology being sought and in the next chapter the 
possibility of a definition based on non-positivist principles 
will be explored.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NON-POSITIVIST ALTERNATIVE 
CONSTRUCTING A SYNTHETIC CONCEPT
In the last chapter it was argued that positivism cannot provide 
an adequate basis for reconceptualising technology in a way which 
synthesises its concrete and abstract aspects. This chapter 
explores an alternative basis for such a concept by drawing on 
the non-positivist ideas of various social theorists. The object 
is to identify those elements which can be incorporated into the 
new concept, to highlight questions which it must answer and to 
identify potential difficulties in its construction. As in 
chapter 2, there is no attempt to provide a full statement or 
critique of each author's work, only to draw on their discussions 
where it is immediately useful in developing the current project.
The argument will be developed in three stages. Firstly the 
possibility and basis of a synthetic concept will be identified 
in the work of Marx. In itself, however, this will not prove 
sufficient, and the second stage will explore a number ways of 
overcoming its limitations. Finally the the various ideas and 
principles explored in the first two stages will be brought 
together to construct the new concept of technology.
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MARX - CONTRADICTION IN A DUAL RELATIONSHIP 
The Beginnings of a Synthesis
The starting point for this reconceptualisation of technology is 
the work of Marx. In itself this will not be sufficient, but in 
seeking to provide a radical critique of his own society, Marx 
began to face the issues and develop a methodology which provides 
a firm basis for the project. There are many interpretations of 
Marx's work, each pursuing its author's ends and providing, or 
implying, a definition of 'technology'. The interpretation 
offered by Gendron (1) was discussed in chapter 2. This provides 
a superficial and popularist reading of Marx reflecting the 
positivist mode of thought rather than Marx's own critical 
method. In the works of Lukacs (2) and the Frankfurt School (3) 
another interpretation emphasises the subjective alienation 
resulting from capitalist and technological societies. By 
contrast, Althusser (4) asserts an objective and materialist 
reading of Marx. The interpretation used here does not draw 
directly on any of these authors but describes a reading of Marx 
undertaken with the specific project of this thesis in mind.
To identify Marx's potential contribution to a definition of 
technology, we must begin, as he does, with the nature of work 
and his statement that:-
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We presuppose labour in a form in which it is
an exclusively human characteristic ..  At
the end of every labour process, a result 
emerges which had already been conceived by
the worker at the beginning .. The use
and construction of instruments of labour, 
although present in the germ among certain 
species of animals, is characteristic of the
specifically human labour process ..  It
is not what is made but how, and by what 
instruments of labour, that distinguishes 
different economic epochs. Instruments of 
labour not only supply a standard of the 
degree of development which human labour has 
attained, but they also indicate the social 
relations within which men work. (5)
We find here that the way people work, and the instruments they 
use, make them unique in the natural world. They also indicate 
the form of social relations and provide a measure of development 
or, what is taken to be its equivalent, the extent of human 
control over nature. This statement does not mean that Marx is a 
technological determinist, rather it indicates his awareness of 
the interrelated character of societies whereby their various 
institutions must change in sympathy with each other. The 
economic epochs which he defines are used to demonstrate his 
argument that such changes come about in a process involving two 
key moments. On the one hand, particular forces of production are 
necessary for certain types of social development, whilst on the 
other hand, a particular type of society is necessary to create 
the conditions and the need for those forces of production.
Thus change arises from a dual motion whereby each moment creates 
possibilities and sets limits on the other. Within each epoch a 
point is reached where further accommodation of the 
contradictions between them becomes impossible and a 
revolutionary transformation occurs heralding a new epoch. In 
Marx's own words:-
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At a certain stage of their development, the 
material productive forces of society come in 
conflict with the existing relations of 
production, or - what is but a legal 
expression for the same thing - with the 
property relations within which they have 
been at work hitherto. From forms of 
development of the productive forces these
relations turn into their fetters ... No
social order ever perishes before all the 
productive forces for which there is room in 
it have developed; and new, higher relations 
of production never appear before the 
material conditions of their existence have 
matured in the womb of the old society 
itself. (6)
For Marx, the social forms of production have three basic 
elements:-
a) Labour Power - the application of the worker's skill and
strength,
b) Nature - the object of labour,
c) Instruments of Labour, ie:-
  a thing, or a complex of things, which
the worker interposes between himself and the 
object of his labour and which serves as a 
conductor, directing his activity onto that 
object. He makes use of the mechanical, 
physical and chemical properties of some 
substances in order to set them to work on 
other substances as instruments of his power, 
and in accordance with his purposes. (7)
Once again Marx makes clear the nature of this process:-
The labour process, as we have just presented 
it in its simple and abstract elements, is 
purposeful activity aimed at the production 
of use-values. It is an appropriation of what 
exists in nature for the requirements of man. 
It is the universal condition for the 
metabolic interaction between man and nature, 
the everlasting nature-imposed condition of 
human existence, and it is therefore 
independent of every form of that existence.
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or rather it is common to all forms of 
society in which human beings live. (8)
Hence Marx does not isolate the instruments of labour but 
discusses them as an integral part of the essentially human and 
social process of labour. They have no meaning outside that 
process and yet are a necessary part of it.
Although he talks about people using nature to achieve their own 
ends, he recognises a reciprocal dependence in this relationship.
Labour is, first of all, a process between 
man and nature, a process by which man, 
through his own actions, mediates, regulates 
and controls the metabolism between himself 
and nature. He confronts the materials of 
nature as a force of nature. He sets in 
motion the natural forces which belong to his 
own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in 
order to appropriate the materials of nature 
in a form adapted to his own needs. Through 
this movement he acts upon external nature 
and changes it, and in this way he 
simultaneously changes his own nature. (9)
Marx distinguishes people from other animals by their capacity to 
act on, rather than react to, the environment. They distance 
themselves from it by manipulating it symbolically to 
conceptualise future states. The essence of technology in this 
situation is to make concrete the interface between humans and 
^^®i^ natural environment allowing the extension of human 
abilities by the use of tools and the creation of social 
organisations. Consequently, it provides a potent focus for 
studying both the content and discontinuities between different 
epochs:-
Technology reveals the active relation of man 
to nature, the direct process of the 
production of his life, and thereby it also
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lays bare the process of the production of 
the social relations of his life, and of the 
mental conditions that flow from those 
relations. (10)
The Evolution of Capitalism as a Case StudyAlthough Marx 
distinguishes analytically between the forces and relations of 
production, he also makes clear how closely they are related in 
practice. The nature of this relationship is demonstrated 
empirically in his description of the evolution of capitalism. 
This process required the gradual laying down of the foundations 
of capitalism within an essentially feudal society until 
transformation to the new form became inevitable. This occurred 
when the economic basis of the old society, domestic industry and 
self-sufficiency agriculture, were unable to meet the increasing 
demands of urban markets at home and foreign trade created by 
colonial expansion abroad.
Marx labelled the first stage of the establishment of capitalism 
'manufacture'. This began with employers concentrating a number 
of craftsmen under one roof, each making an entire article or 
those parts of one for which their craft suited them. At this 
stage it is possible to identify the emergent capitalist 
relations of production with the selling of labour and the making 
of commodities, but the instruments and division of labour are 
largely unchanged. However change in these areas was to follow.
In particular, the work of each craftsman became more specialised 
and the tools they used became more specialised. Hence Marx 
comments:-
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But as soon as the different operations of a 
labour process are disconnected from each 
other, and each partial operation acquires in 
the hands of the worker a suitable form 
peculiar to it, alterations become necessary 
in the tools which previously served more 
than one purpose. The direction taken by this 
change of form is determined by the 
particular difficulties put in the worker's 
way by the unchanged form of the old tool.
Manufacture is characterized by the 
differentiation of the instruments of labour 
- a differentiation whereby tools of a given 
sort acquire fixed shapes, adapted to each 
particular application - and by the 
specialization of these instruments, which 
allows full play to each special tool only in 
the hands of a specific kind of worker. (11)
With the break-up of production into specialised tasks, the 
capitalist was able to combine these tasks in new ways to take 
advantage of the varying degrees and kinds of skill required and 
the speed possible for each. These advantages were spelt out, 
among others, by Adam Smith and Charles Babbage both of whom are 
quoted by Marx in his discussion. Thus he concludes:
By dissection of handicraft activity into its 
separate components, by specialization of the 
instruments of labour, by the formation of 
specialized workers and by grouping and 
combining the latter into a single mechanism, 
the division of labour in manufacture 
provides the social process of production 
with a qualitative articulation and a 
quantitative proportionality. It thereby 
creates a definite organisation of social 
labour and at the same time develops new, and 
social, productive powers of labour. (12)
The link between the forces and relations of production is 
therefore provided by their organisation into a definite 
structure which becomes part of the forces of production and 
embodies the relations of production in the form of the division 
of labour and the wage labour market.
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But Manufacture, even at its most developed, was only one stage 
towards a fully capitalist economy. The possibilities of 
specialisation within an essentially craft—based system were 
still unable to meet the growing demands for production. Thus 
further developments resulted both from the contradictions being 
experienced and from the momentum of change already set in 
motion.
At a certain stage of its development, the 
narrow technical basis on which manufacture 
rested came into contradiction with 
requirements of production which it had
itself created ..  When the system had
attained a certain degree of development, it 
had to overthrow this ready-made foundation 
[of handicraft], which had meanwhile 
undergone further development in its old 
form, and create for itself a new basis 
appropriate to its own mode of production
  large-scale industry also came into
conflict with the technical basis provided 
for it by handicrafts and manufacture. (13)
The 'certain stage' of development occurred when production could 
no longer be increased by further development of the tools 
available or exploitation of the labour force which had reached 
the limits of its strength and skill. In Britain this point was 
hastened by legislation limiting the hours of work and types of 
employment allowed for women and children. Hence a new source of 
labour power had to be found and manufacture was replaced by 
fully developed capitalism which 'makes science a potentiality 
for production which is distinct from labour and presses it into 
the service of capital' (14). This definition is quoted by Marx 
from W. Thompson who also noted that knowledge, which was once 
the attribute of the workman, was now being used to dominate him 
(15).
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The distinction between Manufacture and capitalism is emphasised 
by Marx's discussion of the formal subsumption of labour under 
capital (16). Whilst there is a generalised capitalist 
relationship in Manufacture in the sense that one party provides 
the finance and another the labour power, it takes the specific 
form found in capitalism when it leads to 'a fundamental 
modification in the real nature of the labour process, the actual 
process of production.' (17). This only becomes possible when a 
certain scale of production is achieved which enables the 
capitalist to derive 'relative surplus-value'.
With the production of relative surplus-value 
the entire real form of production is altered 
and a specifically capitalist form of 
production comes into being (at the 
technological level too). Based on this, and 
simultaneously with it, the corresponding 
relations of production between the various 
agents of production and above all between 
the capitalist and the wage-labourer, come 
into being for the first time. (l8 - author's 
emphasis)
It is clear that technological change is a central feature in 
this transformation:-
But on this foundation there now arises a 
technologically and otherwise specific mode 
of production - capitalist production - which 
transforms the nature of the labour process 
and its actual conditions^ (19 - author's 
emphasis)
However change is not technologically led, rather Marx is 
emphasising that the change is from one total form of social 
organisation to another and can only be complete when the nature 
of the labour process and the technology it uses are in harmony 
with the emerging institutions of the new society. Marx saw
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machinery as one factor in the development of the forces of 
production but not as their defining element.
The machine, therefore, is a mechanism that, 
after being set in motion, performs with its 
tools the same operations the worker formerly 
did with similar tools. (20)
Marx distinguishes between humans as natural users of tools and 
the use of tools/machines in capitalism. The latter represents an 
unnatural division of labour and distortion of human relations. 
Thus he says:-
Owing to the extensive use of machinery and 
to division of labour, the work of the 
proletarians has lost all individual 
character, and, consequently, all charm for 
the workman. (21)
He acknowledges none-the-less the value of mechanisation in 
providing for the necessities of life. His critique arises from 
the form it takes in capitalist society.
It is sometimes said about machinery, 
therefore, that it sat'es labour? however, as 
Lauderdale correctly remarked, the mere 
saving of labour is not the characteristic 
thing; for, with the help of machinery, human 
labour performs actions and creates things 
which without it would be absolutely 
impossible of accomplishment. The latter 
concerns the use value of machinery. What is 
characteristic is the saving of necessary 
labour and the creating of surplus labour^
(22 - author's emphasis)
Marx does identify an objective element in production in the form 
of 'use value' but this recognises the complex dependency of 
people on nature rather than the simple neutrality of technology 
approach adopted by Gendron. Mechanisation may create enormous 
productive capacity but Marx's philosophy of history insists that
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it must undergo a revolutionary transition to be appropriate to a 
post-capitalist society. Clearly Marx believes that an 
increasingly 'scientific* understanding of nature can provide the 
technical ability to end physical want. This may explain his 
ambivalence towards the form taken by capitalist technology which 
both enslaves the workers and offers the possibility of freedom 
from want.
The Contribution of Marx
What Marx contributes to the reconceptualisation of technology, 
therefore, is a description of its role within society, in 
particular in social change. Because technology is not an 
isolated concept for Marx, we do not find it discussed in the 
same terms as the uses of 'technology' described in chapter 2, 
nor does it fit comfortably into the continuum used to locate 
them. Instead it offers a view of an integrated society in which 
technology is one element, an interface between the concrete 
object of labour and the abstract relations in which it takes 
place. Because Marx sees labour as the defining feature of 
society, technology necessarily shares in the social relations in 
which labour occurs and must change as they do. Thus Marx 
provides the beginnings of a synthesis which embraces the 
significance of technology for the symbolic actions and 
subjective meanings of individuals, on the one hand, and for 
concrete action on the other.
A number of key ideas will be adopted from this description of 
Marx's position for use in the reconceptualisation of technology. 
These will provide the substantial basis for understanding
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technological change and centre on Marx*s recognition of the dual 
relationship through which that change occurs. This replaces a 
simplistic cause and effect explanation with a device for 
understanding the complexity of change within an integrated 
whole. Within that framework, the occurence of change will be 
explained by two moments; the accumulation of contradictions in 
praxis and autonomous development within the logic of existing 
structures, either through the momentum they generate or their 
own internal contradictions. This recognises the ultimate 
discontinuity of epochs when fundamental institutional logic 
changes but allows for that logic to respond to change and delay 
breakdown until all its resources for adjustment are exhausted.
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THE LIMITATIONS IN MARX 
The Residue of Positivism
Important as this contribution is, Marx*s position is not a 
totally satisfactory basis for the new concept of technology. A 
key to this inadequacy is Marxes concentration on the economy of 
a society as a basis for explaining all its other features. 
Although his analysis of capitalist relations uncovers the 
structure of domination in the economic relations of capitalism, 
it has proved less useful in explaining other forms of domination 
which have become central concerns since his time. In Poster’s 
words:-
By totalizing the social field in terms of 
the universal suffrage of wage labour, Marx 
at the same time effected a closure which 
prevents other modes of domination from being 
named and analyzed. (23)
Similarly, whilst Marx acknowledges the mental and symbolic 
elements of the technological interface, his discussion of 
capitalism emphasises its concrete aspect in the form of 
machines. Because of this it is not immediately applicable to 
modern industrial societies where symbolic knowledge and 
information constitute a growing part of applied technology. 
Thus, although he recognised the duality of the relationship 
between people and nature, Marx still retains vestiges of 
positivism whereby he conceives of people dominating nature to 
meet their own needs and consequently represents development as 
progress towards control through a series of necessary stages.
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We must recognise that Marx is discussing the capitalism of his 
own time in which the concrete benefits of science—based industry 
were the most apparent consequence of industrialisation. He 
recognised some of the newly developing features such as limited 
liability companies, but did not analyse them fully. We must also 
be aware of the political project to which he applied his work in 
which the experience of domination most visible and politically 
exploitable was the uneven distribution of the benefits of the 
products of labour. Thus his revolutionary concepts, which can 
now be seen to imply the redefinition of the positivist 
dichotomies, were constrained in his own writing within the 
terminology of positivism resulting in the creation of the new 
base/superstructure dichotomy and a new basis for a progressive 
description of history. According to Poster:-
Marx accomplished the task of critical social 
theory perhaps to a degree never equalled 
before or since by demonstrating the 
historicity and specifying the mechanisms of 
domination inherent in industrial capitalism.
However, he fell back into the ideological 
mode of liberal political economy by framing 
the advances of his position in terms of 
liberal norms, i.e., universal emancipation.
After revealing the inability of liberal 
political revolution to achieve democracy 
(classless society), he went on to argue that 
the proletarian social revolution could 
accomplish that end. The metaphysic of the 
complete abolition of domination reinserted 
itself within critical theory. (24)
As a result, it has been easy for writers like Gendron (25) to 
retain the positivist dichotomies and to avoid exploring the 
difficult terrain of the pragmatic structure towards which 
historical materialism leads. Similarly, because Marx’s political 
concerns led him to idealise the process of labour and posit an
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apparently utopian, if ill-defined, view of communist society as 
the social vision which could offer hope in the industrial 
conditions of nineteenth century capitalism, others have limited 
their vision to one of revolutionary development through 
proletarian revolution.
In practice Marx seems to have been torn between the logic of his 
own method and a concept of change which demanded that the 
material benefits of capitalist machinery be retained in the next 
stage of development. This contradiction has been borne out in 
Eastern Europe where the political system has changed but the 
technological basis for society has not and where the relations 
embedded in the latter do not allow the transition which Marx 
envisaged. It would be wrong, therefore, to read into Marx’s work 
the issues and values of the 1980’s and to attempt to identify 
any specific ecological stance or significant critique of the 
mechanistic way of thinking. To apply his work to contemporary 
issues we must identify in his arguments those elements which are 
of enduring value and these are to be found in his method rather 
than in his empirical findings. The need for such an approach is 
demonstrated by the weakness of social criticism which fails to 
do so.
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Sumner
Sumner’s attempt to identify the ideological content of writing 
provides an example of such failure (26). He defines ideology
as:-
  elements of consciousness generated
within and integral to social practice, 
reflecting the structure of such practice, 
and the appearance of the practical context. 
(27)
As such it is:-
  integral to every social practice and
thus acts as the cement which prevents an 
unstable social structure from falling apart. 
(28)
He guards against the suggestion that ideology has an independent 
existence, rather it is a ’sign of something other than itself’
(29), although it may find concrete expression ’embodied within 
the material products of social practice’ (30).
He discusses a number of methods of textual analysis including 
content analysis, structuralism, semiology and the work of 
Althusser and concludes thatr-
Taking them as a whole, their general defect 
is that they assume more about the meaning of 
the words of the text (or, meaning of the 
significant units) than they explicitly 
discover. (31)
In other words the analysts impose their own ideas on the text 
rather than objectively extracting its author’s meaning. As a 
result Sumner proposes an alternative approach based on 
historical materialism. Hence he argues that:-
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All ideologies originate within social 
practices and, once formed, are integral to 
their operation and development. Ideologies 
can also be operative within social practices 
other than their necessitating practices.
They may act in the structuring of new 
practices. Some practices tolerate or use 
ideologies developed elsewhere. Origination, 
tolerance, use, maintenance and structuring 
capacity are all possibilities which must be 
distinguished and examined for their function 
in social formation. (32)
This statement appears to contain the essentials of the 
interpretation of Marx being offered in this chapter. However 
Sumner’s definition of social formation immediately constrains 
him within Marx’s own limitations:-
A social formation is a totality of social 
practices interconnected in a variety of ways 
and fundamentally circumscribed, ranked and 
influenced by the structures of economic 
(social) practice. (33)
The method of textual analysis which he derives from this 
position is detailed and thorough but his work is undermined by 
his failure to recognise his own ideological assumptions. 
Historical materialism is not ideological, he argues, because any 
society based on its principles would not be unstable and 
therefore would not need the ’cement’ of ideology. In this he 
holds the same idealistic view of historical materialism as 
Lukacs and by dint of definition and assertion he deflects from 
himself the criticism he levels at others. Hence his method of 
reading becomes not so much a search for understanding but the 
confirmation of his basic assumption.
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Althusser
Although Althusser’s (34) work is rejected by Sumner, it also 
retains Marx’s focus on economic production. In this case the 
object is to counter what Althusser sees as invalid humanist 
interpretations of Marx, typified by Lukacs, and to reassert the 
scientific marxism of ’Capital’. Marx’s theoretical position, 
according to Althusser, underwent a transformation in which his 
early ideas were superseded by those in his later work which must 
therefore be taken as the only correct representation of his 
fully developed theory.
In his statement of Marx’s position, Althusser tries to account 
for the experience of capitalist and socialist societies since 
Marx’s time. Hence he argues that Marx did not rely on a single 
basis of explanation, indeed he suggests that it was this very 
point which Marx rejected in Hegel. Rather, following Engels,
Marx recognised three fundamental social entities, economy, 
ideology and politics. Each can be both determining and 
determined, and may, at any particular time, be the dominant 
aspect of a social formation and hence the source of 
contradictions which bring about social change. Even so,
Althusser maintains that the economy is still the determining 
factor in the last resort.
We may see Althusser’s theoretical manoeuverings as an attempt to 
make a marxist explanation more relevant to modern capitalism 
where domination and conflict are visible in a broader range of 
issues than the economic. At the same time he is trying to 
preserve Marx’s original analysis and to reserve a special place
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for science and theory whereby they rise above social and 
historical limitations to express universal truths in the form of 
historical materialism. However he does not ground his theory in 
the material world of human practice, and as a result, in the 
assessment of Geras (35), he reverts to an idealist position. He 
also fails to overcome the limitations on understanding which 
result from an assumption of economic domination as the essential 
object of social critique.
Habermas
If both Sumner and Althusser fail to overcome the limitations 
which stop Marx’s methodology fulfilling its potential for 
breaking the bounds of positivism, we must look elsewhere. One 
possibility is the work of Habermas who specifically identified a 
need to ’update’ Marx. The alternative which he offers escapes 
Marx’s emphasis on economic production by adopting a philosophy 
of history the main theme of which is the progressive development 
of human knowledge. The search for knowledge, Habermas argues, is 
directed by ’invariant’ interests which ’determine the aspect 
under which reality can be objectified and thus made accessible 
to experience in the first place.’ (36). Three interests are 
identified; technical, practical and emancipatory; corresponding 
to the social spheres of work, interaction and domination 
respectively. Each is subject to a particular mode of scientific 
investigation; analytical, hermeneutic and critical. The 
technical and practical interests are concerned with control of 
the natural and social environments whilst the emancipatory 
interest defines the objective, ideal state, towards which both 
should be directed. Habermas has found the idea of emancipatory
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interest difficult to sustain in his later work and it has tended 
to merge with the practical interest.
His work begins with the contrasting attributes of the practical 
and technical spheres of interest (37). This division has a long 
history (38) starting with the division between natural and moral 
philosophy in Ancient Greece through to the work of Kant and 
Hume. For Habermas the technical interest is concerned with the 
world of work and consists of means-ends relationships adopted in 
the resolution of ’problems’ for which it provides an unambiguous 
definition of success and failure. The practical interest 
concerns the moral aspect of society and the development of 
social institutions and relations. Its is expressed through the 
development of reciprocal relationships in the process of 
maintaining social intercourse and thus it has a negotiated 
meaning of success and failure.
Therborn summarises the distinction as:-
In labour, man confronts nature in 
instrumental action; in interaction, he 
confronts society in normative behaviour. 
(39)
Although Habermas offers variations on these descriptions in his 
later work, the basic distinction remains;-
Whereas the rationalization of 
purposive-rational action depends on the 
accumulation of true (empirically or 
analytically true) knowledge, the 
rationalizable aspect of communicative action 
has nothing to do with propositional truth; 
but it has everything to do with the 
truthfulness of intentional expressions and 
with the rightness of norms. (40)
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The programme which has emerged from this philosophy has 
concentrated on three areas (41):-
a) a general theory of communication,
b) a general theory of socialization,
c) a reconstruction of historical materialism.
The first two fall within the practical sphere of interest and 
Habermas justifies his concentration in this area, as opposed to 
the focus in Marx’s work on the technical interest, by his 
proposals for the reconstruction of historical materialism. The 
latter is undertaken on the grounds that modern capitalism is 
significantly different from that in Marx’s own time, and in 
particular that:-
a) the state now plays a major role in the economic domain,
b) science/technology has become a major source of surplus
value in its own right,
c) there is a greater degree of economic concentration.
Habermas’s version of historical materialism entails a process of 
development through qualitatively different stages of learning, 
each advance involving more abstract and universal thought than 
the previous one. These stages, which owe a great deal to Piaget, 
are applied equally, albeit with differences of detail, to the 
development of individuals and societies. Although development is 
neither necessary nor uni-directional, each stage defines the 
limits of knowledge for the next and hence the possibility of
130
technical development. Habermas argues that:-
The endogenous growth of knowledge is thus a 
necessary condition of social evolution. But 
only when a new institutional framework has 
emerged can the as-yet unresolved systems 
problems be treated with the help of the 
accumulated cognitive potential; from this 
there results an increase in productive 
forces. (42 - author’s empahasis)
Although work and interaction are subject to the same philosophy 
of history in this scheme, Habermas argues that each develops 
separately and not in tandem as described by Marx in ’Capital’. 
Whilst the latter puts the forces and relations of production at 
the base of society with a superstructure of social institutions, 
Habermas treats them as parallel but distinct modes of social 
development.
Habermas’s position diverges from that of Marx, therefore, by 
relocating to the sphere of interaction the explanation of social 
crisis and the potential for resolving social injustice. The 
potential for crisis in modern capitalism, he argues, is not in 
the technical sphere of production but in the political sphere, 
especially in the ability of the state to retain its legitimation 
within society (43). Marx’s later work, according to Habermas, 
lost the early humanist insights related to the practical 
interest and led to the very situation which Habermas criticizes 
in modern capitalism, the confusion of the technical and 
practical interests leading to the inappropriate application of 
purposive-rational thought. Habermas therefore specifically 
rejects the synthesising potential in Marx.
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The focus of his own critique of modern capitalism is a general 
theory of communication in which he argues that the state’s 
legitimization of its position by an appeal to technical 
competence would not withstand examination in undistorted 
discourse. As it is, he suggests, increasing difficulty is being 
experienced in maintaining the claim to legitimacy in the face of 
continuing social and economic dislocations. The revolutionary 
potential of this situation lies in repoliticising the public to 
become directly involved in decisions affecting them rather than 
accepting spurious claims to technical competence on subjects 
which can only be dealt with by negotiation.
In his emphasis on the humanist element of Marx’s work, Habermas 
is following the tradition of the Frankfurt School which 
questions the inevitability of critical and revolutionary 
consciousness arising out of engagement in labour in the way Marx 
suggests. Change, it is accepted, must come through practical 
engagement in society (44), however, because the basis of 
critique is idealistic rather than materialistic, the lead is to 
be given not by workers whose practical engagement is their 
labour, but by intellectuals. The outcome of Habermas’s work 
therefore is an inversion of the leading edge of historical 
materialism and a reversion to the idealism of Hegel and Kant.
This position, as McCarthy (45) notes, has led Habermas a long 
way from his declared methodology and, in spite of his own 
insistence that theory must be grounded in practice, his position 
has become increasingly abstract without any real grounding in, 
or specific prescription for, practice. However McCarthy’s
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comment only hints at the fundamental weakness of the direction 
which Habermas has taken in losing the grounding of material 
practice. The importance of this as a basis for theory is 
discussed by Marx and Engels in ’The German Ideology’ (46). In 
Larrain’s words:-
It is by means of the concept of practice 
that Marx tries to solve the problem of the 
relation between consciousness and reality. 
(47)
For Marx, practice is not simply a question of social 
interaction; people act in, and change, both the natural and 
social aspects of their world, creating in the process structures 
which are the starting point for future action. In this context 
’Capital’, through its description of the economic institution of 
capitalism, can be interpreted as a study of one particular kind 
of practice, of the social structures which result, the objective 
and historical imperatives and constraints on action which are 
created, and the resulting forms of domination and conflict. The 
breakthrough which Marx achieves as a materialist is to reject 
those forms of materialism which see reality only as an object, 
and to frame the social and natural aspects of the environment in 
one set of relations. The consciousness and practice of 
individuals has the effect of socialising nature and the 
relationship between nature and society is fundamentally 
reformulated.
The approach adopted by Habermas recreates, through the 
work/interaction duality, the distinction between nature and 
society. In re-asserting this division without ever demonstrating 
its viability, Habermas loses the understanding to be found in
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Marx whereby the means of production and the relations of 
production form an integrated basis for action. Habermas strips 
work of its social element, leaving it to a separate, objective 
existence with its own history, different from the history of the 
relations between people. In effect he reverts to the idealism 
which gives a special status to scientific knowledge and in which 
the mark of human development is the state of its knowledge. It 
was this view which had led Marx to comment that:-
Hence it happened that the active side, in 
contradistinction to materialism, was 
developed by idealism - but only abstractly, 
since, of course, idealism does not know 
real, sensuous activity as such. (48 - 
author’s emphasis)
The practical result of his divergence from the dual relationship 
described by Marx is that Habermas locates the potential for a 
non-alienating society in the reconstitution of social relations 
independent of, or at least in advance of, any change in the 
material mode of existence. Knowledge becomes the precursor of 
change and new technology can only develop if the appropriate 
knowledge potential is already available. He justifies the label 
of historical materialism for this theory by arguing that the 
stages of development are the statics of a process whose dynamics 
are the need to respond to environmental pressures using the 
knowledge available to do so. Thus he argues that:-
  the change of normative structures
remains dependent on evolutionary challenges 
posed by unresolved, economically 
conditioned, systems problems and on learning 
processes that are a response to them. (49)
However the dynamics of this arrangement cannot provide the 
stimulus for change found in Marx’s model of contradiction and
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autonomous momentum. Instead Habermas is obliged to rely on the 
assumed natural progression of a single element of the social 
formation, knowledge.
His project I would argue, is fundamentally correct in that he is 
seeking to account for the changes in capitalist society since 
Marx’s time and to broaden the practice of critique to embrace 
the non-economic aspects of society. The three interests which he 
identifies suggest analytically useful categories which in the 
concept of technology constructed later in this chapter are 
broadly translated into three levels of analysis; concrete, 
institutional and social. The latter is used to explain the 
fundamental cohesion of the institutions which make up the social 
whole, the role which Habermas is unable to sustain for his 
notion of emancipatory interest because of the sharp distinction 
he makes between the technical and practical interests.
Thus what Habermas demonstrates are some potential pitfalls of 
attempting to modernise Marx’s position without retaining its 
essential integrity. He also identifies two issues which a new 
definition of technology must address. The first concerns whether 
technology, or the knowledge which it uses, precedes the 
emergence of a need or arises out of that need. The second 
question concerns the identification of a group or groups which 
will represent the active element of social change. Whereas 
Habermas is obliged by the logic of his argument to give 
definitive answers to these questions, I will argue that a 
concept which synthesises the concrete and abstract elements of 
technology and emphasises the pragmatic nature of technological
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change, the answer to each may be different in different social 
circumstances.
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DEVELOPING THE INSIGHTS OF MARX
Sartre
Like Habermas, Jean-Paul Sartre looks to Marx for the basic 
grounding of his theoretical position. However Sartre’s ideas 
have been developed within the context of existentialist 
philosophy and the political arena of contemporary France (50). 
The focus of his social analysis is human action, and, for him, 
all social facts are ultimately reducible to the actions which 
initiated them. Thus Sartre recognises only two ontological 
categories, objects which exist regardless of human existence and
those arising from human action in the world, that is ’..  the
world as it may be in itself and as it is structured through our 
interventions as engaged beings .. ’ (51).
In the process of structuring, which translates action into 
social facts, Sartre recognises an element of pre-structuring 
arising from the predilection of people to see the world in a 
specifically human way. However this provides only a coarse 
filter of experience and is subject to the much more demanding 
selectivity of engagement. For Sartre, ’engagement’ represents 
the purpose of individuals in taking action and is seen as the 
normal mode of historical existence. Through engagement 
individuals are constantly totalising their world so that, like 
Piaget, Sartre has a pragmatic concept of existence as a 
perpetual balancing act, but without the former’s connotations of 
progress and development.
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This constant totalising activity does not mean that concrete 
totalities do not exist, and Sartre uses the term 
’practico-inert* to represent the objective results of action 
(52). However the totalising activity which creates them 
continues afterwards and the practico-inert then becomes a 
constraint on its creators who must seek a new totalisation to 
negate it. One example of the practico-inert, which is discussed 
at length by Sartre, is that of the ’group’. Groups arise 
initially from the common project of a number of people. However, 
Sartre sees such conjunctures as inherently unstable and 
temporary so that to become established groups develop a 
hierarchy and leadership. As a consequence the individual members 
must subordinate their own projects to membership of the group 
which therefore becomes a form of domination. Desan summarises 
this relationship as follows:-
  the objectification of [man’s] praxis
may escape him and constitute a passive and 
inert totality which turns around to negate
him .. There is a perpetual circularity
between praxis and practico-inert, between 
the constitution of a group and its 
dissolution back into a series. (53 - 
author’s emphasis)
Because the group becomes practico-inert and hence a constraint 
on its members, Sartre does not see social class, one particular 
type of group, as an adequate basis for mutual action. Hence, in 
discussing the colonial system, he argues that it:-
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  did indeed respond to the objective
needs of French capitalists generally, but 
nevertheless it was originally built by
particular interests ... The colonial
struggle is not an unavoidable evolution of
molecular forces ... colonialism was
originally built by living men .. (54 -
author’s emphasis)
Nor can the children of the original colonialists escape 
responsibility for the continued existence of the system which 
must ’still be maintained and reinvented in the daily conduct of 
the present generation’ (55). Sartre is not unaware of the 
’facticities’ of an individual’s birth. He insists however, that 
there is still choice in the way that these are interpreted.
Thus, although individuals cannot escape their gender or social 
class at birth, they do not have to accept any specific notion of 
sexuality or social division. However, this possibility of 
ultimate, if rather hopeless, individual freedom is the only 
concession in Sartre’s insistence that all action leads to forms 
of domination.
Sartre’s contribution to a new concept of technology, therefore, 
is by way of his discussion of the relationship between 
individual action and structure. In this he reasserts the primacy 
of engaged action whilst acknowledging the emergence of social 
’facticities’ and the potential for autonomous change. Interest 
now becomes a dynamic attribute of individual action rather than, 
as in Habermas’s work, a static category of social formations.
Thus Sartre provides an alternative to the positivist concept of 
rational action by evoking the pragmatic context of action and 
recognising the need for structure to be continually reinforced. 
As a result he offers a way of developing Marx’s concept of the
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dual relationship in the structuring process which allows for 
multiple forms of domination whilst at the same time, asserting 
the totality of society and allowing a degree of discontinuity 
and autonomy between its parts which does not rely, as does 
Althusser, on an ultimate dependency on a single institution.
However Sartre also demonstrates the dangers of over-emphasising 
the role of individuals. Thus, in spite of its interpretive role, 
his treatment of groups has led to considerable criticism.
Because he allows the practico-inert no characteristics of its 
own, his ontology contains no category of we-ness to account for 
groups. They, like other structures, consist simply of the 
individual practices which have created them. In effect, 
according to Desan, Sartre fails to escape the Cartesian 
framework and remains locked into what Lefebvre (56) sees as the 
centre of bourgeois ideology, the myth of individuality which in 
Avineri’s words ’ultimately reduces man to self-defeating 
hedonism’ (57).
Recognising this criticism, Sartre went some way to acknowledging 
the difficulty and admits to ’...... a specific reality of social
facts’. These facts, such as money and language, are the ’product 
of the social activity of collective ensembles’ and ’have their 
own structures and law that dominate individuals’ but in the last 
resort they are still ’the reply of worked matter to the agents 
who work it’ (58).
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Glddens
Sartre’s project of accounting for social structures and the 
relations between individuals and society is a fundamental topic 
for sociology, but, according to Thompson:-
In the writings of most major theorists, from 
Marx, Weber and Durkheim to a variety of 
contemporary authors, this problem is raised 
and allegedly resolved in one way or another. 
Such resolutions generally amount to the 
accentuation of one term at the expense of 
the other ..  (59)
In the case of Marx, I have suggested that the basis for avoiding 
this one-sideness exists but is not fully exploited. Sartre hints 
at how this may be achieved but overemphasises individuality. 
Another attempt to develop the possibilities of Marx’s work is to 
be found in the theoretical work of Giddens. As with Sartre, a 
fundamental concept for Giddens is the dual relationship whereby 
action creates social stucture which then becomes the context of 
further action. Thus he argues;-
  that social structures are both
constituted by human agency, and yet at the 
same time are the very medium of this 
constitution. (60 - author’s emphasis)
He explains the relationship of these structures to the whole 
with the concept of structuration.
The concept of structuration involves that of 
the duality of structure^ which relates to 
the fund ament ally recursive character of 
social lifejr and expresses the mutual 
dependence of structure and agency^ (6l - 
author’s emphasis)
In developing this concept, Giddens criticises both the 
functionalist and the structuralist uses of ’structure’ for their
141
^S'ilure to deal adequately with the time factor or to 
<3ifferentiate between the statics and dynamics of society. He 
finds typical British and American philosophies of action wanting 
because they treat it as a series of separate events rather than 
as a duration. For him, action ’does not refer to a series of 
discrete acts combined together, but to a continuous flow of 
t-onduct (62 — author’s emphasis). In this way, the discontinuity 
between past and present is abolished along with the artificial 
use of dates to identify historical periods and Giddens 
introduces the kind of flexibility sought by Bauman (63) who 
criticises Parsonian structures for their implication of a one to 
one relationship between structures and events. Although 
^^ '^-^ ‘^ture involves order, Bauman argues, it does not necessarily 
imply day to day predictability of this kind and any structure 
lead to diverse events just as a particular event can result 
from more than one structure. It is the ability to account for 
this variability which Giddens tries to afford us with the 
concept of structuration.
Giddens uses ’structure’ to refer to the rules and resources 
-^^ i^ls-hle to actors from a shared set of meanings and knowledge. 
The elements of structure may be described in the absence of any 
subject or time—space dimension but only have concrete existence 
within situated action. He acknowledges a static notion of time 
and space which makes it possible to identify the historical 
duration of a structure and the breadth of its application thus 
distinguishing strata of structures where the most enduring and 
®-Il~^rwbracing equate to the concept of social institutions. The 
constant emphasis of his argument however is that these
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structures do not enter into social action statically but shape 
and are shaped by their presence in practice.
The various structures available to one society create what 
Giddens calls a structured totality which incorporates:-
  regularised relations of
interdependence between individuals or 
groups, that typically can be best analysed 
as recurrent social practices, (64 - author’s 
emphasis)
Such systems have structural properties but are not themselves 
structures. Rather:-
  they involve the situated activities
of human subjects, and exist syntagmatically 
in the flow of time. (65)
In this way Giddens dismisses the static/dynamic distinction 
between the structural properties of the social system.
Structure in this formulation is constraining, in the sense that 
it defines accepted practices, but it is also enabling in that it 
creates possibilities for action. An underlying feature of this 
relationship between action and structure is that the agent could 
always have acted contrary to accepted practice, but typically 
does not. Giddens explains this by identifying two aspects of 
consciousness in human agency; the ’practical consciousness’ of 
everyday existence which assumes a particular structure of 
society and operates within it, and ’discursive consciousness’ in 
which people rationalise their actions, although by doing so they 
may exclude unacknowledged conditions of action and its 
unintended consequences. Structures do not, therefore, embody
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preordination or inevitability and Giddens retains a place for 
both individual autonomy and the uniqueness of each action. We 
cannot therefore study history as a chain of causes and effects, 
rather explanation must account for an ongoing process in which 
one possible course of action is followed rather than another.
However Gidden’s does recognise that
  because of his concentration upon the
critique of the political economy of 
capitalism, to which he gave over his life's 
work, Marx never managed to return to the 
more general problems of ontology that 
preoccupied him in the earlier part of his 
career. (66)
Thus Giddens intends his own work to take up this part of Marx's 
work and extend it beyond its limited concerns with economic 
production. Like Sartre, Giddens presents opportunities to 
develop a flexible and generalised concept of technology through 
the dual motion of structuration with its emphasis on continuous 
change and the uniqueness of events. He recognises the ephemeral 
nature of social structures which are only made concrete in 
specific actions and uses the distinction between types of 
consciousness to explain both the regularity of social action and 
its potential for creating change.
However, this position is not without its critics. Thompson (67) 
argues that the concepts of rules and resources which Giddens 
introduces do more to confuse the issues than resolve them 
because:-
144
a) they are imprecise and no more clearly defined in his 
argument than the concept of structure he seeks to replace,
b) they are applied to society as a whole and provide no basis
for understanding differential applications to, say, 
different classes or sexes,
c) they do not provide the means for identifying things as
being of the same type, for example, for defining that an
institution belongs to a particular society.
The essential weakness however, according to Thompson, is that 
Giddens brackets out a level of social institution which is more 
global than that represented by the institutional rules and 
resources for particular types of action. At this new level, 
structure is not directly amenable to human action and therefore 
Giddens provides no explanation for the creation, maintenance and 
change of institutions at this level. Nor does he describe their 
relationship with the institutions which do concern him. Because 
of this, Thompson is led to question the emphasis which Giddens 
puts on the enabling aspect of structuration at the expense of an 
adequate treatment of the constraints it creates.
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FOUCAULT - AN ALTERNATIVE TO MARX?
Rejecting the Positivism in Marx
Unlike the other authors discussed above, Foucault does not base 
his work on Marx. Indeed, his position may be explicated by what 
it rejects in the contemporary philosophies derived from Marx. 
Hence he;-
a) refuses to totalise his empirical findings into a grand
theory and to explain them on the basis of an absolute
philosophical system or concept of natural rationality,
b) denies any fundamental significance to human agency and 
rejects the idea of individual autonomy through reason,
c) rejects the idea that truth can be embodied in any
particular group or social class,
d) denies that all forms of domination can be explained solely
by economic factors or any other single cause,
e) rejects the subjective/objective relationship embedded in
the idea that domination is best revealed *on the basis of 
constituting the social field as one in which men and women 
act on things* (68),
f) warns against the imposition of one society’s rationality on
another (69).
In effect Foucault makes the case proposed earlier in this 
chapter that historical materialism as Marx applies it fails to 
escape the confines of nineteenth century liberalism because
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ultimately it retains the assumption of human reason and the 
subject/object dichotomy whilst creating new constraints through 
its limited basis of critique. Thus Foucault’s position is 
fundamentally anti-positivist and his criticism of Marx derives 
largely from the latter’s failure to escape that epistemology.
Foucault grounds his own position in Nietzche’s emphasis on the 
diversity of modes of domination and the need to understand each 
historical and social instance on its own terms rather than by 
the imposition of a different socio-historical perspective or a 
calcified concept of natural rationality. Foucault adopts 
interaction in a symbolic world rather than the material world as 
a basis for social analysis which according to Poster is better 
suited to understanding twentieth century industrial societies.
Like Sartre, Foucault is responding to the mood of his time 
highlighted, in France, by the new movements of the 1960’s 
culminating in the revolution of 1968. These demonstrated a 
broader base of opposition to contemporary society than that 
grounded in the experience of labour and the concentration of 
economic power. The demand being made was for a general 
démocratisation of values and took form in racial, feminist, gay 
rights and ecological movements. Hence:-
Instead of refurbishing Marxism with a more 
complex totalization, Foucault proposes a 
multiplicity of forces in any social 
formation, a multiplicity which is dispersed, 
discontinuous and unsynchronized. Social 
theory for him cannot grasp an entire social 
formation in one key concept or schema. It 
must rather explore each discourse/practice 
separately, unpacking its layers, decoding 
its meanings, tracing its development 
wherever its meandering path may lead. (70)
1/1-7
Discontinuity and Discourse
Foucault develops two key concepts which I propose to exploit in 
the reconceptualisation of technology. The first, discontinuity, 
allows him to spatially and temporally isolate social 
institutions as objects of study. Thus each one can be discussed 
in terms of its own logic of explanation without the need to 
explain either transitions from one state to another or the 
relationships between that institution and others. The second, 
discourse, explains the process of social change.
The explanatory role of discontinuity is demonstrated in 
’Discipline and Punish’ (71) where Foucault traces the history of 
punishment back from the present day to a point where its 
practice seems both irrational and barbaric by contemporary 
standards. He then explains the internal logic of the two systems 
of punishment, the first involving public torture and mutilation, 
the second imprisonment and the idea of correction. The method 
seems clear enough, but in reading the explanation offered by 
Foucault we come across contradictions which seem to pervade his 
use of it. Thus the differences between the two systems are 
represented as derivatives of the differing requirements of a 
feudal society needing to preserve the king’s essentially 
arbitrary authority by a public display of power, and the 
post-1789 bourgeois society which emphasised rationality, 
individual responsibility and property rights. However he does 
not explain why this broader change occurred nor does he use the 
characteristics of economy and efficiency associated with the new 
form of punishment to explain other discontinuities between the
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two social formations.
To escape the causality of positivist explanation in favour of 
this discontinuous notion of history, Foucault uses the idea of a 
discourse between power and knowledge. The main characteristics 
of discourse are described in ’The Archaeology of Knowledge’
(72):-
a) it does not exist prior to its occurrence,
b) it is not subject to any process of natural development,
c) it exists only as it emerges in a specific conjuncture of
knowledge and power,
d) the context of its emergence defines the subject of the
discourse and the limits of its application although not 
necessarily the relationships which result.
Thus although discourse occurs at specific historical 
conjunctures, its results may be discontinuous with the objects 
and relations of its origin. The ephemeral and discontinuous 
nature of discourse and its constituents of knowledge and power, 
make them difficult features to locate within a social formation. 
Discourse is the locus of power but it occurs on a broad front 
such that it can only be identified in the concrete relations 
which result. According to Poster:-
When discourse is theorized as the prominent 
feature of the social field, a new logic of 
domination is suggested, one that eschews the 
traits of the subject-object relation but 
follows rather the model of technologies of 
power. Historical materialism in the age of 
informational capitalism finds its premise in 
power that is the effect of 
discourse/practice. By the same token, the
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logic of discourse/practice finds its 
justification in the proliferation of 
information technologies. (73)
Hence, although knowledge occurs in symbolic form it is also to 
be found ’as practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak’ (74). This is illustrated in ’Discipline and 
Punish’ where Foucault says:-
  this knowledge and this mastery
constitute what might be called the political 
technology of the body. Of course, this 
technology is diffuse, rarely formulated in 
continuous, systematic discourse; it is often 
made up of bits and pieces; it implements a 
disparate set of tools or methods. In spite 
of the coherence of its results, it is 
generally no more than a multiform 
instrumentation. Moreover it cannot be 
localized in a particular type of institution 
or state apparatus. (75)
Hence Foucault’s concept of knowledge fundamentally undermines 
the positivist notion of rationality and its assumption of the 
emancipating potential of knowledge as it is expressed, for 
example, in the work of Habermas. Instead it highlights the 
possibilities of knowledge as domination. He suggests, for 
example, that:-
The human sciences project ’man’ as their 
object and, with the intention of liberating 
that object, begin to control it in a manner 
not unlike that of the natural sciences. (76)
The assumption of neutrality of knowledge implicit in positivism 
masks the reality of this power and, as a result, Foucault is 
reluctant to acknowledge his own intellectual role.
The characteristics of power have much in common with this 
concept of knowledge. It too is diverse so that the relations of
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power are not ’univocal’ taut:-
  define innumerable points of
confrontation, focuses of instability, each 
of which has its own risks of conflict, of 
struggles, and of an at least temporary 
inversion of the power relations. (77)
Power is not to be found in binary oppositions but once again is 
diffuse, exercised rather than possessed. It is a property of 
relations rather than individuals or groups. Hence he argues 
that:-
The logic is perfectly clear, the aims 
decipherable, and yet it is often the case 
that no one is there to have invented them 
...... power and knowledge directly imply one
another; that there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that 
does not presuppose and constitute at the
same time power relations ..  In short, it
is not the activity of the subject of 
knowledge that produces a corpus of 
knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but 
power-knowledge, the processes and struggles 
that traverse it and of which it is made up, 
that determines the forms and possible 
domains of knowledge. (78)
Contributions and Difficulties
Foucault’s principal contribution to a new definition of 
technology is in his confrontation with the residual positivism 
in Marx. This arises firstly in his questioning of positivist 
rationality which obliges us in turn to question our own 
assumptions about individuality and the significance of human 
action. In this way we are led to recognise the dangers of 
imposing the rationality of our own time and place on others. In 
Marx’s work, this applies in particular to his reliance on the 
rationality of the economic sphere to understand other social 
institutions. Foucault also questions the emphasis in Marx’s work
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on production and labour and the assumption that the essence of 
humanity is action on an objectified nature.
By focusing attention on the concepts of discourse and 
discontinuity as a means of explaining social formations,
Foucault realigns Marx’s emphasis on the material basis of power 
within industrial societies and draws attention to other forms 
and sources of domination, in particular the possibility that 
control of language and information are as significant as control 
of capital. He also highlights the possibility of autonomous 
change within institutional logic which is not attributable to 
action; an idea which is inherent in Marx’s position but not 
fully developed. His own use of the term technology through its 
association with power conveys the idea of technology as an 
abstract concept whose features are only made apparent by 
application to concrete situations.
However, Foucault’s work also highlights some potential 
difficulties for the construction of a concept of technology. One 
is the result of his total rejection of any position based on 
Marxian concepts. As Poster illustrates, Foucault’s own arguments 
would be strengthened if he drew on Sartre and other elements of 
the Marxist tradition rather than rejecting them outright. In 
studiously avoiding what he saw as the limitations of Marxism, 
Foucault created new ones of his own. Hence while Marxism bases 
its explanation of domination on the division of capitalist 
society into social classes defined by their economic relations 
to each other, Foucault avoided any categorisation of society and 
as a result could only provide explanations for society as a
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whole. His work cannot therefore differentiate meanings and 
experiences of domination within a society. His analysis of 
sexuality, for example, assumes that all women experience sexual 
domination in the same way because he denies himself the 
resources offered both by Marxist class analysis and Freudian 
individualism, whatever their other failings, to differentiate 
between the experiences of groups and individuals.
Foucault’s work also appears to take on the ultimately 
pessimistic view of society to be found in the abstract meanings 
of technology discussed in chapter 2. Ellul (79). for example, 
sees no alternative to domination by technique although to 
interpret this as pessimistic, he suggests, is a reflection of 
the reader’s values rather than his own. Both Heidegger (80) and 
Marcuse (81) also stress the pervasiveness of positivism although 
they each offer limited prospects of an alternative. However the 
logical conclusion of all their positions is illustrated by Noble 
(82) who argues that, for all its internal contradictions, the 
positivist epistemology is so firmly ingrained in industrial 
societies and their dominant elites, that it will be able to 
resist any world-view which might form the basis of an 
alternative society. Thus as Marcuse argues, the ultimate power 
of positivism lies in its ability to define what counts as valid 
knowledge.
Foucault’s own pessimism, like Sartre’s, is implicit in his 
argument that the only basis for understanding society is in 
terms of relations of power and domination. If anything, 
therefore, this pessimism is deeper because it is not just the
153
positivist concept of knowledge which leads to domination, but 
all knowledge. As a result, any discourse will result in 
objective relations of domination and opposition to them will 
simply create different forms of domination. Poster suggests, 
however, that there is an alternative to this interpretation.
If one rejects evolutionist progressivism 
because of its tendency to legitimize the 
present, the reasonable alternative is to 
focus on the limitations of all social 
formations. Such a strategy does not rule out 
a critical perspective that opposes 
domination; it simply reduces the promises of 
radical change. The existing form of 
domination is the one that is oppresive and 
must be resisted, even if there is no 
guarantee that a new form of domination will 
not arise to replace the old. The vision that 
emerges out of Foucault’s writing is not 
necessarily pessimism, but it is one shorn of 
the dream of ’solving the riddle of history’, 
of ending class society forever, of ridding 
the world once and for all of tyrants. To 
reject evolutionism is only to reject 
teleology, not the possibility of 
democratizing change. (83)
This more optimistic view is embodied in the concept of 
technology developed below.
The Question of Method
One further point highlighted by Foucault’s work results from his 
attempt to break with conventional forms of argument, 
interpretation and the expression of ideas. One consequence is 
his unusual style of writing which appears to be vague, 
contradictory and evasive. Another is his refusal to totalise his 
work into a coherent theoretical position. In Poster’s words:-
He seems to take a perverse pleasure in 
shifting his stance, or simply in adopting 
provocatively an unorthodox attitude toward a 
topic. (84)
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This style is a consequence of his attempts to avoid those 
features of Marx’s work which he has criticised. The resulting 
implementation of his notion of discontinuity, however, often 
leaves the reader baffled by his apparent unwillingness to follow 
the implications of his own argument, to answer the questions it 
raises or to explain relationships between its parts. Thus when 
he argues that historians in their interpretive function assume 
power by their use of knowledge, we might expect, but do not 
find, an explanation of how his own position is different or why 
it should receive any greater credence. Nor do we find any 
recognition that his own work is a will to power or that it is a 
consequence of his own biography and historical context. Poster, 
by contrast, argues that;-
The theorist can only propose the analysis of 
specific features of the social field, 
perhaps drawing connections between those 
features and other levels but no more than 
that. The totality remains a horizon of
thought, never its object .. At the
pre-theoretical level, before the object of 
investigation is established or the 
categories developed, the theorist makes a 
choice. This choice concerns a political 
judgement about what is important in the 
present conjuncture, about what needs to be 
done, about the theorist’s relation to his or 
her world and the relation of the theorist’s 
work to this world. At this moment of theory 
formulation a form of totalization is 
implicit if not explicit. (85)
It is the failure to acknowledge this totalization in his own 
work for which Poster criticises Foucault.
We must recognise that his unorthodoxy underlies the fundamental 
value of Foucault’s contribution to the current project by
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highlighting the paradoxes in Marx’s work (86), but in doing so 
it also illustrates that revolutionary modes of thinking which 
attempt to break the mould of contemporary thought may be 
self-defeating if they are too complex and unrelated to existing 
ideas to take a hold in their readers’ minds. It is here that 
Marx’s evolutionary concept of change tempers Foucault’s emphasis 
on discontinuity by recognising that there must be a cohesion and 
identity between the old and the new whereby the old adjusts as 
far as possible before finally giving way to the new.
The same charge of vagueness and imprecision may be levelled at 
the abstract uses of technology described in chapter 2. Winner 
(87), for example, finds this fault with Ellul’s work although 
the latter argues that being descriptive, his work makes no value 
judgements and therefore has no need to provide a basis for 
action. The reason for vagueness in these examples however is 
not, as in Foucault’s case, the result of a deliberate 
methodology, but a failure to take adequate account of the 
concrete instances of technology. Even where those writers 
recognise what Heidegger (88) calls the ’instrumental’ and 
’anthropological’ aspect of technology, they assign it to a 
subsidiary and unimportant role in their theories. A synthetic 
concept of technology must account for both its concrete 
instances and their relationship to the abstract idea of 
technology.
Thus the essential challenge for the reconceptualisation of 
technology is to find ideas and language which clearly describe 
’technology’ in a way which is comprehensible to an audience
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steeped in positivist logic but without relying on that logic for 
its viability (89). The discussion above has suggested ideas 
which may be incorporated into such a concept and an appropriate 
methodology for using them. The remainder of this chapter will 
apply these in the construction of the sought after concept.
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A SYNTHETIC CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGY 
The Nature of Conceptualisation
The key to the concept described below is the method by which it 
is constructed. The underlying difficulty with the meanings of 
technology examined in chapter 2 was that they were either too 
rigid and specific to be applied generally, or too broad and 
vague to provide a basis for specific applications. However the 
idea of a dual relationship developed by Marx, and its pragmatic 
application by Sartre, suggest a method whereby these limitations 
may be avoided. By adopting this idea, conceptualisation becomes 
the practical task of understanding; reflecting the pragmatic 
duality of the everyday activity by which human consciousness 
makes sense of the world of experience. In Bauman’s words:-
The continuous and unending structuring 
activity constitutes the core of human 
praxis, the human mode of being-in-the-world. 
(90)
The creation of a synthetic concept of technology in this chapter 
will be a formalisation of that everyday process of structuring 
in which it creates rules and resources (to use Giddens’ terms) 
which can be applied to specific cases and adjusted in accordance 
with the resulting experience of their use.
This method of conceptualisation recognises that the world of our 
experience is too complex to be described in its entirety, even 
if the language was available to do so. Thus it accepts the need 
to impose structure, in the form of boundaries which delineate 
the subject, and categories which identify the units of
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description. Descriptions of the categories and the relationships 
between them constitute the resources offered by the resulting 
concept. However, it must be recognised that the boundaries and 
categories created for this purpose:-
a) have no necessary or objective reality,
b) must be supplemented by a description of those
characteristics unique to the whole,
c) do not constitute discrete divisions of the whole but slices
through its continuous gradations and complex combinations 
which provide alternative views of the subject at different 
levels of detail and together offer an understanding of the 
totality.
Even so, the boundaries being used have not been drawn 
arbitrarily but encompass a social institution which is part of 
the shared meaning of modern industrial societies. Thus the 
subject ’technology’ will be seen to have a dual nature. On one 
hand it is distiguishable as an intuitively separate entity and 
at the same time, it will be described as an integral part of its 
host society which cannot be understood without reference to the 
social whole or have a history independent of it.
Within these boundaries three categories or levels of analysis 
will be identified and the description of their contents and 
relationships will constitute the basis of the concept being 
constructed. These levels have been suggested by the discussion 
above and will be used in the attempt to synthesise the concrete 
and abstract attributes of technology within a single organic
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social whole. In this way it will be possible to account equally 
for the varying emphasis on action and autonomy in the works of 
Foucault, Sartre and Giddens, and to fulfil the promise in Marx’s 
work of relating them to broader social changes.
The process of conceptualisation to achieve this will have three 
parts. The first will identify the categories being defined and 
describe the relationships between them. This will provide a 
description of the process whereby change can occur at one level 
of analysis as a result of contradictions at another. The second 
part will then identify a second process of change which results 
from the autonomous development of the logic operating at a 
single level of analysis, and any internal contradictions to 
which it gives rise. The final part will then consider briefly 
the broader implications of this description for a more general 
discussion of technology and society.
The Concrete and Institutional Levels of Analysis 
The first level of analysis, which I have labelled 
’institutional’, embodies what Giddens calls ’rules and 
resources’ for action. These are the structural characteristics 
and logic which give technology its institutional identity. 
Technology can never be fully described at this level because its 
abstract nature constitutes a focus of potentials rather than a 
fully delineated entity (91). Only at the second level, in their 
concrete application in action, i.e. in the creation and use of 
technological objects, do these potentials attain definite 
meaning. Thus the concrete and institutional levels of analysis 
enter into a dual relationship of the type identified by Marx and
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used by Sartre and Giddens. In this relationship action is 
generated from the shared institutional structure of meanings and 
knowledge which is then confirmed or contradicted by the 
consequences of that action. This may lead to a change in those 
meanings or knowledge which then become part of the resource for 
further action.
Thus structure defines the expected results of future actions and 
provides a model against which to match new experiences and 
through which to achieve a consistent and cohesive understanding 
of them. The unique content of each action in terms of time, 
place and the engagement of specific participants is an important 
element in understanding the significance of personal projects 
and freedom of choice in this structuring process. It does not 
mean that all action is necessarily rational (in the positivist 
sense) or purposeful, nor does it exclude the unintended 
consequences of action. However it does counter a static 
description of institutions and deterministic interpretations of 
the role of social structures in action. Structure then becomes 
both limiting and enabling. In Bauman’s words, ’Structure means 
always the limitation of possibilities’ (92), and it must be 
recognised that the limits created by structure constrain actors 
to view the world in a specific way. Yet because structure also 
gives stability through shared meanings and provides a means for 
actors to select relevant information within a constant stream of 
sense data, it also makes deliberate action possible (93).
The structure which results from the use of technology in action, 
therefore, is not simply imposed by people on the environment.
l6l
nor is it derived from an objectively real environment, it is a 
pragmatic creation generated through the use of that structure in 
action. For it to be effective, it must have an essential 
correspondence with, and ability to explain, perceived reality.
The crucial test of its value is whether the expectations it 
creates about the results of action are borne out in practice.
The structure, and the process of creating it, are pragmatic in 
the same way that the categories being used in developing this 
concept are. Thus its viability is constantly in doubt and it 
must continually identify and adjust to new information which may 
reinforce or bring into question its assumptions. The importance 
of the concept of structure and its relationship with action is 
that it encompasses both the uniqueness of action, including the 
personal interests of those involved, and the regularities which 
occur through the existence of socially constructed, maintained 
and shared meanings. What it emphasises is the active rather than 
reactive relationship between people and their socio-natural 
environment. It highlights the twofold nature of that 
relationship which both constrains and enables human action.
This concept of a dual relationship does not fit easily into the 
logical structures offered by positivism. Hence, in his comments 
on Marx, Sayer (94) notes the difficulty of conceptualising 
trans-historical features which are only manifest historically, 
that is in specific actions, and Ruben (95) makes a similar point 
in discussing Marx’s view of the relationship between thought and 
being. In reconceptualising technology, however, it is just such 
a relationship which provides for the possibility of an 
integrated account which synthesises its concrete and abstract
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aspects. Just as a full description of technology cannot be 
derived from its abstract form which only represents potentials, 
so the aggregate of all the concrete forms occuring in action 
cannot fully describe its potential because each takes only a 
part of that potential and applies it in a limited and definitive 
way. Instead, the pragmatic and dynamic relationship between 
these aspects of technology means that they are best explained by 
a description of the process by which they change, a process 
which, as we have seen, results from the concrete application of 
potential and the need to account for new experiences and the 
failure of expectations.
Change, therefore, may be defined as the resolution or negation 
of contradictions arising in praxis. In some cases the response 
may be immediate through the accommodation of the contradiction 
within the existing institutional structure. In other cases the 
contradiction may be suppressed or put to one side as a resource 
in the creation of an alternative structure. In yet other cases, 
the nature of the experience may be redefined so that it can be 
assimilated into the existing structure. As Marx demonstrates, 
that structure will use all the means available to adapt to 
contradiction and only change gradually until the accumulation of 
contradictions which it cannot adjust to becomes so great that 
the alternative logic, which has been forming to account for 
them, takes its place. At this point change becomes discontinuous 
leading, in Marx’s terms, to a new epoch.
Change through praxis may be initiated at any point where 
technology is applied. The dual relationship described above
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creates the possibility that this will then be reflected in other 
concrete technology when the changed institutional logic is used 
as a resource in new actions. Through this concept of change, 
therefore, we are able to bridge the static/dynamic and 
concrete/abstract dichotomies which bedevil other theories. In 
retrospect we may identify technological changes as historical 
discontinuities, but this idea of change emphasises the internal 
integrity of each historical moment within a process of change 
which rejects the notion of history as a progressive series of 
causally related and discrete events.
The Social Level of Analysis
The critical contribution of a synthetic concept of technology 
however is not just in recognising the dual relationship between 
technology at the concrete and institutional levels of analysis, 
but in relating them to a third, social level whereby technology 
is integrated into the social whole. The social level of analysis 
reveals another duality in which technology is seen to be a 
specific implementation of the logical principles which provide 
cohesion and identity to a society. The relationship between the 
social and institutional levels of analysis, and the process of 
change it embodies are similar to those in the relationship 
between its institutional and concrete aspects. Thus structural 
principles which hold for the society as a whole provide 
fundamental rules and resources for the construction of 
technology’s own logic although their application will be unique 
to technology. Just as each concrete use of technology in action 
has an element of uniqueness and autonomy but still retains its 
identity as technology, so technology embodies its own form of
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the social logic without losing its identity and cohesion within 
the social whole. Similarly, contradictions occuring at the level 
of institutional technology will require a response at the social 
level which may in the end lead to changes in the principles of 
social cohesion.
This concept of the relationship between technology and society 
does not mean that there is necessarily one global, socio-natural 
reality in which all people share. Numerous models are used in 
different social and historical contexts, and it is a common 
theme in social debate as to whether they have any common 
features (96). Within one society there may be conflicting 
notions of reality and each individual may be subject to multiple 
realities (97). Thus the concept of technology being developed in 
this thesis recognises a degree of autonomy which institutional 
technology enjoys in its relationship with its host society. This 
is a consequence of its specific implementation of the social 
logic and gives rise to the possibility of identifying and 
analysing it as a separate institution whilst recognising that 
the alternative realities, and the relationships between them 
occur within a coherent socio-natural ordering of the total 
environment and cannot be arbitrarily separated.
It is this social aspect which is missing in the action dominated 
theories of Sartre and Giddens and the institutionally dominated 
theory of Foucault (except in the weak concept of Episteme). Marx 
recognises it but locates it within a specific institution, the 
economy. Habermas’s emancipatory interest is intended to play the 
role of social cohesion, but he is unable to sustain it in
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parallel with his rigid separation of the practical 
(institutional) and the technical (concrete) interests. Similarly 
Althusser identifies three aspects of society in which economy 
and ideology may be equated with the concrete and institutional 
levels of analysis and politics with the social. However, he not 
only retains the limiting concept of economy as the determinant 
of the last resort, but like Habermas, he also fails to retain 
the essential synthesising potential of Marx’s position and 
reverts to idealism. By contrast, the different levels at which 
technology has been discussed in this chapter do not allow those 
levels to be discussed without recognising the complex 
relationship between all three and their ultimate grounding in 
pragmatism. Nor does it assume that they are definitive 
categories but uses them to exemplify relationships and a process 
of change which can operate at any point within the 
socio-technological domain.
166
Institutional Logic as a Source of Change
If we stop at this point however, we have still not gone 
substantially beyond Sartre’s position whereby institutional 
technology is no more than an aggregate of the component actions 
from which it is derived. However Foucault highlighted the 
significance of change arising from the internal logic of 
structure itself, and the momentum for change independent of 
action which this creates. Foucault describes this as resulting 
from a discourse between power and knowledge, although his 
preoccupation with domination through the power embodied in 
structure excludes any significance for directed human action. In 
this reconceptualisation of technology, the role of praxis is 
reasserted but the contribution of autonomous change is retained 
through a restatement of the notion of discourse in which the 
potential for power inherent in structure is made distinct from 
the occurrence of domination. This allows for the possibility of 
non-dominating discourse and benevolent power which both Foucault 
and Sartre effectively exclude. This interpretation of discourse 
can also be seen as a generalisation of Marx’s concepts of the 
forces and relations of production.
As Foucault demonstrates, the power and knowledge which 
constitute this discourse are difficult to conceptualise. They 
may indeed, as Sartre insists, originate in human action, but 
they have become disparate and apparently uncontrolled. We may be 
able to identify the implications of the logic constituted by 
discourse, but the origins of that logic, grounded in diverse and
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distant actions, with intended and unintended consequences, are 
impossible to trace. The resulting sense of being dominated by 
autonomous technology is discussed by Winner who suggests that 
the distress it entails is a consequence of the contradiction 
between our obvious dependence on technology and the assumption 
that we should be in control of the things we create (98). This 
situation is illustrated by the dependence of modern industrial 
societies on sources of mechanical power. As the original sources 
of that power fail, this dependence means that others must be 
found. Where, as in the case of nuclear power, this is seen as 
both necessary and unwelcome, the institutional and social 
aspects of technology have to respond to this contradiction in 
order to legitimate its use. This in turn leads to new concrete 
technology concerned with reinforcing that acceptance, for 
example by providing safety measures. Thus autonomous change, 
like that arising from contradiction in action, may generate its 
own momentum and lead to new concrete implementations.
Clearly, if we concentrated solely on the generation of change at 
the institutional level, it could be argued, as does Foucault, 
that resistance to particular examples of technology is fruitless
because, in Winner’s words, ’..  a therapy that treats only
the symptoms leaves the roots of the problem untouched.’ (99). By 
recognising that change can also result from the negation of 
contradictions experienced in action, however, this 
reconceptualisation of technology acknowledges a role for 
individual actions. This possibility is grounded in the 
essentially pragmatic nature of structure which, because it 
exists to make action possible, remains viable only while it
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proves adequate in that role. Thus, although the contradictions 
in action may be diverse and individually limited, they may, if 
the existing structure cannot respond to them, achieve a critical 
mass at which discontinuous change occurs regardless of the 
apparent strength of technology’s own institutional logic.
Hence, whilst power still resides as a potential of institutions 
and of the relations between them, the possibility also exists 
for powerful, directed actions either by individuals or groups. 
Even where single acts seem powerless, they may contribute to an 
accumulation which develops a momentum towards change. Also, 
because action involves engagement/interest, this view of power 
allows for the possibility that structure may favour, or be 
directed to the benefit of, the personal or group projects of 
particular members of society. This will result from the ability 
of those people to exploit or benefit from the power potential 
within structure. It recognises, therefore, that although action 
may take the form of critique, it may also be directed to 
reinforce the structure by parties whose interests it represents. 
Thus although, as Foucault argues, power is not the property of 
groups or individuals, but is a potential of institutions and the 
relations between them, it may be harnessed by a group, or 
coincide with their interests, although, as Sartre points out, 
this dominance must be continuously reinforced by new actions. 
Furthermore, this ability to harness power is always tempered by 
the unintended consequences of action, the autonomous logic of 
the institution, action designed to negate the contradictions of 
domination, and the ultimate requirement for a consistent and 
coherent explanation of experience.
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Change at the Social Level
This discussion of autonomous technology can also enlighten our 
understanding of the relationship between technology and society. 
Within the conceptualisation of technology described above, 
social structure tolerates semi-autonomous and contradictory 
rationalities at the institutional level but maintains an overall 
cohesion within the social whole. Change in the principles of 
cohesion results from a similar relationship between the social 
and institutional levels as that between the latter and 
technological action. Change can therefore occur in two ways; as 
a consequence of contradictions occuring at the institutional 
level which require a response at the social level, or as a 
result of the momentum generated by the logic of social 
principles and their own internal contradictions.
In his description of capitalism, Marx does not maintain this 
distinction and as a result sees all social change as being 
generated through the relations of economic production. Althusser 
provides a broader interpretation using the concepts of 
’structure in dominance’ and ’overdetermination’ whereby change 
can be generated in social institutions other than the economy 
although the latter still determines change in the last instance. 
Habermas, by contrast, moves away from the economy entirely and 
locates change within the political sphere. In contrast to these 
positions, the pragmatic basis of the synthetic concept of 
technology avoids the need to identify any dominant institution 
although it does allow that at any one time the pressure for 
change may be focused through a single institution. This may
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result in a progressive change in the principles of social 
cohesion so that they reflect the specific orientation of the 
dominant institution and cause sympathetic change in other 
institutions. In this way the logic of the dominant institution 
may seem to be translated into the logic of the society as a 
whole.
However, whilst this explanation provides a viable interpretation 
of the apparent dominance of technological thinking, the dual 
relationships embodied in the new concept of technology encourage 
us to recognise that social change is unlikely to be 
uni-directional. Thus, although mechanistic technology is the 
implementation of positivism most directly experienced by many 
people, it is not the only way in which positivism is experienced 
at the social level; it is part of a broader process of change 
involving, for example, religion and the economy. As Foucault's 
discussion suggests, therefore, power and knowledge are no more 
likely to be located in one institution than in a specific group 
and change is unlikely to be directed through any single source. 
Thus, whilst Marx casts an economically defined group, social 
class, in the role of vanguard of social change and Lukacs 
identifies intellectuals in this role, the synthetic concept of 
technology does not require such a specific identification. Hence 
any group or individual may be the source of change if 
contradictions arise out of their actions and even if technology 
is regarded as the most obvious focus of positivist principles 
and contradictions, fundamental change does not have to result 
from the actions of a group defined in terms of technology.
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SUMMARY
The object of this chapter- has been to construct a concept of 
technology which synthesises its concrete and abstract aspects in 
a way which an approach based on positivist thinking is precluded 
from doing by its own fundamental logic. It has used the work of 
a number of theorists as a resource in identifying both an 
appropriate methodology for reconceptualisation and the content 
of the concept. In the process, however, it has adapted and 
reformulated those ideas into a format which must be judged on 
its own merits not its pedigree.
The basis for the new concept was found in the work of Marx and 
took as its starting point his description of social labour; in 
particular the way it changes and develops within the total 
social context. A key element of this description is the dual 
relationship between the forces and relations of production 
within which technology provides an interface between people and 
their environment. This idea created the possibility of 
describing technology in terms of relationships and the ways they 
change and hence of achieving the required synthesis. The main 
features of Marx's position were identified in his description of 
the development of capitalism. In this he identifies 
contradiction as the main impetus leading to change and to an 
ultimate discontinuity between epochs. He also recognises, 
however, that existing structures will respond to contradiction 
and that revolutionary transformation will only follow a period 
of delay in which the accumulation of contradictions exceeds the 
structure's ability to adjust. Thus Marx was seen to demonstrate 
that simple causality cannot explain historical development
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except at the most superficial level.
In spite of the value of this contribution, there were seen to be 
limitations in Marx's position and two in particular were 
highlighted. Firstly, it was argued that his concentration on the 
economy and social production as the key to social relations and 
change, limits the value of his work for understanding other 
forms of domination. And yet, it is clear that other focuses of 
critique are relevant to twentieth century societies including 
domination through the control of information. Secondly, a 
residual positivism was identified such as that demonstrated by 
his progressive philosophy of history. These limitations were 
located within the context of Marx's contemporary experience of 
technology and his political objectives and it was acknowledged 
that these criticisms are the result of hindsight. His potential 
contribution to the reconceptualisation of technology was 
acknowledged, therefore, but was seen to reside in the 
possibilities. which his methodology creates rather than in his 
own empirical conclusions. Consequently the work of other 
theorists was examined in the search for a reformulation of his 
ideas which could overcome his limitations.
Three uses of Marx's work were examined for this purpose.
Firstly, the work of Sumner and Althusser was considered to 
reinforce the argument that Marx's analysis cannot be applied to 
present-day industrial societies without recognising its 
limitations. Secondly the work of Habermas was used to show that 
attempts to overcome those limitations, without retaining the 
integrity of Marx's methodological insights, also preclude the
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creation of the sought-after synthetic concept of technology by 
recreating the positivist dichotomies and lapsing into idealism.
The third use of Marx's work was demonstrated in the discussions 
of Sartre and Giddens who were shown to have addressed some of 
its limitations without sacrificing its essential insights. Both 
give a dominant position in their work to the role of action in 
the creation of structure and the subsequent use of structure in 
action; essentially the dual relationship discussed by Marx. 
Sartre reinforces this by replacing the positivist concept of 
rationality with the pragmatic concept of engagement and Giddens 
offers a new perspective on the abstract nature of institutional 
technology as a repository of rules and resources to be applied 
in action. However the emphasis on action by both authors was 
seen to have its own limitations. In Sartre it gives no place to 
institutional autonomy whilst Giddens cannot account adequately 
for a social level of analysis.
In contrast to all these approaches, which are fundamentally 
derived from Marx, the work of Foucault was seen to contradict 
the very foundations of Marx's theory. In doing so it highlights 
both the residual positivism in Marx's own work and its 
limitations for the critique of multiple forms of domination. Two 
key concepts developed by Foucault informed the
reconceptualisation of technology in this chapter; discontinuity 
and discourse. Discontinuity breaks with causal explanation and 
allows social institutions to be understood within their unique 
temporal and spatial contexts. Discourse describes the process by 
which those institutions change emphasising the ephemeral nature
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of power 8,nd knowledge which are the principal constituents of 
that discourse. As a consequence Foucault was seen to attribute 
little significance to individual action and to emphasise the 
autonomy of change. Foucault's work gave rise to a number of 
difficulties, mostly deriving from his attempts to retain the 
integrity of his own position in the light of his criticism of 
Marxists. As a consequence, it was suggested, his style is 
frequently evasive and leaves unanswered questions. He is also 
unable to find any significant role for praxis, for differing 
experiences of domination or for a totalisation of institutional 
relationships at the social level. Thus, each of these 
contributions, both those making different uses of Marx and that 
of Foucault which rejects Marxism entirely, was seen to have 
limitations for the purpose of reconceptualising technology. 
Together, however, they provided the means to undertake that 
task.
The concept constructed from these sources was described in terms 
of the relationships between three categories; the concrete, 
institutional and social levels of analysis. At the concrete 
level, technology was described as the active implementation of 
the potentials and restrictions embodied in the institutional 
level. However the interactive relationship between the active 
and institutional levels meant that neither could fully define 
technology. The institution must always embody more possibilities 
than are actually implemented, yet these cannot be described 
except in terms of their concrete occurence. Through this dual 
relationship, therefore, it was possible to establish the mutual 
repricocity between the uniqueness of each action (resulting from
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the specificity of time, place and actor) and the regularity of 
everyday experience (resulting from the common institutional 
source of shared meanings). This was confirmed by a description 
of the process by which this relationship generates and transmits 
change. The essence of that process is the pragmatic application 
of institutional resources. Confirmation of the expected 
consequences of action will reinforce the existing institutional 
structure but contradiction will require it to respond, and 
possibly change. Where change occurs this may alter the resource 
which is available to future action. Thus their is a continual 
circularity of use and change informed by the purposes and 
context of action.
However, this relationship between the concrete and institutional 
levels of analysis could not in itself embody the totality of 
technology which also had to take account of a similar 
relationship between the institution of technology and the social 
whole of which it is part. The same relationship which exists 
between the concrete and institutional levels was also seen to 
operate here, and indeed at all other levels of the 
socio-technological domain. But change through contradiction at 
different levels was only seen to be one type, and, drawing in 
particular on Foucault, a second type of change was described. 
This results, from the momentum generated by the autonomous logic 
operating at each level of analysis and through its own internal 
contradictions. The description of the new concept was concluded 
with a brief discussion of its implications for a broader social 
analysis, showing, in particular, that it did not require that 
any single institution or group should be the sole carrier of
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technological or social change but that it created the 
flexibility for examining the broad nature of such changes whilst 
recognising that they may, in practice or appearance, be focused 
for a time through a particular institution or group.
The process by which this concept has been developed was seen to 
be a formal application of the everyday process of structuring by 
which people make sense of their experiences. It therefore had to 
enter into the same dual relationship by which praxis, in this 
case a study of other authors, creates structural resources which 
can then be used in further action. This method carries the 
methodological implication, as Goldmann puts it, that:-
The advance of knowledge is thus to be 
considered as a perpetual movement to and 
fro, from the whole to the parts and from the 
parts to the whole again, a movement in the 
course of which the whole and the parts throw 
light upon one another. (100)
The mistake of positivism is its lack of an historical 
perspective for which Marx criticised the bourgeois economists 
(101) and which leads Gadamer to argue that:-
True historical thinking must take account of 
its own historicality. Only then will it not 
chase the phantom of an historical object 
which is the object of progressive research, 
but learn to see in the object the 
counterpart of itself and hence understand 
both. (102)
The use of this method, therefore, recognised the constraints it 
imposes, in particular its creation of artificial boundaries and 
categories which, although essential to the explication of the 
concept, can exclude as well as enable possibilities for 
understanding. In the pragmatic methodology which informs this
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conceptualisation, the value of those categories can only be seen 
in their application to empirical understanding. This chapter, 
therefore, must be seen as the first part of a process, which 
creates resources to be used empirically in the later chapters.
To this end, the next three chapters will look at aspects of 
computer technology in order to demonstrate the value of the 
concept. Chapter 5 will look at the historical antecedents of 
modern digital computers to understand both the timing of their 
general acceptance and the form of their concrete implementation. 
Chapter 6 will then look at the process of developing commercial 
computer systems to identify the contradictions leading to change 
and the directions it has taken. In chapter 7. the mechanisms of 
resistance to these changes will be identified and then applied 
in a broader context where their implications will be considered 
in more detail.
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CHAPTER 5
INTERPRETING THE HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE SYNTHETIC CONCEPT
Chapter 2 demonstrated the difficulties which arise from the 
variable usage of the term 'technology'. In particular it showed 
that current uses tend to emphasise either its concrete or 
abstract attributes at the expense of the other. Subsequently 
both positivist and non-positivist principles have been explored 
in search of a means of synthesising these two orientations. 
According to the positivist epistemology described in chapter 3 
technology is only incidentally related to the contemporary world 
in which it occurs. Different views may be held as to the source 
and status of technical knowledge, but technological change is 
invariably seen as a consequence of the independent and 
progressive development of new knowledge. An alternative view 
developed in chapter 4 sought to synthesise the concrete and 
abstract aspects of technology in a way not possible within the 
confines of these positivist principles. It represented 
technological change and the development of technical knowledge 
as the pragmatic and indexical consequences of a complex social 
reality whose various elements are mutually interdependent. 
Accordingly, new technology was seen to result from a discourse 
between social relations and knowledge. The required synthesis
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was achieved by locating this discourse within a set of 
relationships encompassing both action at the concrete level of 
analysis, and the rules and resources employed in action which 
reside at the institutional and social levels.
The second part of the thesis will now seek to demonstrate and 
provide empirical support for the ideas developed in the 
preceding chapters through their application to aspects of 
computers and their use. Specifically, the next three chapters 
explore the explanatory power of those ideas in terms of their 
ability to illuminate past, present and potential forms of 
computer technology. To do so they apply the notion of moving 
between different levels of analysis in such a way that each can 
enlighten the others. This method offers a resource to a 
potentially vast range of empirical projects ranging from the 
detailed analysis of a specific social process, such as the 
development of a particular computer program, to a wider ranging 
discussion at the institutional and social levels in order to 
explore the culture and ways of thinking which inform such 
processes. This thesis does not attempt to exploit opportunities 
at all these levels but concentrates on the social and 
institutional levels as a basis for the initial application of 
its concept whilst recognising the potential benefits of other 
empirical focuses.
The present chapter, which provides a discussion of alternative 
interpretations of the historical precedents of todays computers, 
serves to link the theoretical discussion which has preceded it 
and the later discussion of contemporary issues in the computer
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world. It does this firstly by reinforcing the rejection of the 
positivist basis for understanding and demonstrating the value of 
the synthetic alternative. In the process the three levels of 
analysis discussed in the theoretical development above recur in 
forms of causal explanations typically offered for historical 
events; that is the individual characteristics of significant 
actors (concrete level), the technological sophistication of 
their society (institutional level) and the effective demand for 
their ideas and inventions (social level). By emphasising the 
latter, the second linking element of this chapter is its 
reinforcement of the importance of the social level of analysis 
before the discussion in the next two chapters focuses on the 
institutional culture of computer technology.
The argument in this chapter will be developed in three stages.
In the first, the nature of historical explanations based on the 
positivist and synthetic concepts of technology will be 
summarised. The second stage will then describe a number of 
events which typically are taken to have contributed to digital 
computers as they currently exist and the final stage will 
contrast the interpretations of those events offered by the two 
concepts previously described. This will demonstrate the 
limitations of the causal/positivist approach and the broader 
understanding offered by the pragmatic/synthetic alternative.
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CAUSAL AND SYNTHETIC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PAST 
Historical understanding requires an appropriate language to 
describe events and the relationships between them. According to 
Elster (1), the causal mode of explanation involves principles of 
determinism, locality and temporal asymmetry. In other words, an 
event takes place because at a particular time and place there 
have existed:-
  a determinate set of causal
antecedents that are jointly sufficient and 
individually necessary for its occurence. (2)
This is essentially the same mode of explanation as that adopted 
by positivist science and assumes that events can be subsumed 
under general laws. Causal explanation therefore represents the 
past as a sequential unfolding of events within a unidirectional 
relationship described in terms of significant acts and actors. 
Its mode of explanation is essentially teleological so that the 
past is understood in terms of present meanings and past events 
explained in terms of the end-state to which they are seen to 
have led.
Some difficulties with the positivist mode of explanation were 
discussed in chapter 3- In this chapter it will be seen that the 
application of that method to historical understanding reflects 
those difficulties and creates its own peculiar problems. In 
particular, because it is not possible in historical analysis to 
confine a subject to an artificially constrained experiment, the 
causal method can never account for all the factors at work. 
Instead, we are left with the contradiction of a method seeking 
absolute definition and yet unable ever to identify final causes
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(3). The object of this chapter is to illustrate the consequences 
of that dilemma for understanding the historical development of 
computers by contrasting the form of historical explanation 
offered by causality with that arising out of the pragmatic and 
synthetic concept of technology developed in the last chapter.
(For brevity this concept will be labelled 'pragmatic' from now 
onwards.)
This latter view represents the past as a continuous process in 
which individual events are contextually circumscribed in complex 
interactions. Change is initiated through contradiction and 
momentum both at the level of action and within institutional and 
social logic. However there is no necessary or even identifiable 
relationship between the initiator(s) of change and their 
consequences. Technological change is not represented as the 
result of a natural progression of knowledge nor as the unfolding 
of a necessary sequence of events. Rather it seen as a pragmatic 
process of selection from available alternatives occuring within 
constraints created by the social principles which define the 
institution of technology and the society in which it exists.
This form of explanation requires no final causes. Instead it 
acknowleges the integrity of each moment so that events are 
viewed using the criteria which defined them at the time they 
happened and the processes of which they were part. It does not 
therefore rely on a one-way relationship of cause and effect but 
the dual relationships of mutual development. Similarly, it does 
not concentrate solely on people and events which are 
retrospectively seen to have played a significant role in some 
present state. Rather it is able to account for events whose
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significance cannot be represented in a simple causal 
relationship but which none-the-less were part of the total 
context within which change occured.
To compare the explanations offered by these alternative forms of 
historical understanding, this chapter will apply them to a 
number of events and trends which are typically represented as 
being significant for the development of the modern digital 
computer. In particular it will look at the question of why 
machines and ideas available since the l820's were not exploited 
for over a hundred years when, in the years since 1945, similar 
ideas and machines have become a dominating feature of industrial 
societies.
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EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF COMPUTERS
Charles Babbage - a prophet ignored in his time?
The earliest known reference to computing machinery was in 
letters written in 1623-4 by Wilhelm Schikard of Tubingen to 
fellow astonomer Johannes Kepler. The first authenticated working 
machine was produced by the French philosopher Blaise Pascal (4) 
in 1645 with others being made soon after by Samuel Moreland in 
Britain and Gottfried Leibniz in Germany. These early machines 
were little more than curiosities and they had no general impact 
even among scientists and mathematicians. However they represent 
one thread of the developing concern with calculation which was 
part of the revolution in scientific and mathematical thinking 
heralded by Galileo which had already seen the invention of 
logarithms (by Napier in I6l4) and the slide rule (by Delamain in 
1630 and independently by Oughtred two years later).
The first sustained effort to develop calculating machines was 
made by Charles Babbage (1792-1871). He was a leading figure in 
the revival of interest in mathematics and quantification which 
was part of the industrial revolution in Britain. As such, he was 
a founder member of the Analytical Society, which was in the 
vanguard of that revival, and demonstrated his interest in the 
practical application of mathematics through his membership of 
the Statistical and Astronomical societies. He won the letter’s 
first gold medal in 1823 for his "Observations on the Application 
of Machinery to the Computation of Mathematical Tables". He also 
developed techniques which are now the basis of operational 
research, and published the first comprehensive treatise on
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actuarial theory, the first reliable life tables and a set of 
logarithms. An interest in engineering led to an association with 
Brunei and to major improvements in metal-working techniques 
through his foreman, Whitworth (5).
The social and economic philosophy which Babbage applied to his 
work is illustrated by his book "On the Economy of Machinery and 
Manufactures" (6) in which he advocates the principle of division 
of labour and the application of machines to both physical and 
mental tasks. He describes the production of logarithm tables in 
France where, by an appropriate division of labour, the bulk of 
the calculation could be performed by relatively unskilled 
labour. One of the continual themes of his career was the 
development of machines which could replace even this limited 
human participation.
Initially he received support for his project from the British 
government and the scientific establishment. His first efforts to 
construct a machine began in 1822 and shortly after he 
demonstrated a working model of his Difference Engine (7)* He 
then began to build a much larger version of the machine which, 
with hindsight, demanded tolerances in craftmanship which were 
beyond those available to him, in spite of his efforts to 
encourage improvements. His lack of progress and deteriorating 
relations with his backers lost him his financial support and 
efforts to construct the Difference Engine were abandoned in 
1833. However a more modest version was made in Sweden by Pehr 
and Edward Scheutz. This won a Gold Medal at the Paris Exhibition 
of 1855 and was bought by an American observatory. A copy was
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also bought by the Registar-General’s Department in Britain for 
the production of life tables.
Far from being discouraged by the difficulties experienced with 
the Difference Engine, Babbage embarked on an even more ambitious 
project, the Analytical Engine. In many respects this embodied 
the first conception of the principles of the modern digital 
computer (8). This machine worked not on analogues of numbers but 
on digital representations which, in Babbage’s words:-
  converted the infinity of space, which
was required by the conditions of the 
problem, into the infinity of time. (9)
In other words, large numbers would no longer need bigger and 
more complex machines to physically represent them in analogue 
form but could be processed by more iterations on their digital 
representation and therefore take time rather than space. Wilkes, 
one of the pioneers of modern computers was to say of this work 
that:-
  Babbage was moving in a world of
logical design and system architecture, and 
was familiar with and had solutions for 
problems that were not to be discussed in the 
literature for another 100 years ..  (10)
Even in the 1940’s people working in the field of mechanical 
calculation were applying concepts which were cruder than those 
employed in the Analytical Engine. As with the Difference Engine 
however, Babbage’s design was not only brilliant but grandiose, 
and it was never completed.
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Data Processing Before the Second World War
We must recognise that while Babbage was concerned primarily with 
the development of calculating machines, the principal use of 
computers in modern industrial societies is data processing (11). 
For almost 80 years after Babbage’s death computation and data 
processing followed largely separate paths and it is approriate 
to consider separately some of the developments which occured in 
the latter field.
The first real stimulus for mechanical data processing came with 
the need to speed up the production of results from the United 
States census. By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
information being gathered in that rapidly changing country was 
taking so long to process that the results were of little 
practical value by the time they were available. A competition to 
find a solution to this dilemma was won by Herman Hollerith and 
was based on the use of cards containing information as a pattern 
of holes punched into them (12). The principle of holding 
information in this way had been used as early as the fourteenth 
century for controlling the sequence of mechanical clocks. It had 
also been used by Jaquard to control looms and adopted from him 
by Babbage. Its implementation in the form of Hollerith’s 
machines was used in the census of 1890 and produced the required 
results in six weeks.
Although Hollerith developed his machine not long after Babbage’s 
death, he was already the beneficiary of better machining
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techniques and a greater knowledge of electricity. Equally 
significantly, the task he was attempting, and his method of 
achieving it, were simple in conception and execution. Unlike 
Babbage, he was not trying to provide the means for performing 
complex calculations. Rather, the requirements of the census work 
typify many commercial applications which perform simple 
arithmetic and logical operations, such as counting and sorting, 
but do so on large amounts of data.
It was not long before punched card machines (or tabulators as 
they were often known) found their first commercial application 
when the New York Central Railroad began using them for 
accounting in 1895. To benefit from this potential market,
Hollerith left the US Census Bureau to start his own company 
which was ultimately to become part of IBM. His successor at the 
Census Bureau, James Powers, developed the machines further (13) 
until he too left to form his own company. From the turn of the 
century punched card equipment of this type was to become a 
normal part of the business scene and was only finally replaced 
when computers were generally accepted for use in commercial data 
processing in the 1960’s (14).
Computation Before the Second World War
Although machine assisted data processing was more widespread 
than its computational counterpart during the first half of the 
twentieth century, the modern digital computer still emerged as a 
result of developments in the latter field. And yet it was over 
seventy years after Babbage’s death before the principles he 
devised for the Analytical Engine were to be reunited in a single
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working machine. In the intervening period, however, a number of 
trends were developing which were to be realised in the 
construction of that machine.
One such trend was an increasing exploitation of the properties 
of electricity and the development of electro-mechanical devices. 
We have already seen one illustration of this in Hollerith’s 
punched card machines. Another example was the work of a 
Spaniard, Leornardo Torres y Quevedo, who won a Gold Medal at the 
Paris exhibition of 1920 for a working model of an 
electro-mechanical version of Babbage’s Analytical Engine. A 
second trend was the increasing role of science in the economy 
both as a basis for new industries and through ita application to 
research into new products and methods of production. At the same 
time there was an increasing use of mathematics and numeric 
representation of data, not only in science but in trade, 
accounting and government which, as we saw above, was being 
satisfied by punched card equipment.
A further trend was the development throughout this period of 
theoretical concepts and ideas which subsequently have been 
incorporated in modern digital computers. These are typified by 
developments of Boole’s symbolic logic. Boole (1815-64) was a 
contemporary of Babbage who may have been acquainted with Boole’s 
work which provides an ’algebra’, that is a language, for 
expressing logical relationships (15). It was not until 1938 that 
the American Claude Shannon designed the first electronic 
circuits based on these principles, but since then it has become 
the basis of all modern micro-electronic circuit design and the
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formal logic used in computer programming.
Another significant conceptual development was the work of Alan 
Turing, a British mathematician working at Cambridge University 
in the 1930’s. He defined the concept of a ’universal’ machine 
which, in principle, could solve any problem of any complexity on 
the condition that the solution could be defined by a finite 
number of steps, each involving an elementary operation (16). As 
we shall see in the next chapter, the ability to define an 
algorithm, that is a set of instructions specifying those steps, 
has become central to methods of specifying and implementing 
computer systems. It also represents a significant conceptual 
step in the history of technology by which the ’universal’ 
machine is not limited to a few physical operations, but, through 
its manipulation of symbolic representations, can become a 
different ’machine’ with each new set of instructions.
Although Hollerith and Powers were able to take commercial 
advantage of their inventions in the data processing field from 
the beginning of the century, the various elements of future 
calculating machines described above did not coalesce into a 
marketable product until after the Second World War. In the 
meantime the demand for calculating machines was met largely by 
those with a direct need. In Britain L.J. Comrie, who was 
Superintendent of H.M. Nautical Almanac Office, used commercial 
punched card equipment for producing tables of future positions 
of the moon. W.J. Ekert, an astronomer at Columbia University, 
also devised a combination of punched card equipment for use in 
his work. In Germany frustration with the calculations needed for
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his engineering studies led Konrad Zuse to develop his first 
calculating machine which was based on magnetic relays and an 
ingenious form of input using holes punched in old 35mm film 
(17). In the United States Howard Aitken was equally frustrated 
by the effort required to solve differential equations for his 
doctoral thesis. Unlike Zuse, who had no major backing, Aitken 
was to receive help from IBM and from I9M  his computer was used 
by the United States Navy. He was subsequently to develop a 
number of versions of the machine and play a significant role in 
the develoment of computer technology in the post-war years.
The Spur of War
There is no question that exploitation of the potential 
demonstrated in the work of Zuse and Aitken was accelerated by 
the Second World War. There was a general increase in the 
sophistication of many branches of engineering. New aircraft and 
weapons announced the age of the jet and the atomic bomb, there 
were significant improvements in analogue devices such as gun and 
bomb sights and in electronics there were considerable advances 
in fields such as RADAR and communications. These developments 
reflected changes in basic scientific techniques two of which, in 
particular, contributed to and accelerated the development of 
digital computers. One was the sheer size of the calculations 
required by the new science and technology which was making 
standard methods of performing them impractical. The second was 
that electronics was becoming a fashionable solution to the new 
problems being made urgent by the needs of war. These factors 
came together in Britain in the development of Colossus, a 
machine built for the specific purpose of breaking German codes.
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The essential technique for code-breaking was to identify 
patterns in the coded transmissions which would indicate the key 
to the code being used. Although sophisticated statistical 
techniques were employed, searching for these patterns was still 
a time-consuming process using conventional methods and was only 
made practical by electronic speeds. Colossus was a special 
purpose machine and did not have all the features which have 
subsequently come to be an accepted part of a digital computer. 
Even so, it was a significant advance in the use of electronics 
for computation and many of those involved with it were to play a 
role in the post-war development of computers in Britain.
However the details and success of Colossus were to be a secret 
for many years after the end of the war. As a result, the 
breakthrough in this field which was most publicised in the early 
post-war years was an American development, the Electronic 
Numerical Integrater and Computer (ENIAC). This machine used 
vacuum tubes as its principal method of storing the electronic 
impulses which represented its data. Like Colossus, it was 
exploiting a very expensive and untried technology which without 
the war may not have found a sponsor willing to take the 
investment risk. Originally designed for the production of 
artillery range tables, it was to be the training ground for many 
of the post-war pioneers of computer technology in America and to 
provide a public demonstration of the feasibility and potential 
of large scale electronic computers.
Some of the major advantages of electronic computers over 
mechanical calculation which it demonstrated were accuracy.
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flexibility in setting up problems, and the use of electronic 
components. The latter not only overcame the problems of 
tolerance in mechanical devices, such as those which dogged 
Babbage, but provided the possibility of mathematically 
determined error thus guaranteeing the replicability of results. 
However, as in Colossus, it was the speed provided by electronics 
which gave ENIAC its principal advantage over analogue 
alternatives. The use of electronics, which relies on switching 
between two states, together with the conceptual grounding 
provided by Boole and Turing, ensured that discrete rather than 
continuous representation of data became the norm for both the 
physical and logical design of computers and computer systems.
ENIAC itself was deficient as a modern digital computer in a 
number of respects. It was ’programmed’ by a plug board rather 
than an internally stored program and its ’programmers’ did not 
use many of the methods and principles which were to become 
standards for programming its successors. It also held its data 
in decimal rather than binary format and had relatively crude 
devices for entering information and recording results. These 
omissions, and its limited capacity for storing data, would be 
major drawbacks to the use of computers in data processing. 
ENIAC’s designers, however, were more aware of its limitations in 
terms of its computational capability and, according to 
Goldstine, had:-
  very specific ideas on the type of
mathematical problems needing solution and on 
the logical design of a new machine to handle 
them as well as its engineering design. (l8)
As a result, much of the development work immediately after the
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war concentrated on the computational potential of computers and 
led to a variety of new machines both in the United States and in 
Britain.
In this period of establishing the conceptual basis of modern 
computers the work of John von Neumann was particularly 
significant. Von Neumann was a mathematician whose interest in 
computers was essentially in their ability to solve mathematical 
problems. For him, therefore, the algorithmic approach was a 
natural choice for the basic principles to be adopted in this new 
field. His special skill, according to Goldstine, was the ability 
to clearly express those principles as they were being 
established by the pioneering work in which he was involved. 
Goldstine directly attributes to him two very significant 
advances. The first was to recognise that it is the logical 
operations taking place, and not their electronic representation, 
which is the significant feature in realising the potential of 
computers. The second was to identify the importance of the 
stored-program concept. This means that the complete set of 
instructions for performing a calculation should be held in the 
computer in its entirety rather than fed in sequentially. In this 
way the instructions can be altered according to the intermediate 
results of the calculation giving an important flexibility to the 
processing logic.
These principles, commonly referred to as the ’von Neumann 
architecture’, have remained the model for almost all data 
processing engineering to the present day. Only recently, with 
the need for even greater processing power than is possible with
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von Neumann’s architecture, have alternatives been considered. 
However, even in 1950 it was not the only model available. The 
possibility of alternative approaches was demonstrated by Norbert 
Wiener in 19^7 in his book ’Cybernetics’. Wiener first formulated 
his ideas when he was working on the design of a control system 
for anti-aircraft guns which maximised the chances of hitting an 
evading target. He began, not from Turing’s universal machine, 
but from a concept of ’information’ which embraced notions of 
control and communication which are equally applicable to 
machines and people. Thus the same principles can be applied to a 
management reporting cycle, an automated industrial plant or the 
human nervous system.
In Aleksander and Burnett’s words;-
  Wiener was already well aware that the
arrangement of electronic switches proposed 
by von Neumann was only one of a whole range 
of possible ’architectures’. Indeed Wiener’s 
whole approach to the possibility of 
information processing machines was quite 
different to that of von Neumann and the
other computer pioneers ..  Certainly when
it came to planning the structure of the 
computer the mathematicians and engineers did 
not look to nature for a model; instead the 
arrangement adopted was dictated by the idea 
of a computer as a programmed machine that 
would resolve mathematical and logical 
problems. (19)
However it was the von Neumann model which predominated and by 
the early 1950’s the essential elements of modern digital 
computers had been defined and demonstrated. The main limitations 
on their widespread use were inconvenience and the expense of the 
engineering involved.
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Post-war Developments In Data Processing
Although computers have revolutionised the possibilities of 
science in the post-war years, their most direct social impact 
has been in the field of data processing. Even though computation 
remained the primary use for computers immediately after the war, 
some of the first commercially available machines were used in 
non-computational roles. The LEO (Lyons Electronic Office) was 
used by J. Lyons in Britain from 1950 and the United States 
Census office installed a Univac machine the following year. The 
spread of computers for data processing was delayed initially by 
IBM’s reluctance to enter the field which it already dominated 
with punched card equipment. However the industrial boom which 
paralleled the Korean War finally brought it into this new market 
which it was also soon to dominate.
The transition to using computers for data processing involved a 
number of avenues of development. Perhaps the most significant 
early breakthrough was the conceptual realisation that the 
information used by science is only one form of data and 
computation only one possible type of data processing. It is not 
possible to identify a moment when this realisation occured, 
rather it represents one aspect of the process which saw an 
increasing willingness to subject non-numerical data to the same 
logical processes as were used by mathematicians. Technically 
this became realistic with the implementation of symbolic logic 
in electronics which demonstrated both that information could be 
stored as electronic bits and that arrangements of this logic 
could be set up to represent conditional constructs (20).
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However the possibility of a more general use of computers for 
data processing was also improved by other developments. In 
particular, changes in engineering meant that computers became 
more reliable, cheaper and more convenient in terms of size and 
heat output. In other words they became mass market products 
(21). Another field of development was in the engineering of 
devices peripheral to the central processor to make the input, 
output and long-term storage of large volumes of data more 
convenient. One of the major differences between computation and 
commercial data processing is that the former does large amounts 
of processing on relatively little data whilst the latter does a 
little processing on large volumes of data. Hence the importance 
to a viable data processing machine of devices such as fast 
paper-tape and card readers, printers and magnetic storage on 
tapes and drums. Progress in this direction was not smooth 
however, partly because most innovation still originated in the 
universities who retained a computational bias. Hence, in 196^ , 
one commentator noted that:-
No clear, general formulation of business 
requirements, an experimenter’s disdain for 
costs, and continual advances in electronics, 
have caused the development of A.D.P. 
machines to be dominated by technical 
factors. One of the more significant has been 
the continued mismatch between the speeds of 
calculation and of entering and removing 
data. (22)
However it was not only hardware developments which could resolve 
these difficulties. Increasingly the basic architecture of 
machines involved a mix of hardware and software (23). The 
software element, the machine operating system, was created to 
interface between the physical operation of the machine and the
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programs using it. One of its functions was to overcome the 
discrepancy in speed between the central processor and the 
peripheral devices for inputting and outputting data. Until this 
could be done, the benefit of electronic speed for data 
processing was always limited by the performance of the 
electro-mechanical peripherals. The essence of the solution was 
to separate the execution of a program from its communication 
with slow peripherals. To achieve this, a fast peripheral such as 
a magnetic drum, was used to interface between the processor and 
the slower peripherals such as card readers and printers. The 
data to be input was transferred to the faster device prior to 
program execution and its results written back to it for 
subsequent output on, say, a printer.
In itself this technique could not reduce the overall time taken 
to execute a program and a parallel development in operating 
systems also gave them a facility to share the time of the 
central processor between a number of programs. Thus, while a 
main program was processing, reading and writing its data from 
fast peripherals, other programs could use the short periods when 
it was waiting for a transfer of data to do other processing.
These programs would typically be printing data left by a 
previous program or reading data from cards to be used by a later 
one. We can see how from the beginning, therefore, the technical 
contradictions of electronic data processing were being resolved 
by the standard positivist technique of reducing a complex 
operation to its component parts and rearranging them without 
radically altering the final result.
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Another area in which the use of machines was being made easier 
was in the development of programs, particularly the languages in 
which they were written. This was important for commercial data 
processing if organisations were to be able to develop their own 
programs. Increasingly the object of language design was to hide 
the programmer from the task of physically controlling the 
hardware or understanding the basic principles of the computer’s 
operation. This detachment was achieved by letting the programmer 
write in a code which was then translated into instructions which 
could be executed by the machine (2Ü). The earliest languages 
reflected the still dominant interest in computation; hence 
FORTRAN (formula translator) was introduced in 1957. However by 
1959 work was also beginning on the definition of COBOL (Common 
Business Oriented Language) which has become the standard 
language for most commercial installations.
These developments began to have a significant impact by the 
mid-1960’s when they could take advantage of increases in the 
power of central processors which ensured that the extra 
processing required by high-level languages and the operating 
system did not detract from the performance of the users’ 
programs. Since then the use of computers has become almost 
compulsory for all but the most limited data processing 
operations. With the introduction of personal computing (25) many 
of these are also succumbing.
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APPLYING THE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
Causal
In terms of developing an understanding of technological change, 
the main point of interest in the series of historical 
circumstances described above is not so much the detail of the 
technical developments, but why the machines and ideas produced 
by Babbage were not taken up more enthusiastically by his 
contemporaries when similar ones have revolutionised modern 
industrial societies. If we adopt a causal mode of explanation, 
this will require the identification of necessary cause(s) which 
were absent in the first instance and present in the second. In 
discussing Babbage, Mowshowitz suggests three causes which may be 
relevant.
The computational needs of the nineteenth 
century were not seen by his contemporaries 
to warrant the dedication of resources 
required for such a project. In addition the 
technology of the period was inadequate, 
perhaps even inappropriate, to the task.
Babbage’s continual modifications in the 
design also complicated matters. Too much a 
visionary, he could not compromise his grand 
design to translate possibility into 
feasibility. (26)
Thus Mowshowitz has selected effective demand, the state of 
engineering knowledge and Babbage’s own personality as elements 
in a causal explanation (27).
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Refering to Babbage’s personality, Bowden comments that:-
It was the tragedy of the man that, though 
his imagination and vision were unbounded, 
his judgement by no means matched them, and 
his impatience made him intolerant of those 
who failed to sympathize with all his 
projects. (28)
There is no question that Babbage alienated those who had lobbied 
for, and provided, his early financial support, both by his 
attitude to them and by the lack of results from his efforts. 
Consequently he was not the best person to encourage a general 
understanding or acceptance of either his conceptual achievements 
or the practical potential of his machines. If we compare this 
with the circumstances after the Second World War, we find that 
there was a key figure, von Neumann, who was able to communicate 
the essential concepts of the digital computer, and others who 
were able to demonstrate the engineering practicality of 
implementing them. However the argument based on Babbage’s 
character loses some of its force in view of evidence that others 
were available to perform the role of advocate for him. As we 
noted above, at least two Difference Engines were put to 
practical use, one in Britain and the other in America. Babbage 
also had the assistance of the colourful Lady Lovelace who 
produced both an excellent description of the Analytical Engine 
and, by repute, the first computer program (29).
Mowshowitz’s second line of explanation is the inadequacy of the 
technical knowledge and skills available to Babbage. Writing in 
1953. Bowden (30) doubted whether it was possible even then to 
produce a mechanical device of the complexity envisaged by 
Babbage. When his ideas were implemented in later years by
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Torres, the latter was able to employ electro-mechanical 
techniques and the real breakthrough which led to the modern 
digital computer came with electronics. An explanation in terms 
of available knowledge, therefore, seems more convincing than one 
based on Babbage’s personality. However this still cannot explain 
why no major effort was made to solve the technical problems he 
faced, or to develop his ideas once those problems had been 
solved in later years. For example, one possible basis for a 
computer was available as early as when the Bell Telephone
Company considered the use of the mechanical switching devices 
used in telephone networks as a means of storing and processing 
data. However it was not until the Second World War that such a 
device was built. We have also seen that Torres had produced a 
working electro-mechanical version of the Analytical Engine by 
1920 and, as Randell comments:-
  there seems little reason to doubt
that, should the need have been sufficiently 
pressing, Torres would indeed have built a 
complete analytical engine. As we shall see 
in later chapters, it was not until the 
1939-19^5 war that the desirability of large 
scale fully-automatic calculating machines 
became so clear that the necessary 
environment was created for Babbage’s concept 
to become a reality. (31)
Of the causal explanations suggested by Mowshowitz, therefore, 
the most feasible would seem to be the lack of an effective 
demand for the facilities Babbage, and later Torres, were 
offering. If an effective demand had been available during his 
lifetime, we might have expected greater efforts to overcome the 
barriers created by his own personality and the limits of 
technology, or at least to make more use of what had been 
achieved by the Scheutz’s. Instead, the demand for calculating
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machines by Babbage’s contemporaries was much as it had been 
since Pascal and Leibniz first produced their machines in the 
seventeenth century, that is to reduce the drudgery of 
calculation especially in the production of tables such as those 
used by astronomers. Napier’s publication of logarithms had been 
similarly motivated.
Seeing that there is nothing (right well 
beloved students of the mathematics) that is 
so troublesome to mathematical practice, nor 
that doth more molest and hinder 
calculations, than the multiplications, 
divisions, square and cubical expansions of 
great numbers, which beside the tedious 
expense of time, are for the most part 
subject to many slippery errors, I began to 
consider in my mind by what certain and ready
art I might remove these hinderances ..
(33)
Even by the 1930’s the motivation for constructing calculating 
machines was largely as it had been for Pascal, the need to solve 
an immediate mathematical problem. Hence those produced by Aitken 
and Zuse were both built initially to deal with the mathematical 
problems raised by other fields of study. Similarly, ENIAC was 
originally built to calculate artillery range tables (33) and 
Babbage’s own interest in mechanical calculation was stimulated 
by their potential for the automatic production of logarithm 
tables rather than by possible commercial or industrial 
applications. It was only with the emergence of ’big’ science 
during and after the Second World War, and the direct government 
involvement which that entailed, that a general demand for 
calculating power became effective (3Ü). Meanwhile the demand 
which had developed for automatic data processing in commerce and 
industry was being met by a different type of solution in the 
form of punched card machines.
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There is certainly a case, therefore, for arguing that lack of 
demand can explain the failure of his contemporaries to take up 
Babbage’s ideas with more enthusiasm. However this type of 
explanation only leads us to ask more questions both about why 
the demand was not there and why it was to develop subsequently. 
The same difficulty arises in explaining the course of post-war 
developments. What causes, for example, explain the adoption of 
the von Neumann architecture rather than the cybernetic 
alternative, and what factors brought about the developments in 
operating systems and programming languages? In each case an 
explanation based simply on causation can at best be partial and 
can never grasp the totality of its subject.
Synthetic
The alternative form of historical explanation derived from the 
concept of technology developed in the last chapter suggests that 
the limitations of causal explanation may be overcome by 
recognising the pragmatic nature of the historical process. As 
that discussion observed, some structuring is inevitable if 
understanding is to be achieved. In historical studies it is 
convenient to create that structure by relating a series of 
historical events in terms of a common theme such as the 
development of calculating machinery. However the synthetic 
concept of history demands continual awareness of the 
vulnerability of such structures lest their convenience be 
mistaken for some necessary feature or process of history. This 
does not deny the significance of specific features such as the 
role of individuals, the availability of knowledge or the
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existence of demand. Nor does it deny the enabling effects of the 
concurrence of a number of such features. However it interprets 
these features in a context where they are not independent 
parameters of a discrete event, but part of a complex process 
occuring over time. Wilder makes a similar point in the case of 
mathematics when he argues that:-
At any given time, there will evolve only 
concepts that are so related to the existing 
mathematical culture as to increase its 
utility in meeting the demands of either its 
own hereditary stresses or the environmental 
stresses from the host culture. (35)
One possible means of overcoming simplistic causal explanations 
is suggested by Pinch and Bijker (36) who use the concept of 
’relevant social groups’ to explain the direction taken by 
technological development and the possibilities excluded on the 
way. Relevant social groups consist of people with a similar 
perception of an emerging technological artefact, each of which 
will identify different ’problems’ with the new artefact and a 
number of possible solutions to that problem. The process of 
selecting which problems will be solved, and which solution 
chosen, is shown to involve not only ’technical’ evaluations but 
’non-technical’ considerations such as morality and legality.
Pinch and Bijker see this approach as the beginnings of a social 
constructivist approach to technology, that is one which looks at 
the social derivation of not only the ’use’ of technology but 
also its ’content’. In this they take their lead from 
developments in the sociology of science. Although they use a 
different conceptual framework from the synthetic concept of 
technology developed in this thesis (’problem’ rather than 
’contradiction’, ’closure-mechanism’ rather than ’response to
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contradiction’), there are grounds for suggesting that the two 
approaches are complementary. Thus it would seem that the 
synthetic concept takes the work of Pinch and Bijker a stage 
further by seeking to identify not only direct social influences 
but to locate the construction of problems, and the prediliction 
to certain solutions, by these influences within the broad social 
context of their occurence.
However, while the consequence of the causal approach is that all 
events in an identified chain are interpreted in terms of the 
concepts and realities of the historian’s present. The synthetic 
intepretion is in terms of the context and categories pertaining 
at the time of the event. Thus it can accommodate a fundamental 
asymmetry between the cultural and epistemological environments 
of Babbage’s nineteenth century Britain and the mid-twentieth 
century. In Foucault’s terms it accounts for the discontinuity 
between the two periods which makes the meanings and categories 
of one inappropriate for understanding the other. It allows, 
therefore, that although Babbage’s society was undergoing rapid 
industrialisation, the habits and cognitive style that have come 
to dominate modern industrial societies were not yet established. 
Indeed Babbage himself was instrumental in making the case for 
the application of mechanistic thinking to industry. Hence we 
cannot argue that had the same people and techniques been 
available in his time as were to be found in 19^ 5. his ideas 
would have been taken up. This is not simply because there was no 
demand, but because it would deny the essential incompatibility 
of the nature of digital computers and the cognitive style which 
dominated nineteenth century Britain.
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Although this idea of discontinuity is a useful shorthand, 
however, we must be wary of assuming that there is a single 
identifiable point at which the transition occured. It was not a 
sudden event but the culmination of a long process of change 
which we now label the ’Industrial Revolution’ (37). The nature 
of that process is illustrated by the typical motivation for 
technological change which in the nineteenth century was 
essentially application oriented, whereas in the twentieth 
century it is typically based on the implementation of 
generalised principles. Thus, in the earlier period, most 
technical developments resulted from practitioners applying their 
experience to the resolution of the specific contradictions which 
they experienced in their own workplace or industry. Their 
motivation was economic not scientific (38). The application of 
general principles was still not the broadly accepted way of 
developing knowledge relating to industrial equipment and 
processes. As Flinn comments;-
There is a strong case for arguing that 
industrial technology and scientific research 
proceeded on independent if parallel lines 
for a century or possibly more after the 
foundation of the Royal Society [175^ ]. (39)
A key feature in the transition to general principles was the 
broader application of ’scientific’ methods and particularly the 
language of mathematics. In Babbage’s society, concern with 
mathematics was limited to a few occupations such as engineering 
and navigation although one of his own contributions was to 
stimulate a wider interest in its practical applications. There 
were also indications of a developing concern with the collection
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of information and its numerical presentation. The first national 
census was taken in I85I and more sophisticated mechanisms of 
financial control were being developed in the form of limited 
liability companies, the rationalisation of financial 
institutions such as banks and the Stock Exchange, and the growth 
in industrial units beyond the size which could be controlled by 
the individual entrepreneur. By the twentieth century the trends 
had gathered considerable momentum and, as Mowshowitz notes:-
The rapid diffusion of computer applications 
in the post-war period is not a historical 
accident contingent upon the chance creation 
of a single instrument. Both the disposition 
to use the computer and the particular areas 
of its application have been conditioned by
prior developments  .. Perhaps the key to
understanding the present disposition of 
computer applications lies in the fact that 
advances in computing technology accompanied 
the growth of large-scale industrial 
enterprise and centralised government 
administration. (Ü0)
However, in the nineteenth century, as Pollard (Ü1) points out, 
forms of commercial accounting were still very simple and 
managerial knowledge, like industrial innovation, was restricted 
largely to the running of a particular industry rather than the 
application of general principles. Most critically, perhaps, the 
conceptual link had not been made whereby it was natural to apply 
essentially computational tools and logic to non-computational or 
simple arithmetic data processing requirements. This gap between 
the mathematical needs of scientists, which led them to develop 
calculating machines, and the data processing needs of industry 
and government resulted in their largely separate development 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
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The construction of digital computers beginning in the 19 0^*s 
therefore was not so much the culmination of a series of 
necessary stages of technical innovation as the maturation of a 
conceptual development which established positivism, especially 
scientific and technological thinking, as the basis for the 
principles of social cohesion. The development of data processing 
after 19Ü-5 illustrates a very different situation from the period 
before the Second World War. The synthetic method suggests, 
therefore, that a crucial element in the merging of the 
computational and data processing streams of development, to the 
point where they used the same machine architecture, was the 
creation of this mutually compatible environment in which both 
could apply the same logical principles to their operations. This 
had emerged as the culmination of the trends which were described 
above and led to the establishment of the von Neumann 
architecture. Basic concepts based on the algorithmic principle 
were then applied to both the engineering of hardware and the 
construction of software. Thus the response to the contradictions 
being experienced in the commercial use of computers such as slow 
peripherals and lack of mass storage, was confined within this 
mechanistic paradigm which consequently generated its own 
momentum.
A similar argument can be applied to explaining the failure of 
Wiener’s ideas to have an impact on the fundamental architecture 
of computers in the 1950’s. Rather than an explanation in terms 
of his personality, technical feasibility and demand, the 
synthetic view recognises the discontinuity, that is the 
essential incompatibility, between the principles which he
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advocated and the algorithmic principles supported by the 
dominant mathematical/engineering culture in which the first 
machines were developed.
Thus, although complexity of historical processes requires that a 
synthetic interpretation of past events be structured in order to 
make it comprehensible, the status of that structure is very 
different from the one imposed by a causal explanation. The 
events it describes are linked not by chronological causality but 
by changes in institutions and social principles resulting from 
contradictions and momentum in action and institutional logic. To 
understand why Babbage’s contemporaries were not even aware of 
the opportunity they were missing, it judges them not by the 
categories and values of societies which have grasped that 
opportunity a century later, but in terms of the categories and 
values of his own society. The process by which simliar ideas 
subsequently came to be adopted and then developed is to be 
understood in terms of the momentum generated and the 
contradictions emerging in the intervening and subsequent 
periods. In this sense we cannot say that the opportunity for 
computers as we now know them even existed at the earlier time.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has started to explore and assess the benefits of 
the synthetic concept of technology constructed in the last 
chapter. It began with a summary of the forms of historical 
explanation offered by that concept and an alternative derived 
from positivism. It followed with a description of some events 
and trends typically associated with the historical development 
of mechanical computation and data processing. It then compared 
the understanding of those events and trends offered by the 
pragmatic/synthetic and positivist/causal concepts of 
technological change. It focused particularly on the question of 
why machines and ideas developed by Babbage in the nineteenth 
century were largely ignored until they were subsequently 
incorporated into the digital computer which has since become a 
dominant feature of modern industrial societies.
Typical causal explanations in terms of personalities, the 
availability of knowledge and effective demand, were examined and 
found either to have limited support or to leave questions 
unanswered. These difficulties it was suggested arise from its 
uni-directional and telelogical mode of explanation which is 
unable to account for the complexities, discontinuities and 
contextual uniqueness of the historical process. It was not 
suggested that the elements identified in causal explanation are 
not significant, rather that the structure it imposes on them is 
unsatisfactory.
The synthetic approach was seen to offer the opportunity to 
overcome the limitations of causal explanation. It does so
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firstly by recognising the importance of the total context within 
which historical events occur. This allows for the interaction of 
disparate social functions through their common identity in the 
principles which bind their society. It also recognises the 
potential for discontinuity between that context and the one in 
which the historian undertakes his work. Finally, it does not 
limit the historian’s view to those people and events which, with 
hindsight, have proved significant. Change is a process of 
selection between alternatives. The direction taken is 
constrained by the social context in which it is chosen and the 
same explanation can be used in understanding the paths which 
were not followed as in understanding those which were. Thus we 
can explain the development of modern digital computers both by 
identifying the culture of the von Neumann architecture from 
which they are derived, and by explaining why Wiener’s cybernetic 
alternative was not acceptable. As with Wynne’s discussion of 
Barkla (^ 2), therefore, understanding is focused not on the 
’technical’ or ’scientific’ validity of a particular idea or 
machine, but on the social process in which it is accepted or 
rejected.
This application of the synthetic concept of technology has 
demonstrated the value of its flexibility and comprehensiveness 
in developing historical understanding. However it is implicit in 
that concept that understanding of the present and all possible 
futures will be derived from the same pragmatic relationships 
through which the past has developed and will, therefore, be 
subject to the same mode of explanation. Because it acknowledges 
no natural or progressive logic which gives special status to
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present knowledge, except in so far as it is currently pragmatic, 
so each moment in time has the same potential for change as the 
last. The next two chapters will explore this mode of 
understanding, firstly in relation to contemporary changes in 
computer technology, and then to a consideration of the future 
implied by the continued application of positivist principles to 
computer technology.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5
1. Elster J. ’Explaining Technological Change’, 1983,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2. Ibid., p. 27
3. Sartre creates much the same problem with his insistence
that all social entities must ultimately be explained 
by the human actions which created them.
4. A popular computer language has been after Pascal.
5. He is also credited with the design of the cowcatcher
featured on American railway engines of the period.
6. Babbage C. ’On the Economy of Machinery and
Manufactures’, 1835, Charles Knight, London
7. This is named after the mathematical principle on which
it is based.
8. The main ones being:-
- A Mill - a mechanism for performing arithmetic
- Memory - for the storage of intermediate results
- A library of routines for common functions
- A control unit - which allows conditional branching
- Input - punched cards
- Automatic printing of results
9. quoted in Randell B. (Ed.), ’The Origins of Digital
Computers’, 1982, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, p. 11
An analogue represents a value as a physical quantity 
such as voltage or, in Babbage’s case, as teeth on a 
cog. A digital representation is a code for the value. 
Hence 10 may be represented as an analogue by the 
distance between the x’s x x, and digitally as 10
(the decimal code), as 1010 (the binary code) etc. For 
an analogue device like Babbage’s Difference Engine to 
process larger numbers, the machine had to increase in 
size to accommodate the larger number of cogs. For a 
digital machine like the Analytical Engine which 
achieves multiplication and division by repeated 
addition and subtraction respectively, processing 
larger numbers principally requires an increase in the 
time taken for the increase in additions and 
subtractions.
One example of this distinction is wrist watches which 
may be analogue, ie. represent time as distance round 
the clock-face, or digital, ie. represent time as 
numbers.
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An important implication of the difference is that 
digital representations are always in units and 
therefore discrete whilst analogue representations are 
potentially continuous although in practice the 
mechanism producing them may create units, eg. teeth on 
a cog.
10. Randell B. 1982 op cit., p. 11
11. The principal distinction between commercial data
processing and computation is that computation normally 
performs complex processing on a limited amount of data 
whilst data processing normally performs a simple 
procedure on a large amount of data. This distinction
is necessarily simple but is sufficient to explain both
their separate paths to mechanisation in the first half 
of the twentieth century, and the contradictions which 
shaped the development of computers to meet data 
processing requirements after 1ÇÜ-5-
12. The size of the standard 80 column card used by IBM
began with Hollerith who based it on a Dollar bank 
note.
13. The main reason for these developments was an attempt to
circumvent the patents held by Hollerith.
14. Some attempts were made to use this type of equipment
for scientific purposes (see below) but its limited 
calculating powers made this largely untenable.
15. Typical Boolean operators are AND, NOT and OR used in
statements such as:-
- IF X is true AND Y is true THEN Z is true - which 
defines a relationship in which both conditions are 
required for the result to occur
- IF X is true OR Y is true THEN Z is NOT true - which 
defines a relationship where if either of the 
conditions is met the result does not occur.
16. This will be recognised as an application of one of the
principles of positivism described in chapter 3-
17. Those who would take the regression of causal analysis
to its logical conclusion might like to identify the 
chain of causality whereby Zuse and his chief 
collaborator were originally brought together by a 
common interest in King Kong.
It is not clear how far Zuse developed this work and in 
the aftermath of the Second World War it was largely 
forgotten.
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18. Golds tine H.H. ’The Computer from Pascal to von
Neumann’, 1972, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
p. 186
19. Aleksander I. and Burnett P. ’Reinventing Man’, 1983,
Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 107-8
20. There are a number of conditional constructs, eg. ’IF x
is true THEN do y ELSE do s’, and ’WHILE x is true DO
y’. The conditions (x) are typically stated in Boolean 
terms, eg. (p AND q) OR r. The significance of these 
constructs can be seen from the fact that in the 
technique known as structured programming (see chapter 
6) all possible requirements are reduced to four or 
five such constructs.
21. The term generation is used to represent changes in the
principal form of circuitry, ie.
- igliH to 1958/9 - various types finally settling by 
about 1953 on vacuum tubes
- 1958/9 to 1969 - Transistors
- 1967 to date - Solid state integrated circuits
Some would add a fourth generation for the very large 
scale integrated circuits which made micro-computers 
possible.
The term generation has also been used to distinguish 
the sophistication of operating system facilities (see 
below) and more recently has become embodied in terms 
like ’fourth generation language’ and Japan’s ’fifth 
generation research programme’ where it impies 
something advanced.
22. Laver F.J.M. ’A User’s View of A.D.P. Systems Design’
in The Computer Journal Vol 7, 196Ü-5, P*93
23. Hardware is taken to mean the physical mechanism by
which processing is achieved and software to mean a
program of instructions. (NB. the spelling ’program’
which is normal in technical circles is used throughout 
this thesis). This flexibility in combining the machine 
and its operating instructions is a natural 
implementation of the ’universal’ machine where the 
hardware alone does not define its capabilities.
2k. There are a number of techniques for this process such
as compilation, assembly and interpretation.
’Translation’ is used here to cover them all rather 
than in a specific technical sense.
25. Personal computing has arisen from the ability to reduce
the circuitry for a computer to a size where it can 
comfortably fit on an individual desk. Some idea of the 
extent of this reduction in size can be seen from a 
comparison of a modern personal computer with ENIAC. 
The latter was 100 feet long, 3 feet deep and 10 feet 
high with the capacity for less than 2000 numeric
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digits. A typical PC will be no more than 2 feet in 
each direction with potential storage of 6kO kilobytes 
of data directly accessible and a further 20 megabytes 
or more on disc.
26. Mowshowitz A. ’The Conquest of Will’, 1976,
Addison-Wesley, Reading Mass, p. 36
27. Aleksander and Burnett (1983 op cit.) identify similar
causal factors in explaining why Wiener’s ideas were 
largely ignored in computer circles in the crucial 
period after World War II:-
It was, perhaps, unfortunate that 
over-enthusiasm on the part of his 
disciples [encouraging the idea 
that he saw people as entirely 
replacable by machines] was 
mirrored by traits in Wiener’s 
character which led him to savour 
his sudden elevation to the status 
of prophet with a certain ponderous
relish ..  The main reason why,
for a quarter of a century after 
the publication of ’Cybernetics’,
Wiener’s proposal that mechanical 
intelligence might be investigated 
on ’bottom-up’ principles went 
unheeded was the apparent 
impracticality of the undertaking.
However intriguing the idea of 
direct comparisons between natural 
and artificial neural nets, it 
simply did not look like a workable 
proposition on either technical or 
economic grounds, (pp. 107 & 209)
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28. Bowden B.V. (Ed.) ’Faster then Thought’, 1953, Pitman,
New York, p. 15
His intolerance was legendary in his own time with, in
retrospect, amusing consequences.
Babbage was intensely annoyed by 
the cries of street musicians, who, 
so he said, made it impossible for 
him to concentrate on his work.
Instead of following the example of 
a fellow sufferer - Thomas Carlyle 
- who retreated to a sound-proof 
room, Babbage embarked on a 
life-long vendetta against them, 
and tried to have them prosecuted.
This public-spirited action so 
enraged his contemporaries that 
jeering children followed him 
through the streets; drum and fife 
bands came miles out of their way 
to serenade him, and indignant 
citizens who had an hour or two to 
spare made a point of having a 
drink at some local hostelry, and 
then blowing trumpets and other 
instruments under his windows at 
all hours of day and night. (Bowden 
p. 15)
29. Lady Ada Lovelace, whose husband was the poet Lord
Byron, has now been recognised in the naming of a new 
language commissioned by the Americal Department of 
Defence (ADA). Unfortunately her mathematical skills 
were not up to the task of saving her from large 
gambling losses.
30. Bowden B.V. 1953 op cit.
31. Randell B. 1982 op cit., p. iZl
32. quoted in Bowden B.V. 1953 op cit., p. viii
33. It was used by von Neumann for other calculations
possibly including some required for the development of 
the Atomic Bomb.
3II. see Sklair L. ’Organised Knowledge’, 1973. Paladin, St.
Albans
35. Wilder R.L. ’Evolution of Mathematical Concepts’, 1968,
J. Wiley & Sons, New York, p. 207
2Zk
36. Pinch T.J. and Bijker W.E. ’The Social Construction of
Facts and Artefacts: or How the Sociology of Science 
and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each 
Other’ in Social Studies of Science Vol. Ik No. k, Aug. 
19&k.
On a social constructivist approach to technology, see 
also Woolgar S. ’Why not a Sociology of Machines? The 
Case of Sociology and Artificial Intelligence’ in 
Sociology Vol. 19 No. k, Nov. 1985
37. see Mathias P. ’The First Industrial Nation’, I969»
Menthuen, London
38. see Pollard S. ’The Genesis of Modern Management’,
1968, Penguin, Harmondsworth
39. Flinn M.W. ’Origins of the Industrial Revolution’,
1966, Longmans, London, p. 77
kO. Mowshowits A. 1976 op cit., pp. 1 & 2
kl. Pollard S. 1968 op cit.
k2. Wynne B. ’C.G. Barkla and the J Phenomenon: A Case
Study in the Treatment of Deviance in Physics’ in 
Social Studies of Science Vol. 6 No.’s 3 & Sept.
1976. See chapter k.
225
CHAPTER 6
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS
COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND THE PROBLEM OF COMPLEXITY 
A Further Demonstration of the Limits of Positivism 
The last chapter began to develop empirical support for the 
synthetic concept of technology by contrasting its interpretation 
of the historical development of computers with that offered by a 
positivist/causal analysis. The positivist view? set historical 
events within a progressive sequence constructed retrospectively 
and with knowledge of the ’final’ result, the computer. It 
employed without question contemporary categories and concepts to 
explain both the present and its derivation. The synthetic view 
explained the same events in terms of the indexical meanings of 
actions within the context of the institutional and social logics 
prevalent when they occured. As a result, the eventual 
development of the modern computer was seen to be a consequence 
of broad social changes rather than the independent development 
of science and technology. Hence, it was shown to be the 
relationships within w;hich change occured, and the multiplicity 
of alternative courses they presented, which gave rise to the 
possibility of computers, the desire to create them, the concrete 
form they have taken, and the uses to which they are being put.
In this chapter, and the next, the synthetic concept of 
technology will be applied to changes occuring in contemporary 
computer technology. This chapter wjill look in particular at the
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methods used to develop commercial data processing systems. It 
will explain the nature of those systems and describe the process 
by which they are developed. This description will show that 
social and institutional resources are employed in shaping both 
the general form of the methods used and the specific design of 
particular systems. It will also show how these resources take 
concrete form through the actions of the individuals involved in 
the development process. Thus, it will be suggested, computer 
systems, and the programs (2) which are their main component, are 
not the consequence of an objective technical process but emerge 
from a social discourse. The second half of the chapter will then 
examine ongoing debates about the methods of systems development 
and how it should be managed. This will demonstrate that the 
epistemology underlying the development process is based on 
positivist principles through the application of mechanistic 
models from mathematics, engineering and management.
A recurrent theme in this chapter will be the difficulties 
currently being experienced in establishing development methods 
and managing the development process. It will be suggested that 
the explanation of these difficulties lies in a failure to 
recognise, or adequately account for, the social nature of the 
development process; in particular the complex and abstract 
nature of the reality being subjected to computer processing.
This failure, it will be argued, results from the limitations of 
the positivist principles which underlie current methods and 
which are being exposed in this new arena.
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The Value of Computers as an Empirical Subject (3)
Computer systems provide a fruitful subject for exposing the 
limitations of positivism because they embody features not 
associated with traditional technology. Although they are still 
based on the use of a machine, they process and output symbolic 
representations rather than concrete materials (k). Hence 
computers provide the same enhancements to human mental functions 
that other technology has provided for their physical functions. 
However, whilst the different parts of the physical body have 
limited purposes and capabilities which can be isolated from the 
whole, the brain, through its manipulation of symbols, can be 
adapted to many functions. Consequently, in trying to extend the 
capabilities of the brain, computers have reversed the tendency 
to specialisation inherent in other forms of modern technology.
The computer as a machine (hardware), like the human body, is of 
little practical value in itself. Instead, it represents a 
potential which requires instructions to direct its opération.
This is provided by programs (software) which are analogous to 
the brain within the hardware body.
Computer software operates at two main levels. The first, systems 
software, directly controls the physical operation of the 
machine. The design of modern machines typically creates an 
’architecture’ in which the software and the hardware are 
combined to achieve the necessary functionality, and in which, to 
some extent, they are interchangeable (5). To continue the 
physical analogy, therefore, this software is the equivalent of 
the unconscious and instinctive functions of the brain. The 
second type of software, applications software, directs the
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processing of specific data and will normally only be present 
when actually required. This is the level at which commercial 
data processing systems operate. This type of software is 
equivalent to the conscious brain which may engage in any number 
of different projects.
Some computers are designed for special purposes, for example 
process control in an oil refinery and rocket guidance systems.
In such cases, the software will only have one function and there 
will be no effective distinction betwen the two levels. This 
chapter, however, is not concerned with such special-purpose 
applications or with the development of computer hardware.
Rather, its focus is on the develoment of commercial data 
processing systems (6) in which the flexibility afforded by the 
general-purpose computer provides the ability to process large 
amounts of different types of data quickly. It is by discussing 
this example that the limitations of traditional mechanistic 
conceptions of technology will be exposed and the representation 
of systems development as an objective technical process 
challenged.
The Nature of Commercial Computer Systems and Programs 
Before describing what a computer system is, and how it is 
developed, two points must be made about the nature of this 
description. Firstly, it must be recognised that what is being 
described is the commonly accepted understanding of systems and 
consequently, mechanistic concepts and terminology are used which 
will later be brought into question. The second point to be made 
is that methods and ideas about how systems should be developed
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are changing rapidly. No description can be true in all cases and 
that offered below is a generalisation which for some systems 
will already be out of date. This reflects the fact that during 
the time taken to prepare this thesis there have been significant 
changes in all areas of computer technology. For example, 
improvements in communications networks mean that many more 
systems are now being developed which involve direct interaction 
between the user and the system through the use of visual display 
units (VDUs). Personal computers have also brought about 
significant changes in computer awareness and the types of 
application for which computers can be used. Networking and 
personal computers have also both had a direct impact on the 
methods and tools used to develop systems. In such a rapidly 
developing situation any description can soon become dated. 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, the important factor is 
not the specific methods being described but the process of 
change through which they have evolved. In that context the 
trends indicated in the description below are more important than 
up-to-date detail.
Similarly, there are many different types of computer application 
and new areas are regularly being explored including those 
related to artificial intelligence which are discussed in the 
next chapter. In this respect also, therefore, the following 
description is a generalisation which is more appropriate to 
traditional systems development than some of the more recent 
types. Within these limitations, a commercial data processing 
system can most simply be described as a means of transforming 
data. Thus, typically, systems and programs are described in
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terms of their input and output, and the process by which the 
first is transformed into the second. These elements may be 
related sequentially or through an interactive process. Each may 
involve the use of files, that is collections of data stored in 
such a way that it can be used by the program. Examples of such 
transformations would be those from timesheets to wage-packets 
and from sales statistics to a marketing plan. It must be 
remembered that a full data processing system involves not only 
the processing performed by the computer, but the human processes 
which accompany it, such as the input of data and the use of the 
output. The discussion in this chapter, however, concentrates on 
the computer element of the system although it cannot ignore the 
influence on systems design arising from the need for it to 
interface with human actions.
A parallel for the typical computer system, then, is the type of 
clerical process which it might replace. Let us say, for example, 
that a clerk is passing invoices for payment. Input to this 
process would be the invoices presented for payment and its main 
output, an authority to make payment. The clerk would perform 
checks on each invoice; for example, that it was correctly 
calculated and that the goods to which it referred had been 
received. The latter check would involve reference to a file of 
orders and delivery details. The procedure would allow 
alternative actions according to the consequences of the checks. 
Thus, it would have to allow for invoices covering more than one 
order, or for which no order could be found. It would also have 
to involve appropriate courses of action where any of the checks 
failed, for example where the goods had not been received or an
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expected discount had not been allowed. Accepted invoices would 
be put in a file for payment and the others disposed of according 
to the condition which stopped payment.
A computer program would follow essentially the same sequence of 
events. It would read and check details of the invoice using a 
file of orders and goods received (7). It would follow a course 
of action appropriate to the results of its checks creating files 
for other programs such as one to print cheques. However, where 
the development of commercial computer systems seems to differ 
most from other technical practices is in the difficulty 
experienced in formulating and implementing basic principles to 
develop such programs. After forty years of experience it is 
still recognised that most systems take longer, and cost more, to 
develop than originally planned, and that they frequently do not 
perform in the expected way. They are also so complex in many 
cases that they are difficult to maintain and enhance. A 
fundamental reason for these difficulties is the extent and 
nature of the complexity involved which creates a new dimension 
to the interface between calculative systems and the empirical 
reality in which they operate. It is the failure of existing 
methods to resolve the contradictions of this confrontation which 
brings into question the conceptual basis offered by models of 
technological development and change based on positivist 
principles.
Within the positivist framework, complexity becomes significant 
when the sum of the different elements and relationships in a 
system create a totality which cannot easily be predicted or
controlled. It takes on the new dimension when those elements 
prove elusive of definition. In developing computer systems these 
difficulties derive partly from the nature of the reality being 
modelled and partly from the exclusion of the human factor during 
the execution of a computer program. It is this aspect of 
programming which leads Naur to assert that program development 
taxes human ability to its limits (8). The reality of commercial 
computer systems is essentially a social world in which the 
knowledge required to perform a task is not limited to technical 
rules and not always simple to define (9). Human beings trained 
to do a new task come to it with taken-for-granted knowledge and 
skills. With basic job training, they can begin to perform that 
task on the assumption that they will recognise untaught or 
questionable situations and ask how they are to be dealt with. In 
time new principles and heuristics will be learned so that action 
in new situations can be determined without the need for specific 
rules.
Performance, therefore, results from generalised knowledge, 
specific instruction and experience. If a computer program is to 
function correctly in every case, however, it must be capable of 
dealing with any circumstance in a controlled way from its own 
resources from the first day of operation. In simple terms it 
must be told not to pay an invoice for fO.OO or that an address 
cannot be correct if it places York in Lancashire. To this 
extent, any computer system must be an ’expert system’ in that it 
encapsulates the knowledge of an experienced human practitioner 
(10).
Meek (11) highlights the difficulties involved in fully 
specifying requirements when he attempts to develop a formal set 
of rules for the children’s game of spotting car numbers with 
registration plates starting 1,2,3 etc. What initially seems to 
be a simple game is found to require rules to deal with a range 
of potential situations such as what to do with foreign and 
military vehicles, whether stationary ones can be included and 
what to do in the case of a vehicle which can be seen and whose 
number plate is known but is no longer readable. Many of the 
problems of managing program development and of poor performance 
in operation arise from a failure to identify and program for all 
the situations which may arise. Ince comments that:-
Currently, a major weakness in the software 
development process is specification. We just 
don’t seem to be very good at it. This is 
especially disastrous when you realise that 
because specification occurs early in a 
software project an undetected error can be 
catastrophic. (12)
According to Tsichritzis (13), it is problems of this nature that 
have led to the habitual failure of software projects to complete 
on time or to budget. The way in which systems are currently 
designed to achieve this feat is the next subject of this 
chapter.
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THE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE-CYCLE 
Initiating a Development
Many discussions of the process of developing a computer system 
describe its life-cycle (Ik). The stages which they define and 
their nomenclature vary but all cover the same basic elements:-
a) Conception of a requirement
b) Analysis and clarification of the requirement
c) Design and specification of the system
d) Implementation
e) Operation and maintenance
These stages constitute the career of a development in which the 
possibilities of successive stages become progressively more 
limited by decisions made at the previous ones. The description 
of this career will show how it is constrained by the origins and 
social context of its development (15).
The first stage of the development life-cycle involves the 
conception of a requirement which the system is to meet. In many 
cases that requirement may be presented as a necessity so that, 
for example, a company selling goods will assume that it must 
have a way of obtaining payment for them. However systems are 
always developed within the context of a taken-for-granted world. 
Hence, the need for a payment system in a modern industrial 
society will assume a monetary economy. Simiarly, a marketing
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manager assumes the market economy and the profit principle in 
specifying a requirement for a market analysis system, the 
requirement for a production control system implies a specific 
notion of efficiency just as a project to land men on the moon 
implies a particular model of the universe and priorities for 
scientific research.
Weber recognised the role of such assumptions in the initiation 
of scientific work:-
Today one usually speaks of science as "free 
from presuppositions." Is there such a thing? 
It depends upon what one understands thereby. 
All scientific work presupposes that the 
rules of logic and method are valid; these 
are the general foundations of our 
orientation to the world ..  (l6)
However Weber acknowjleges these presuppositions only at the 
conceptual stage, beyond which he defends the objectivity of 
science and insists on the necessity of preserving it. In the 
commercial context, a similar role is played by taken-for-granted 
assumptions which define what questions/requirements may 
legitimately be raised, which methods of investigating and 
answering are appropriate to them and the criteria to be applied 
in judging the results. Thus they constrain the statement of 
objectives, the possible methods of solution and the evaluation 
of their feasibility both technically and in terms of their 
benefit to the organisation.
The role of these assumptions in the initial definition of 
requirements is frequently ignored in studies of the development 
lif e-cycle (17). However, it is the contention of this chapter
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that it can only be understood fully if these factors are taken 
into account. Furthermore, if we apply the concept of technology 
developed in chapter k, the operation of these assumptions cannot 
be understood simply by analysis at the social and institutional 
levels. It must also account for their specific and concrete 
implementation through the actions and interactions of 
individuals. Hence, although the requirement for a system may 
seem to be a natural consequence of circumstances, a closer look 
will usually show that its identification has involved a process 
of negotiation, occurring within the constraints of social and 
institutional logic, in which actions will be fashioned by the 
individual biographies and interests of those involved and their 
access to power. Negotiation and the exercise of power need not 
necessarily be overt. As Lukes (18) points out, the most potent 
exercise of power may not be in winning a debate but in stopping 
an issue being raised. Thus, those with the power to sanction 
developments may exclude some possibilities because it is knov-?n 
that they will not find favour. Even where a project is proposed, 
the way it is presented and justified may be designed to appeal 
to the known preferences of those with the power to sanction it. 
Thus, by the time that the second stage of development, analysis, 
begins, a number of decisions will have been made and 
possibilities excluded through the operation of taken-for-granted 
assumptions, and the intentional and powerful actions of 
individuals.
The Analysis Stage
The object of the analysis stage is to clarify the initial 
requirement by translating it into specific objectives whose
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achievement can be identified and measured (19). At the same time 
the feasibility of the objectives is assessed and the methods by 
which they can be achieved evaluated. This stage focuses and 
hardens the decisions made in the conceptual stage. In doing so, 
it establishes the principles on which the development will be 
based and by which it will be judged. The social factors 
operating at the conceptual stage continue to operate at this and 
all other levels. Hence the social and institutional logics which 
constrained conception of the requirement continue to define the 
context of development whilst, at the level of action, the 
working out of individual projects, the exercise of power and the 
process of negotiation also continues. As a consequence, those 
involved not only require technical knowledge and skills but must 
also be able to exercise them in a political environment. In 
Kindred’s words:-
Mo matter how thorough the preparation and 
technical training the systems people might 
have, they are valuable to their organisation 
only when they are thoroughly familiar with 
the personalities of its members, the 
strengths and weaknesses of its operations, 
and the informal as well as formal power 
structure at work in the organisation. (20)
Whilst these non-technical elements may be acknovjledged, however, 
it is still normally assumed in formal descriptions of the 
development process that the analysis stage w?ill be concluded 
with a clear and unambiguous description of the required system 
on which its subsequent development can be based (21). The 
analyst’s role in providing this specification reflects the need 
to know in an uncertain world and to make an ambiguous world 
unambiguous. It also reflects the mechanistic assumption that 
such clarity is both possible and desirable. Its desirability.
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however, is frequently tempered by a recognition that it is 
rarely achieved. Weinberg suggests that:-
Perhaps the most critical problem in systems 
analysis is that, often, neither the user nor 
the systems analyst knoNS wnet is required or 
desirable. (22 - author’s emphasis)
Systems analysis is rarely taught, he suggests, because it is so 
difficult to simulate the political process of defining the 
problem. He discusses some techniques v?hich may be applied in 
these early stages of development, but these largely ignore the 
difficulties which he has identified. Most writers do not even go 
this far in acknowledging these difficulties. Instead, by 
concentrating on the later stages of development, and assuming 
fully defined requirements, they ignore this early discourse.
Design and Implementation
The design stage translates the requirements specified by 
analysis into detailed plans for the system. Implementation turns 
this design into an operational system through such activities as 
writing programs and designing files. In both these stages, 
earlier decisions are further hardened as they take concrete form 
in the delivered system. The assumption that the analysis stage 
concludes with a clear specification means that these later 
stages are usually represented as entirely technical in their 
nature, the essence of technicality being that decisions are made 
on logical, rational and objective grounds.
The process of negotiation in these stages is more overt (23) but 
the congruity of the epistemological and cultural assumptions 
which guide those involved are masked by the assumption of
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technical objectivity. Hence as Mulkay notes in a general comment 
on technology:-
It is important to recognise that the 
difficult task facing the sociologist here is 
that of providing an analysis of the 
technicalr as opposed to what we might 
loosely call the social meaning of 
technology. Thus, it is fairly easy to show 
that the social meaning of television varies 
with and depends upon the social context in 
which it is employed. But it is much more 
difficult to show that what is to count as a 
’working television set’ is similarly 
context-dependent in any significant respect. 
(2Ü - author’s emphasis)
The argument of this thesis, however is that these apparently 
technical stages of design and implementation are equally subject 
to non-technical criteria and to demonstrate this, two particular 
aspects of these stages will be considered in more detail; 
testing, and the criteria for assessing the quality of programs.
Testing is concerned with proving the correctness of the design 
and its implementation. It can occur at different levels of 
detail and for different purposes. One type of testing, for 
example, aims to ensure that the logic of each individual program 
meets its specification. Another checks that the programs 
interface with each other correctly, that is, that data output by 
one is in the format expected by another. Other tests check that 
the system as a whole performs the required business functions 
and that it it is acceptable to the people who will have to use 
and operate it. Each type of testing poses questions which 
require a decision by the tester.
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An example will illustrate this. One type of test applied to 
individual programs is designed to ensure that they operate 
successfully on a range of different values. The implications of 
this type of check are illustrated by Van Tassel (25) who 
calculates that to test every possible combination of two numbers 
for an operation taking one thousandth of a second, would take 50 
billion years (26). When it is realised that a system of any size 
will contain hundreds of such operations, the impracticality of 
fully testing programs, even on this one dimension, becomes 
apparent.
Testing the logic of a program creates similar difficulties. To 
appreciate the nature of such testing it must be understood that 
the flexibility of computer programs resides primarily in their 
facility for making decisions on the basis of the data being 
processed. Each decision will be a choice between two possible 
courses of action. However, as one decision after another is 
made, the resulting geometric increase in the number of 
alternative paths through the program’s logic means that it may 
weave a very complex web. This problem is typified by chess 
playing programs which quickly run into difficulties if they try 
to evaluate every possible option more than a few moves in 
advance. Whilst theoretically it would be possible to test each 
route, in practice the time required would be prohibitive.
Because it is not possible to test every possible combination of 
logic paths and values which the program may encounter in its 
operation, a decision must be made as to how thorough the testing 
W7ill be. Any testing uses resources and extends the time taken to
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complete the development. As we might expect, therefore, the 
positivist criterion of efficiency is invoked in the 
decision-making process in the form of a balance between the 
potential cost of the system failing in operation and the costs 
of different degrees of thoroughness in testing. As a result, a 
satellite controlling program or an aircraft navigation system is 
likely to receive more thorough testing than an accounting 
package. Even so, there can be no absolute certainty, except in 
the most trivial cases, that the system will not fail in some 
unforeseen circumstance. Testing then can only be based on a 
sample and must seek to prove principles rather than cases. As a 
result, it is possible for a program to run throughout its 
lifetime without exposing an error if the conditions which would 
cause it never occur. Hence, in words echoing Popper’s concept of 
falsification (27). Wirth argues that:-
Experimental testing of programs can be used 
to show the presence of errors but never to 
prove their absence. (28 - emphasised in 
original)
Once it is recognised that there is no realistic way of fully 
testing a program, what constitutes a ’working’ program becomes a 
pragmatic decision based on an evaluation of the possibility of 
success and the consequences of failure. The nature of this 
evaluation is illustrated by the example of an expert system 
designed to offer a medical diagnosis for a set of physical 
symptoms. The system may not achieve a correct diagnosis in every 
case, nor even as often as the most successful medical experts, 
but if it is consistently more successful than the average 
medical practitioner, it will not be rejected because it is not 
totally accurate. Even so the value placed on its diagnoses v?ill
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vary according to the circumstances of its use. For example, it 
would be given more weight when being compared with the 
conclusion of a medical student than with that of a consultant. 
Computer systems like any other form of technology, therefore, 
are not finally proved by the ingenuity or skill of their 
creation, or the Validity* of the principles on which they are 
based, nor by the methods used to construct them, but by the 
pragmatic consequences of their use.
Even when the tester is satisfied that a program achieves the 
expected results or performs to an acceptable standard, other 
types of testing will be required to show that it meets its 
functional specification and is acceptable to the people who will 
use and operate it. Once again the criteria for these tests are 
pragmatic. To use an example from a different type of technology, 
a vehicle with a maximum speed of 5 m.p.h, fuel consumption of 10 
gallons to the mile, a width of twenty feet and a weight of 
twenty tons is unlikely to fit most people’s concept of a working 
motor car (29). In the same way, a computer system for airline 
reservations which accepts instructions from a remote terminal, 
records the reservation and prints a ticket back at the terminal 
may be meeting the output specification for its design. If it 
takes twenty minutes to do so it will not qualify as a working 
system by contemporary standards because the customer does not 
expect to have to wait that length of time.
These criteria will have been laid down in the analysis stage and 
will therefore have been subject to the social process described 
above. This will have involved the balancing of a number of
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factors such as cost, benefit, and time and resources available 
against the level of function and performance required. Hence 
defining a program as ’working’ involves not only producing the 
required end result, but doing so according to criteria derived 
from the world in which it will be used. This world decides that 
aircraft crashes through incorrect computer navigation are less 
acceptable than a gas bill for fO.OO. It operates with a concept
of time which leads an airline customer to expect his booking to
be confirmed in seconds rather than minutes and involves a notion 
of efficiency which determines what cost is acceptable in 
achieving these results. The definition of a system as ’working’, 
therefore, involves socially derived considerations of both 
function and performance (30)
In the same way that the criterion applied in testing must be 
balanced, so we find that the evaluation of program quality 
involves the balancing of various factors. Chantier (31) lists 
the features of a quality program as:-
- accuracy - does what is required
- reliability - goes on doing it
- robustness - copes with exceptions
- efficiency - makes optimum use of machine resources
- usability - is easy to use and well documented
- maintainability - is easy to change
- readability - is easy to understand
Hibbard and Schumann (32) provide a similar list;-
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- validity - with respect to its stated specifications
- integrity - under all possible conditions of usage
- efficiency - relative to the compexity of the task
- clarity - of both its structure and function
Hence they comment:-
It has long been recognised that the ability 
to achieve a proper balance amongst such (not 
necessarily compatible) objectives depends 
primarily upon the way in which the programs 
are constructed. The degree of success is 
largely determined by the techrdques employed 
during program development and by the tools 
used to support this process (where a 
programming language is merely the most 
traditional of these tools). (33 - author’s 
emphasis)
Hence Van Tassel (34) argues that a program which optimises 
machine performance by using complex or obscure techniques is 
second best to one which achieves the required objectives whilst 
being easily understood. Thus, he is suggesting, there must be a 
balance between, in Chantler’s terms, efficiency and 
maintainability. However the decision as to what that balance 
should be is made pragmatically according to the context of its 
development and proposed use.
The decisions made in constructing and testing programs may be 
portrayed by computer professionals as technical because the 
recognition and evaluation of these criteria is part of the 
everyday performance of the development function. However these 
examples illustrate that underlying their evaluation are 
pragmatic and social factors which are not technical in the 
accepted sense of being determined according to objective
245
criteria. The cost/benefit analysis and measurements of 
efficiency which are part of the analysis and design stages of a 
commercial system may appear to be technically defined and give 
an objective evaluation of the proposal, but they are derived 
from the mechanistic principles of modern industrial societies. 
Thus the deciding factors are inherent in the social and 
institutional constraints in which the system has been developed 
and made real through the action of engaged individuals. They are 
not objective or independent parameters of the task of 
construction. Hence there is no absolute measure of a ’working’ 
system and what appear to be technical criteria of evaluation are 
the distillation of a social process of negotiation, experiment 
and pragmatism.
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THE ACADEMIC DEBATE
It might be expected that after forty years of use computer 
technology would have passed its ’adolescence’ (35) and have 
established principles of system design. However, there is still 
considerable doubt as to what these principles are, or at least, 
how they can be applied. Hence, although many computer systems 
are in use, it is still common for the literature (academic, 
technical and popular), to bemoan the inability of developers to 
deliver systems on time, on budget and to specification (36). We 
have already noted the nature of computer technology and the new 
demands it places on its practitioners. We have also noted the 
tendency of those discussing it to underplay or ignore the social 
and abstract elements of the reality it deals with. Thus it is 
typically assumed that a clear specification of requirements 
should emerge from the analysis stage and that all subsequent 
decisions will be based solely on technical criteria.
In academic circles, therefore, the debate has concentrated 
largely on ways of resolving the consequences of complexity 
arising at the implementation stage of system development, 
especially during the writing of programs. Most of this 
discussion aims to define principles of construction derived from 
the existing models of the physical sciences but, as I have 
suggested, with mixed success. As a result the status of the new 
discipline of computer science remains unclear. Van der Linden, 
whilst accepting that there is some high quality software in 
existence concludes that:-
2lX7
Software writing is almost wholly a creative 
design activity. It is also a comparatively 
new discipline, which has yet to crystallise 
around solid principles. (37)
Buckle argues to the contrary that:-
  design has become a more scientific
process and less of an art ..  (38)
Dennis similarly argues that:-
It is often asserted that software 
engineering is largely art and based very 
little on sound principle. Yet trends are 
visible and new ideas are developing that 
promise to substantially increase the role of 
theory and principle in the design and 
construction of software systems. (39)
Yourdon believes that the best programmers instinctively use the 
’right’ methods and the development of a programming discipline 
involves distilling principles from their work for the use of all 
(40). Hirst (Ü1) describes this process of creating a discipline 
as the assimilation of experience into knowledge. This knowledge 
takes the form of central concepts and their relationship to each 
other, together with criteria of validity, and techniques and 
skills for further exploration. Wirth, a key figure in the 
development of a discipline of computer science, says of his own 
work:-
My primary motivation is to introduce 
programming as the art or technique of 
constructing and formulating algorithms in a 
systematic manner, recognising that it is a 
discipline in its own right. (42)
However the development of a new discipline (43) cannot occur in 
a vacuum and in the case of computer science it is occurring
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within the context of mechanistic thinking in industrial 
societies. As a consequence, the methods proposed tend to be 
adaptations of its positivist principles. This is illustrated in 
the work of Abelson and Sussman at MIT which Durham suggests 
might be making some contribution to overcoming the difficulties 
of complexity.
They try to teach their students strategies
of design - technologies of thinking ..
Scheme [a programming language used in the 
course] is presented as a notation for 
abstract procedures, and only incidentally as 
a language which may be executed on 
computers. (44)
Abelson and Sussman suggest three main ’technologies of 
thinking’. The first is the use of ’black box’ abstractions to 
break a problem into parts (45). This results in a description of 
the behaviour of the box, that is its input and consequent 
output, without any description of the transformation process 
itself. The second strategy is the establishment of conventional 
interfaces so that the boxes may be combined in a variety of 
ways. The last strategy is the use, and if necessary the 
development, of appropriate languages and tools to describe the 
concepts being used. However:-
Their ideas on the design of large systems 
were cemented as strategies for the design of 
very complicated integrated circuits (46)
Hence Abelson and Sussman avoid the difficulties of analysis and 
specification by choosing an example in which the accurate 
statement of requirements is more readily achievable than in 
commercial systems. In practice they are teaching the 
conventional wisdom of the engineering model. They are not
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entirely unaware of social factors in this process; Durham 
paraphrases a comment by Sussman to the effect that:-
Things don’t get invented in a place 
They get invented by a culture. (47)
However there is no evidence that they question the cultural 
assumptions evident in their own teaching.
Academics tend to support one of two alternative mechanistic 
models. One is derived from engineering, as in the case of 
Abelson and Sussman, the other from mathematics, although the 
distinction is often blurred in the terminology used. The 
argument for the application of a mathematical model to 
programming is a natural development from the discussion of 
testing earlier in this chapter. As an alternative to current 
methods of testing, which always leave the possibility of error, 
those advocating the application of the mathematical model 
propose the use of formal methods of proof similar to those used 
in mathematics (48). This ’formalist’ position does not 
necessarily imply that the required methods are to be found in 
existing mathematics. According to Grochla and Ssyperski;-
A growing number of companies are recognising 
the necessity to develop tools for the task 
of analyzing their information systems. 
However, the available mathematical theories 
for the most part do not appear to be an 
appropriate basis for the description and 
analysis of complex information systems. (49)
They see a need therefore to:-
  develop new theoretical approaches and
more powerful algorithms. (50)
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Van der Linden summarises the position of one advocate of 
mathematical formalism, Hoare, with the assertion:-
  that software engineering is the
practice of basing programs on underlying 
theoretical, mathematical principles. 
Furthermore the use of mathematics should not 
be solely confined to the algorithms which a 
program embodies, but should be extended to 
the use of program proofs, logical program 
specification languages, and program 
verifiers. (51)
Linger et al (52) put the case rather differently. The proof of a 
program’s correctness, they argue, is the personal satisfaction 
of the programmer. However this still requires the use of 
mathematical methods because that is the only kind of reasoned 
certainty possible.
Not all those involved in finding new techniques are as convinced 
as these writers of the value of the mathematical model. De Millo 
et al argue that attempts to apply the method of mathematical 
proof to programs misunderstands the nature of such proof which 
is:-
  only one step in the direction of
confidence. We believe that, in the end, it 
is a social process that determines whether 
mathematicians feel confident about a theorem 
- and we believe that, because no comparable 
social process can take place among program 
verifiers, program verification is bound to
fail ... The point is not that
mathematicians make mistakes; that goes 
without saying. The point is that 
mathematicians’ errors are corrected, not by 
formal symbolic logic, but by other 
mathematicians. (53)
In the end, they argue, theorems are accepted not so much because
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of their formal proof but because they have undergone a process 
of refinement by use in which they have been found to have 
practical value and consequently are internalised and used in 
subsequent work. Program verification by contrast is meant to be 
a one-time process.
If mathematical certainty is untenable however, De Millo et al 
suggest that the engineering approach may offer a better 
alternative because it embodies a more realistic notion of 
reliability which, above all, never demands perfection. The 
acceptibility of bridges and buildings is not determined by the 
technical content of the final product, but by factors such as 
economics, timescales and personalities.
Wirth has no doubts as to the applicability of the engineering 
model:-
As in other engineering disciplines, the 
construction of a product - in this case, an 
algorithm - consists of a series of 
deliberations, investigations, and design 
decisions. (5^ )
But if the engineering model is a measure, then Morton is 
critical of the results to date:-
  software in general shows all the
signs of poor and inadequate engineering
  there is very little software in the
hands of users which has been built on the 
best available engineering principles. (55)
He does however accept the possibility of some long term benefit 
from this approach. Naur (56) is less sure. Attempts to apply the 
engineering model have so far proved disappointing, he argues,
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because they have not taken into account the unique character of 
the end-product. Van der Linden doubts that it can ever apply and 
comments:-
But this gilded view ignores the fundamental 
nature of software, and the attributes which 
separate it from the world of the physical 
sciences.
Software has such an incorporeal and 
insubstantial physical existence that the 
engineering stages associated with 
transforming a design into a solid physical 
reality simply do not apply. Indeed, it is 
counter-productive to try to impose this 
inappropriate schema in the attempt to 
"engineer” software.
If software production is to be compared to 
engineering then the comparison must stop at 
the design stage - the completion of a 
prototype in engineering terms is the correct 
analogue for the completion of a program in 
computing terms.
We do not gain by the fact that software 
production is completed so early in the 
traditional engineering cycle. On the 
contrary, we pay a heavy price. Instead of 
half-a-dozen or more steps of manageable 
intellectual proportions, we have telescoped 
all the complexity into just a couple of
stages of labyrinthine difficulty ..
There is no such thing as a model of a 
program (except at the most trivial and 
abstract level) because the whole point about 
computer programming is that every last 
little detail has to be established. (57)
We can see, therefore, that even though the academic debate on 
principles of development concentrates on the ’technical’ stages 
of design and implementation, it is far from over. In the 
literature, the consequences of complexity derived from the 
social nature of both the development process and its object are 
frequently avoided by the use of examples derived from machine 
oriented software closely related to the physical operation of 
the computer rather than the implementation of commercial data
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processing applications. Yet it is in this latter area that the 
unique nature and complexity of programming are most clearly 
demonstrated and the difficulties of applying the mathematical or 
engineering models are most apparent (58). Practitioners, 
however, cannot ignore these consequences even though they may 
not acknowledge their cause. Their approach, therefore, is less 
concerned with the principles involved and more with the 
practicialities of their work.
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THE PRACTICAL APPROACH
Whilst the correct application of positivist principles to 
systems development is still being debated in academic circles, 
an examination of the practical steps taken will show that those 
principles are already established in the tools and methods used 
by practitioners. As new tools and methods are introduced, they 
are invariably found to reformulate the computer system 
development process in the image of one of the positivist models 
used in the development and management of other forms of 
technology. Indeed, a closer affinity to the practices of other 
disciplines is often heralded as the only way to master the 
problems being experienced. Hence Burns comments that:-
For twenty years some members of the 
profession have endeavoured to introduce more 
scientific theories and better engineering 
practices to the art. The term 'Software 
Engineering' was coined as long ago as 1968!
The essence of Software Engineering is the 
use of systematic, structured ways to 
specify, design and implement systems, and to 
manage all these processes. (59 - author’s 
emphasis)
The consequent application of mathematical and engineering 
concepts is illustrated by the principles currently applied to 
the practice of systems development and to its management.
Most of the ideas for new tools and methods in the design and 
implementation stages revolve around the concept of structure 
used by Burns which took its early form from the work of Dijkstra 
(60). The objective of structured techniques is to achieve 
clarity and control in complex situations. Its principal concept 
is the reduction of complex tasks to a series of more manageable
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ones with clearly defined interfaces so that each task can be 
developed independently. Subsequently these parts will be 
reassembled to create the whole structure whose characteristics 
are the sum total of those parts. Quite obviously this is a 
direct application of the positivist principle of wholes and the 
mechanistic concept used, for example, by Abelson and Sussman.
The ideas of structured programming are now the accepted 
methodology of computer science to the extent that programming 
languages for schools are judged by their adherence to them (6l) 
and home computer books apply them to the smallest machine.
For most authors (62), achieving a clear definition of the 
requirements for a system is treated as being synonymous with 
clarifying the parameters of a mathematical algorithm. In some 
cases what is called a discussion of programming is nothing but a 
mathematical debate on these lines. Emery defines an algorithm 
as:-
  a set of unambiguous rules that define
how a particular problem, or class of 
problem, can be solved in a finite sequence 
of steps. (63)
Maly and Hanson give a similar description and emphasise the role 
of algorithms in computer science:-
Of central importance to computer science 
and, in fact, any essentially problem-solving 
disciplne is the notion of algorithms. The 
core concept, around which the entire book 
revolves, is the construction of algorithms 
in general and their computer representation 
in particular. (64)
An algorithm they define as:-
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  a procedure which always terminates
after a finite number of steps for any 
allowable set of input quantities (if there 
are inputs). (65)
Higman is equally explicit:-
The most fundamental concept in computing is 
that of an algorithm. (66)
Wirth (67) goes so far as describe a program as essentially a 
mathematical statement of the form y=f(x) where y is the result 
of transforming x by applying the function/program f. It is no 
suprise then to find that his examples are concerned largely with 
the development of compilers for programming languages where the 
rules of transformation are rigorously defined.
However, the dominance of the algorithmic approach is not to be 
explained simply by its mathematical origins. Rather, as we saw 
in chapter 5. the technology emerged within a mechanistic 
environment whose principles were part of the symbolic universe 
of the principal actors involved and which became embedded in von 
Neumann’s architecture for central processors (68). The influence 
of structured ideas is not easily escaped by the programmers, 
therefore. Not only does the hardware constrain them towards the 
algorithmic approach, but the tools they use, especially 
programming languages, often embody structured principles in 
their design. The role of such influences is illustrated by the 
name of one of the earliest programming languages, ALGOL, which 
is derived from the word algorithm. The same influences can be 
seen in the development of the language ADA (commissioned by the 
United States Department of Defence to be the main language for
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use in military contracts). These languages not only encourage a 
structured discipline, they deliberately make it difficult to 
write unstructured programs.
Commenting on the use of Pascal, another language designed to 
enforce structured ideas and one commonly used in university 
courses, Allan comments:-
Part of the argument concerning Pascal is to 
do with Pascal as a programmimg language^ 
however the more important part of the 
argument concerning Pascal is to do with 
Pascal as an ideology (almost a religion) 
which is trying to eradicate most other 
ideologies. (69 - author’s emphasis)
He points out that there are other languages, many designed for 
specific types of programming, some of which are more suited to 
the work typically done in undergraduate courses. Why then he 
asks do so many academics concentrate on Pascal?
The answer, as might be suspected, is mainly 
cultural, and has more to do with the 
self-esteem of certain academic computer 
scientists than with practicalities.
To work out why the Peddlers are so keen on 
selling Pascal, we enter the sociology of 
professions. (70)
Thus he suggests that Pascal has been adopted because it 
expresses the structured ideas whose formality can be expressed 
in a form appropriate to the knowledge of a professional body, in 
this case academic computer scientists. This tendency to 
incorporate structured principles in the programmers’ tools has 
become even more apparent with the introduction of ’fourth 
generation’ programming languages. These are claimed to overcome 
some of the consequences of complex programming methods and in
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the process limit the facilities available to the programmer a,nd 
encapsulate them in a relatively rigid structure (71).
Thus, although the arguments about the value of the mathematical 
and engineering models continue in academic literature, the 
analytical and mechanistic world-view from which they are derived 
is already shaping practical applications. So far the main 
emphasis has been on programming, however they have not proved to 
be the panacaea to all the problems being experienced. As a 
result the same ideas are now being applied to those stages in 
the development cycle which precede programming with an emphasis 
on achieving a correct and complete specification. The 
application is different but the principles and objectives are 
the same. This trend is typified by Yourdon (72) and Martin (73) 
whose work is directed at the practitioner rather than academics. 
Yourdon is quite specific about his assumptions on the political 
nature of computer development especially in the early stages:-
Virtually everything in this book assumes 
that you are a rational manager; that you 
have rational programmers and analysts 
working for you; that you deal with rational 
users and customers; and that the environment 
in which you determine your schedules and 
manpower estimates is not only rational, but 
also friendly and supportive. (74)
Such an assumption is necessary if the formalisation of 
requirements which he describes is to be achieved. However, 
advising on the practical rather than the theoretical nature of 
the task, he is obliged to recognise some of its realities:—
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A project involving up to 100,000 lines of 
code is sufficiently complex that neither the 
analyst nor the user is likely to have a. 
crystal-clear understanding of exactly what 
the system is supposed to do; and even if 
there is a clear understanding, the user is 
likely to change his mind about some of the 
requirements. (75)
As with programming, the structured philosophy has provided 
methods and exemplars for analysts as well as being the basis of 
their tools. At present the latter consist largely of assistance 
in gathering, ordering and presenting information. More recent 
ones also undertake some logic checking which applies the rules 
of structured analysis and thus forces the analyst to adopt them. 
However the promise made for these ’workbenches’ in the not too 
distant future is that they will not only record information but 
suggest what information is needed and one recently launched 
product (76) provides a direct link to the implementation stage 
by generating the necessary programs as well.
The practical approach to complexity, therefore, quite clearly 
applies the principles of positivism and, as Ellul (77) suggests, 
these are slowly infiltrating into every aspect of the 
development process. They are to be found in the design of the 
hardware, in the tools used to develop systems, and in the 
principles applied to their design. However the application of 
positivist models does not end with the ’technical’ process of 
systems development. It is also to be found in the methods used 
to manage the development process and some of the implications of 
that situation are considered in the final part of this chapter.
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MANAGING THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Discussions on the managment of computer systems development 
typically centre on how standard management models can be applied 
to that process and involve questions not only about which tools 
to use, but how to control and maximise the efficiency of those 
using them. Managers who use the systems developed by others 
often resent their reliance on the computer and the apparent 
anarchy of systems development whilst managers responsible for 
that development still struggle with the problems of complexity 
that it raises. Hence Weinwurm comments that:-
For all practical purposes there are no 
generally accepted, generally available, or 
generally applicable guidelines or techniques 
on which a manager can rely (other than ao' 
hoc experience of technical experts) in 
making cost or schedule estimates, in 
weighing the investment of increments of time 
and money against hoped-for improvements in 
performance or quality of the computer 
program end product, or in assessing 
cost-to-value after the fact. (78)
Although this was written fifteen years ago, the same sentiments 
are echoed today by Yourdon:-
Indeed, one of the premises of this book is 
that conventional projects tend to be 
overbudget, behind schedule, expensive to 
develop, expensive to maintain, unreliable 
and unacceptable to users. (79)
The contributors to Weinwurm’s book reflect a range of attitudes 
to this situation, from those who argue that the process of 
developing programs is not well understood, to those who believe 
control is simply a question of applying the same management
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techniques used in other engineering projects. Researchers have 
not been idle in seeking to show how computer development can be 
assimilated into existing and familiar management methods, not 
least because of the commercial advantage to be gained by anyone 
offering to do so. The formality and success of these methods is 
assumed although whether this is justified is open to question.
These attempts to formalise and structure the management of 
systems development are the subject of Kraft’s (80) discussion of 
the emergence of programming as an occupation. His main theme 
concerns what he sees as the struggle by managers to gain control 
of the programming function. This control, he argues, is an end 
in itself and separate from the need to improve the quality of 
the programs produced. The drive to control, he suggests, is not 
unique to programming management but part of the basic management 
model applied in industrial societies. He makes a clear 
distinction therefore, between the technicality of programming 
and its control;-
In 'Programmers and Hanagers' I have 
described structured programming as many 
managers and programmers see it; I have 
suggested that managers use structured 
programming to de-skill and control their 
programmers. Yet, there is nothing inherent 
in the principles of structured programming - 
at least as put forward by people like Edsger 
Dijkstra, David Gries, and many others - 
which suggests that its developers are 
concerned with anything except making the 
writing of programs a more clear-headed and 
self-conscious undertaking than it presently 
is. (81)
Kraft compares programming with engineering occupations and, 
following Noble’s lead, sees a number of parallels (82). The role 
of management in both occupations, he suggests, has been to look
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for and adopt ways to de-skill and control work. De-skilling is 
defined as;-
  a deliberate effort to transform work
made up of separate but interdependent tasks 
into a larger number of simpler, routine, and 
unrelated tasks. (83)
However, not only are programming and engineering both subject to 
de-skilling, they are also management’s tool for de-skilling 
other work and therefore have both technical and managerial 
functions. The latter are to rearrange and redesign work tasks to 
increase management control and to simplify tasks so that they 
can be undertaken by less skilled workers (84). According to 
Kraft:-
In this sense, computer programmers are the 
ultimate engineers. (85)
He believes that similarities in the development of engineering 
and programming education are critical and reflect the origins of 
the latter in electrical engineering whose traditions it has 
borrowed. Because much of Kraft’s detailed discussion is based on 
the American education system, it must be treated with care in 
relation to Britain. However the comments on similarities between 
engineering and programming education could apply in both cases, 
their main point being the creation of two classes; the expert 
engineers/programmers and the semi-skilled technicians/coders.
In programming, Kraft identifies three main methods of 
de-skilling, the use of externally written packaged software, the 
use of structured programming, and changes in the organisation of 
work typified by the advent of Chief Programmer Teams. The
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principle of CPT’s is that one expert programmer determines how 
each task is to be sub-divided and how its parts are to interface 
with each other so that they can be given, as self-contained 
units, to less skilled staff. Thus Kraft comments;-
It is all here, quite plain and explicit: the 
major divisions between conceptual and 
routine tasks; a "Backup Programmer" who acts 
as both apprentice and potential replacement 
for the chief creative (and supervisory) 
worker; the modularisation, i.e., 
fragmentation and standardization of work 
into routine segments. (86)
Once again he emphasises the motivation for this process:
The transformation of programming is not the 
result of technological imperatives inherent 
in the logic of programming or computing. 
Programming has changed because managers, 
concerned about profits, have set about 
systematically and carefully to change it. It 
has happened before. Similar attempts to 
routinize work have been made by managers of 
the most diverse workplaces. The common 
denominator has been the desire to substitute 
less skilled and therefore less expensive 
workers. (87)
Although Kraft provides a thought-provoking illustration of the 
nature of programming as an occupation, he raises a number of 
questions which his own analysis cannot answer convincingly. The 
reason lies almost entirely in his separation of the technical 
and management aspects of work. He does not ask why managers 
adopt the view of their function which he ascribes to them. Nor 
does he recognise that the same principles which underlie the 
management model are deeply embodied in society as a whole and 
consequently that the basis for the programmers’ acceptance of 
their situation begins not in their technical training but in 
their assumption of the same cultural world as their managers.
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His emphasis on the almost conspiratorial determination of 
managers to achieve control implies the consistent application of 
the same methods to all programmers, yet as Kraft himself notes:-
But programming is not the same as assembly 
line work, at least not yet. Programming, 
even coding, is still primarily a mind-skill 
and there are few hard and fast rules of 
behaviour which managers can compare against 
an efficiency expert’s model in order to 
check performance. (88)
He never asks why this should be so, nor does he acknowledge the 
significance of the fact that the same methods which he 
identifies as managements’ tools for de-skilling have failed as 
yet to provide the solution to the difficulties of programming.
In practice, we find that the adoption of structured techniques 
is not universal and Yourdon (89) suggests that resistance often 
comes from managers themselves for whom it creates new problems 
in terms of training, changeover costs and their staff’s 
resistance to change.
Kraft’s interpretation is based on the generalisation of a series 
of historical snapshots guided by a pre-formed notion of the 
nature of society. He alludes to the work of Braverman and Noble 
but essentially his analysis is in the standard Marxist tradition 
of Gendron (90) which maintains the independence of technology 
and concentrates criticisms on its application rather than the 
form it takes. Kraft implies that computers and programming, even 
structured programming, would have existed in the same form in 
other societies and still could. As a result, he constantly 
distinguishes between the technical benefits of structured 
techniques, which he considers appropriate to the task of
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programming, and their use by managers for political, that is 
non-technical purposes. The concept of technology constructed in 
this thesis, however, offers an alternative interpretation which 
correlates more closely with practice. It recognises that the 
cultural and epistemological worlds in which both the programmers 
and the managers operate is similar. The positivist principles of 
wholes and efficiency are natural to them both and there need be 
no conspiracy among managers to impose the structured concepts.
In Noble’s words:-
From the outset, therefore, the engineer was 
at the service of capital, and, not 
suprisingly, its laws were to him as natural 
as the laws of science. (91)
This suggests that the factors which direct managers’ choices and 
the reason programmers accept them, can both be explained by 
their common use of the same structural resources in 
understanding their work situation. Structured programming is not 
an objective technique turned by managers into a means of 
enforcing their authority, it is a natural application of the 
principles of mechanistic thinking by industrialised societies to 
new areas of knowledge, work and their management.
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SUMMARY
In this chapter, a discussion of the methods used in developing 
commercial computer systems has provided a vehicle for developing 
the theme, introduced in chapter 3. that positivism has its 
limitations as a model for technological development. The 
empirical value of this subject, it was suggested, is its 
exposure of the positivist view, in its different forms, to a new 
dimension of complexity and abstraction. In the same way that 
Newton’s mechanistic model of the natural world has been found 
inadequate at the frontiers of science, so positivist principles 
have been shown to be inadequate for this new type of technology.
This chapter has described three aspects of computer technology; 
the nature of commercial data processing systems and programs, 
the process by which they are developed, and current debates 
about the principles and methods which should apply to that 
process and its management. These descriptions establish that 
systems development is a social process and that the principles 
on which it is based are derived from positivism and take the 
form of mechanistic models of mathematics, engineering and 
managment. This provides the basis for the argument that the 
difficulties being experienced in establishing principles of 
systems development, and in its practice, are a consequence of 
the adoption of these models. Kraft’s discussion of the 
management of programming served as one illustration of a 
positivist explanation and was contrasted with the alternative 
suggested by the synthetic concept of technology. The recent 
introduction of new methods and tools has aimed to overcome the 
consequent difficulties and some of the ideas they incorporate
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may seem to be loosening the shackles of mechanistic thinking. 
However, in the next chapter the synthetic concept of technology 
will again be used to offer a different understanding of these 
changes.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6
1. See Chapter 2.
2. This American spelling has become the norm in technical
literature and will be adopted here.
3. Although the physical analogy used in this section is
questioned elsewhere in this thesis, its use is 
appropriate for describing the mechanistic form of 
contemporary computer technology.
4. There are various types of symbolic representation. The
next chapter distinguishes between three; data, 
information and knowledge. For simplicity within this 
chapter the term ’data’ has been used throughout.
5. See Buckle J.K. ’Managing Software Projects’, 1977.
MacDonald & Jane’s, London.
Some of the significant historical developments in 
systems software (operating systems) were discussed in 
the last chapter.
6. Commercial is used here as a generic term to include any
form of administrative system, e.g. businesses and 
government organisations
7. The computer system requires additional checks. Its
input is transcribed from the original form, in which 
it would be used by a clerk, thus providing an 
additional opportunity for error.
8. Naur P. ’Concise Survey of Computer Methods’, 1974,
Studentlitteratur, Lund.
Not all systems represent the same degree of complexity 
of course but the source of difficulty is always the 
same. It might then be asked, why, if it is so 
problematic, are computers used at all. The answer lies 
in their speed and consistent accuracy and what these 
make possible. Most day to day commercial data 
processing involves the frequent repetition of a 
limited series of steps. The value of the computer in 
such circumstances is that it can quickly and 
invariably perform such tasks. However it has become a 
truism of system development that 20% of the effort 
goes in to providing for the normal course of events, 
and the other 80% into coping with exceptional 
situations. It is in this latter area that the 
implications of complexity become evident.
269
9« The indexical interpretation of bureaucratic rules has
been explored, for example, by Cicourel A.V. ’The 
Social Organisation of Juvenile Justice’, 1976, 
Heinemann, London
10. Expert systems are discussed in more detail in chapter
7.
11* Meek B. ’Why the Rules Have to be so Complex’ in
Computer kieekly 13/9/84
12. Ince D. ’Ultra-Reliable Software the Prize in a Testing
Battle’ in Computer Weekly 29/11/84, p. 23
13. Tsichritsis D. ’Project Management’ in Bauer F.L. (Ed.)
’Software Engineering - An Advanced Course’, 1975, 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, p. 374
14. A more general description of these stages is to be
found in Aspinall D. ’The Coming of Age of Computer 
Technology’, 1971, University College of Swansea, 
Swansea
15. A similar description of human careers is given in
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CHAPTER 7
MECHANISMS OF CHANGE 
REINFORCING THE EMPIRICAL CASE
A central theme of this thesis has been the limitations inherent 
in positivism both as a means of understanding technological 
change and as a basis for the development of concrete 
technological applications. The basis for this claim was laid in 
chapter 3 which found positivism unable to provide a 
comprehensive conceptualisation of technology. Chapter 5 
illustrated the consequences of those limitations for achieving 
an understanding of historical events, and the last chapter 
demonstrated their operation within a specific form of 
technological practice, the development of commercial computer 
systems. Computers, it was suggested, provide a particularly good 
demonstration of the argument because they give rise to a new 
dimension of complexity in technology, and it is in dealing with 
complexity that positivism is most vunerable. Even so, it was 
shown that the interpretation of the difficulties being 
experienced in developing systems, and the search for solutions 
to them, are still being constrained within the mechanistic 
paradigm derived from positivism.
The present chapter will reinforce and develop this argument in 
two ways. Firstly it will look in more detail at responses to the 
contradictions being experienced in systems development showing 
how new methods being introduced to cope with them reflect and
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are being constrained by mechanistic assumptions. The 
introduction of prototyping as a method of systems development 
will provide a specific focus for this discussion. The second 
part of the chapter will then concentrate more specifically on 
the question of complexity. It will argue that, in spite of 
existing difficulties, the rationalist momentum created by 
positivist logic is driving systems developers to explore 
increasingly complex realities, in particular in the area of 
artificial intelligence. The nature of artificial intelligence 
systems will therefore be explored to show how they expose even 
more directly the contradictions arising from the logic of 
positivist technology. As a consequence it will be argued that 
the limitations of positivism do not only bring into question its 
suitability for non-technical spheres of society, as Habermas and 
the Bergers argue, but also for areas which are ’technical’. In 
doing so it questions the technical/non-technical distinction and 
clarifies the nature of technicality. This discussion will lead, 
in the final chapter, to a consideration of the broader 
implications for technology, and for society in general, of the 
argument presented in this thesis.
The basis for the discussion in this chapter will be the 
synthetic concept of technology constructed in chapter 4. In 
adopting this concept we must remember that it does not offer 
concrete or immutable definitions or categories, but an intuitive 
understanding of the relationships through which technology 
changes. Thus it provides a resource for application in 
particular cases. Similarly, although this chapter differentiates 
and labels a number of responses to explain the changes which are
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taking place, and as a means of temporarily fixing the object of 
study, this is only a first step in the process of understanding. 
It is a pragmatic arrangement which reflects the pragmatism of 
technology itself. As Winograd and Flores argue:-
In the act of design we bring forth the 
objects and regularities in the world of our 
concern. We are engaged in an activity of 
interpretation that creates both 
possibilities and blindness. As we work 
within the domain we have defined, we are 
blind to the context from which it was carved 
and open to the new possibilities it 
generates. (1)
Hence, the difficulty with the meanings of technology discussed 
in chapter 2, was not so much that they restricted their 
perspective to either its concrete or abstract dimensions, but 
that they closed themselves to the broader possibilities for 
synthesis and did not account adequately for the artificial and 
specific validity of their own cases. By contrast, although the 
construction of the synthetic concept of technology specified 
three levels of analysis, its potential is not limited by those 
categories. Instead it describes the generalised relationships 
which they characterise and the process of change which those 
relationships engender. Thus the development of knowledge becomes 
an iterative process in which an understanding of the parts, 
temporarily transfixed for the purpose, illuminates the whole in 
a way which can deepen the original understanding of the parts. 
The pragmatism of this approach acknowledges the need for the 
creation of artificial boundaries and categories but does not 
mistake their tenuous nature for an absolute reality. Instead it 
leaves the justification for their use to their success in 
achieving practical understanding.
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RESPONSES TO CONTRADICTION 
Contradiction in Action
Within the synthetic concept of technology, contradiction plays 
an important role in explaining the origins of change. It was 
identified at two points in the relationships through which 
change is transmitted; in action and in the institutional logic. 
The discussion in the last chapter showed some of the responses 
to the difficulties/contradictions which have resulted from 
current methods of systems development. In this chapter those 
responses will be examined further. For that purpose I propose to 
identify three general categories of response (2). The first 
category, which we may label repression, occurs when the 
circumstances giving rise to contradiction, and/or their 
consequences, are redefined so that they can be ignored. This was 
illustrated in two ways by the discussion of systems development. 
One example was the exclusion from most academic debate of the 
problem of achieving a clear definition of requirements from the 
early phases of the development cycle. Thus most texts 
concentrate on the design and implementation phases of systems 
development and use case studies which circumvent the problems of 
definition. The second example of repression was to be found in 
the argument that difficulties were being experienced not through 
any fault of the mechanistic logic of systems development, but 
because of its inadequate implementation. A typical consequence 
of this form of repression is the emergence of new methods whose 
justification is that they match the development process more 
nearly to the positivist-based engineering model (3).
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However, the particular difficulties created by the potential for 
flexibility and the abstract nature of the raw material of 
computer systems has led, in some cases, to a recognition that 
existing models cannot be adopted without change. This has given 
rise to the second type of response, accommodation. Here the 
institutional logic is modified to take account of these special 
conditions, although not to the extent that the changes undermine 
the principles on which that logic is based (4). This type of 
response is illustrated by a shift in the interpretation of the 
development life-cycle which was described in the last chapter. 
Whereas traditionally the stages of the life-cycle have been 
followed sequentially, writers such as Yourdon (5) are now 
suggesting that situations arising at one stage may require 
reconsideration of decisions made at an earlier stage. Hence 
development will involve a series of iterations through the 
cycle. This approach makes some concessions to the difficulties 
experienced in achieving a clear and final definition of system 
requirements at the end of the analysis phase. Such 
accommodations may represent a permanent acceptance of the 
special nature of computer systems, but they may also suggest a 
temporary acknowledgement that current methods cannot match up to 
the mechanistic ideal.
The final type of response to contradiction is assimilation. In 
simple terms this may be seen as the converse of accommodation.
It accepts the misfit between the paradigm and its subject but 
reacts by reshaping the subject to fit the expectations generated 
by the paradigm. The model for this process will be defined by 
the principals underlying the paradigm. Hence, in the case of
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computer* systems, this may mean that where people find a system 
difficult to operate, the solution will be to redefine their role 
more mechanistically so that it follows the same strict rules as 
the computer system and takes no account of the context or the 
individuals involved. The discussion of expert systems later in 
this chapter will give some detailed illustrations of this type 
of response.
These different types of responses are not unique to technology.
A scientist, for example, finding that experimental results do 
not fit with a theoretical position may respond in a number of 
ways. One way could be to redefine the theory to take account of 
the new results (accommodation), another to redesign the 
experiment to give satisfactory results according to the original 
theory (repression). A third response could be to redefine the 
results to conform with the original theory (assimilation). In 
practice the response might be a combination of these 
alternatives so that the experiment may be redesigned to confirm 
the original theory, and a separate theory constructed to account 
for the results of the original experiment. A causal explanation 
of such responses would regard them as the direct effect of the 
contradiction between the original theory and the experimental 
results. However, as the discussion of historical explanation in 
chapter 5 argued, this could not account for the origins of the 
contradiction, nor for the specific actions taken to resolve 
them. By identifying the experience of contradiction as a 
consequence of the pragmatic and indexical application of the 
paradigm of action, the synthetic concept of technology focuses 
attention on the institutional constraints on action and, using
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the categories of response identified above, will provide a means 
for understanding both the original contradiction and the form of 
its resolution.
Contradiction in Institutional Logic
So far the three types of response have been discussed in terms 
of contradictions in action. They can also be used to understand 
the response of institutional logic to its own, internal 
contradictions. One example of this type of contradiction results 
from the momentum generated by the positivist principle of 
control. To achieve control, it will be remembered (6), 
positivism assumes that all parameters in a process must be 
defined and their consequences for any input known. In positivist 
technology this finds expression in the creation of general rules 
and principles which constitute a specific, formally learned body 
of knowledge which may then be applied unchanged to specific 
cases. The ultimate expression of this concept of control is 
automation. The alternative, which we may call craft, relies on 
intuition, learning by experience and imitation, and the 
immediate and practical requirements of specific circumstances 
(7). This principle of control generates its own momentum for 
change within the logic of institutional technology, and its own 
contradictions. That momentum develops because the 
rationalisation of any process in order to achieve or maximise 
control will normally expose the ’irrationality’ of related 
processes which in their turn become objects of rationalisation.
The ’ripple’ effect which this generates is similar to the image 
of knowledge throwing light on one area only to expose the larger 
area of darkness around it (8). The contradiction inherent in
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this process is derived from the assumption that overall control 
(or total knowledge) is ultimately desirable and attainable 
whereas, in practice, each stage of rationalisation exposes even 
more contradictions. The synthetic concept of technology, by 
contrast, recognises the pragmatic element in the process of 
technological change and explains it in terms of events and 
contextual factors directly relevant to the circumstances in 
which contradiction arises. It does not, therefore, have any 
developmental notion leading to an expectation of an ultimate and 
ideal state.
The technological imperative to rationalise and control is 
demonstrated by the process of industrialisation in Britain. The 
initial demand for increased production which stimulated the 
industrial revolution in the nineteenth century exposed the 
limitations of domestic labour and merchant capitalism. The 
resulting factory system exposed in its turn the irrationality of 
human labour, methods of management and the financial system on 
which industry was based. Rationalisation in these areas led to 
Taylorism, double-entry book-keeping and limited liability 
ownership. Even so, modern industrial organisations are still 
seeking ways to control the irrational elements of their 
environment (9). In the same way, initial difficulties in 
controlling computer programming have led to its rationalisation 
through the introduction of high-level languages, structured 
methods and fourth generation languages (10). These have 
facilitated progressive attempts to automate programming, but 
have highlighted in turn limitations which result from current 
practices in the earlier stages of the development life-cycle.
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A new phase of rationalisation is now beginning, therefore, which 
aims to automate the analysis and design of systems. Initially 
the motive was to further rationalise the programming stage. 
Hence one product is described as follows:-
It aims to replace much of that programmer 
intellect by computer power. Indeed, by next 
year it should be possible to generate entire 
programs in a language that the computer can 
understand from a system specification 
without human intervention. (11)
Already, however, rationalisation of these other phases is 
becoming an object in itself. The new tools being made available 
will correct logical errors in analysis (logical, that is, in 
terms of mechanistic rationality) and ultimately their developers 
see them automating further, for example by deciding who to 
question and what to ask them. The discussion of artificial 
intelligence below will show that this momentum is being carried 
even further, and where machines demonstrate the irrationality of 
humans as a source of mechanical power, artificial intelligence 
is demonstrating the irrationality of human mental processes. 
However, before proceeding to that discussion, we will examine 
one further example of the way in which responses to 
contradictions in systems development are fitted to the 
mechanistic model.
Understanding Prototyping as a Response to Contradiction 
Prototyping in its traditional context, means the construction of 
a one-off model of a new product or process which has the same 
functionality as the intended end—result. Its purpose is to make 
possible the testing and modification of a design without the
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costs involved in the final product itself. Hence one proponent 
of the use of prototyping in computer systems development 
describes it as:-
  similar to the well tried and tested
engineering practice of building "prototypes" 
of proposed aeroplanes or ships, before
moving to "final production" versions ..
It mimics, almost exactly, the ’engineering’ 
approach to designing a product ..  (12)
In the last chapter, however. Van der Linden was quoted as 
arguing that the engineering model cannot be applied to the 
development of computer systems. On the contrary, he argued, 
computer systems cannot be prototyped because it is impossible to 
achieve the full functionality of a program without constructing 
the finished product. Certainly, there is reason to question the 
validity of the analogy between prototyping in traditional 
engineering and the method given that name in systems 
development. The latter has two main forms. One, used in the 
analysis stage is typically found in the development of expert 
systems where the ’prototype’ is used as a focus for the process 
of knowledge elicitation in which the reasoning and knowledge to 
be embedded in the system are identified and formalised.
The second form of prototyping has become established largely as 
a result of the increasing number of systems which use an on-line 
interface between the user and the system. Here it typically 
involves constructing a skeleton of that interface so that users 
and designers can manipulate the content and layout of screens, 
and the sequence in which they are presented. In both forms, 
therefore, prototyping introduces an interactive element to the 
development process. In the design stage, however, whilst to the
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user the prototype may seem to do everything that will be 
expected of the final system, much of the processing necessary in 
a production environment may not be present. For example 
validation on the input data may not be as stringent as the final 
system will require and the security necessary when updating 
production files may be missing. Consequently the prototype never 
attains the functionality which will make it a satisfactory means 
for testing a system and, as Van der Linden argued, cannot be 
equated with engineering prototypes.
Even so, the positivist pedigree of prototyping as a systems 
development method is quite clear, as is the perception of the 
’problems’ which its use is designed to overcome. In terms of the 
categories of response described above, it may be explained in a 
number of ways. One interpretation might be that it represents a 
repressive response to contradiction by ignoring the differences 
between computer systems and other forms of technology. 
Alternatively, the interactive development involved in 
prototyping might be said to recognise the difficulty of a user 
achieving a clear definition of complex requirements. Hence 
prototyping may be said to represent an accommodation to these 
difficulties. Yet again, by drawing users into the technical 
process of development, it may also be argued that people are 
being constrained to express their requirements in the context of 
the computer. Hence there may also be said to be an element of 
assimilation.
We are not limited to these separate alternatives, however, and 
an explanation may be constructed which has elements of all
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three. For example, prototyping could be seen as accommodating 
some of the special difficulties presented by computer systems 
and repressing others. Thus it offers a short term expedient for 
improving on the current situation and also moves nearer to the 
mechanistic ideal by drawing on engineering concepts and bringing 
non-technical users into that domain. Prototyping also 
illustrates, therefore, that whilst the three categories of 
response create possibilities for understanding technological 
innovation, they necessarily simplify in order to achieve this 
and cannot be attributed any absolute validity.
However, an understanding of prototyping, at this detailed and 
essentially concrete level, can only be a step towards a broader 
understanding of the processes of change which fostered it. 
According to the synthetic concept of technology, understanding 
is derived from a process which moves between the different 
levels of analystis. In chapter 4 technology was defined at a 
broad and abstract level and did not deal with any specific form 
or application. The description of system development in the last 
chapter narrowed that focus to one type of application and the 
discussion of prototyping above has narrowed it even further. The 
iterative concept of understanding now allows us to widen the 
focus once again. In doing so, we are not required to retain the 
categories used at the more detailed level, nor even to resurrect 
them if we revert to the same level of analysis later. Their 
value is entirely pragmatic and has been to simplify the subject 
sufficiently to allow an initial appreciation.
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In widening the focus we will become increasingly aware of the 
complex nature of the process of change which has occurred and 
for which we must account. For example, in looking at the context 
in which prototyping has developed, we noted that it was related 
to improvements in communications hardware whereby on-line 
interaction has become the normal basis for design. Similarly, it 
is related to the conceptual changes which underlie developments 
in artificial intelligence, in the form of expert systems. In the 
same way, the introduction of other new techniques has occurred 
in conjunction with changes in different aspects of computer 
technology such as the availability of personal computers and the 
graphical capabilities they offer. Thus, as we look at the 
broader context of technological change, we identify a paradigm 
covering not only systems development but computer technology in 
its broadest sense. It is this paradigm which constrains 
developments in relatively diverse aspects of computing to 
directions of change in which they create requirements and 
possibilities for each other. If the focus was widened further, 
we would identify increasingly abstract and general paradigms 
within which the possibility of change in technology is itself 
constrained. Thus, ultimately, as in chapter 5. we find the
explanation is grounded in the principles which guide the society
in which the change occurs (13).
Thus, in the words of Winograd and Flores:-
It is clear (and has been widely recognised) 
that one cannot understand a technology 
without having a functional understanding of 
how it is used. Furthermore, that 
understanding must incorporate a holistic 
view of the network of technologies and 
activities into which it fits, rather than
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treating the technological devices in 
isolation. But this is still not enough. We 
can say that the word processor must be 
understood by virtue of the role it plays in 
communication, the distribution of 
information, and the accumulation of 
knowledge. But in doing so we take for 
granted the use of words like 
’communication,’ ’information,’ and 
’knowledge,’ which themselves require close 
examination. (14 - authors’ emphasis)
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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE - THE ULTIMATE COMPLEXITY?
The Nature of Artificial Intelligence in Computers 
The discussion in the last chapter illustrated the contradictions 
arising from the application of positivist rationality to the 
complex realities being addressed in commercial computer systems. 
Those contradictions it was argued are a consequence of the 
limitations imposed by positivist notions such as the 
relationship of a whole to its constitutent parts, causality and 
quantification. In the remainder of this chapter that argument 
will be reinforced by looking at what is perhaps the most complex 
computer application yet considered, artificial intelligence 
(15). In its present state of development AI does not provide the 
same practical evidence as systems development, but it has 
touched much more directly on the ’philosophical’ questions 
raised by computer technology.
The term ’artificial intelligence’ covers a number of fields of 
investigation and there is no clear agreement among its 
practitioners as to its exact scope. One field, which we may call 
robotics, is concerned with giving machines the equivalent of 
human senses and the ’intelligence’ to interpret and respond to 
their input. The nature of the problem this presents is indicated 
by the current capabilities of industrial robots. If one of these 
machines is required to use, say, three different metal castings, 
these will have to be presented to it in the correct alignment 
and the right sequence for the process it is performing. The
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problem for artificial intelligence is to devise a means whereby 
the parts can be presented in an unsorted pile from which the 
robot selects the required casting whatever its orientation, even 
if it is partly hidden by others. This requires the kind of 
’intelligence’, therefore, which enables humans to visually 
identify objects (16). A second area of AI research, which may be 
labelled cognitive, seeks to replicate the human capacity for 
abstract reasoning, for example by correctly interpreting speech. 
This type of work has attracted most public attention through the 
increasing use of ’expert systems’ and highly publicised projects 
such as the Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars). For the 
purposes of the discussion in this chapter, it is research into 
this cognitive form of AI which has most to offer.
Neither type of research necessarily assumes that the development 
of AI must copy exactly the methods of the human brain. For 
example, a test for the attainment of artificial intelligence 
devised by Turing, suggests that if a person, who is isolated 
from both a human respondent and a machine, cannot distinguish 
between them after interrogating them via a teletype, then the 
machine is demonstrating intelligence. This test makes no claim 
as to whether this is human intelligence, rather:-
The underlying assumption of the test is that 
if a machine can act intelligent, then, for 
all intents and purposes, it is intelligent.
(17 - author’s emphasis)
Hence, the aim of expert systems is not necessarily to replicate 
human cognition, but to formalise representations of knowledge 
and methods of reasoning. In this way, it is assumed that 
ultimately they can capture the skills of human experts which can
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then be used without the presence of the expert (18). The logical 
conclusion of this idea is the creation of a cognitive ’shell’ 
which embodies all forms of human reasoning and which may be 
applied to different bodies of knowledge as required. To date 
this degree of generality has proved elusive and most 
applications are specific to, a particular knowledge domain and 
the style(s) of reasoning appropriate to it.
Work on the cognitive aspect of AI has, in recent years, taken 
two main directions (19). The ideas on which both are based 
originated in research establishments such as universities and 
these continue to dominate investigations into the fundamental 
and conceptual requirements of AI. The other direction of 
research has resulted from attempts to exploit AI in the 
commercial market and has concentrated on the development of 
expert systems. This second direction clearly illustrates the 
process whereby computers have been progressively applied to 
increasingly complex applications. In doing so they demonstrate 
the consequences of the rationalising momentum generated by the 
positivist logic of technology which was dicussed above. The 
hallmark of that logic in its application to computer systems is 
a tendency to reduce all relationships to its own form of 
mechanistic rationality and, where this is contradicted by other 
contingent factors in that relationship, to extend its 
rationality to those factors as well. Thus positivist principles 
become increasingly pervasive as each new area of ’irrationality’ 
is revealed.
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In their initial application computers continued two processes of 
rationalisation already under way. On the one hand they were used 
to control machinery and therefore removed some of the remaining 
potential for irrationality involved in human operation. On the 
other hand, they were applied to the largely repetitive and 
procedural aspects of clerical work thus continuing the process 
of mechanisation started by the use of calculating and tabulating 
machinery and creating the basis for automation (20). It is in 
this second sphere that computers have subsequently had most 
impact and in which the process of rationalisation is most 
clearly seen. One indication of that process is the changes which 
have occured in the way computer systems are described. The early 
use of computers was typically labelled 'data processing', 
reflecting their use in essentially procedural tasks. More 
recently, the term 'information processing* has been preferred.
This is not simply a cosmetic or fashionable change, but reflects 
a difference in the use of computers whereby the concern has 
moved from the simple content or value of data to its function 
and interpretation. It emphasises the difference between data as 
a raw material to be transformed into a resource, and information 
as a resource in its own right. Whilst data processing constrains 
the representation of data into a computer processable form, 
which, as chapter 5 showed, is a development compatible with the 
positivist tendency to quantify, information processing also 
requires that the interpretation of data conforms to the 
requirements of computer processing. Although this change in 
emphasis could be interpreted as a consequence of the increasing 
sophistication of computers and those using them, it may also be 
argued that because information has an interpretive element which
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invokes a different dimension of human interaction, it represents 
a new level of complexity and rationalisation.
A new label now being applied to some forms of computer system is 
’knowledge processing’. This has been heralded by an increasing 
interest in artificial intelligence and especially in expert 
systems. In knowledge based systems the process started by the 
transition from data to information goes one step further by 
requiring that formal expression is extended beyond the 
interpretation of data to the ways of thinking through which that 
interpretation is applied. As yet this type of application is not 
in the mainstream of commercial systems development, but already 
products are beginning to appear which apply the concepts and 
methods of expert systems to everyday systems rather than to 
stand-alone systems as is more commonly the case at present. An 
understanding of the differences between the three types of 
computer processing, data, information and knowledge, may be 
helped by an analogy with the differences between words, syntax 
and meaning, or between a dictionary, a grammar and a book (21).
In each case the key point to recognise is that in progressing 
through these forms, content and value are of decreasing 
importance and more is represented by the statement in which they 
occur. Hence, while each word or item of data represents a 
discrete value, when it is expressed as information its function 
within the sentence or system becomes significant, and when it 
becomes knowledge, its context and relationship with the other 
elements adds a third dimension which is only meaningful in a 
broader context.
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We can see, therefore, how these different forms of computer 
processing represent progressive stages in a process of 
rationalisation. Each moves the object of processing further from 
absolute to less precise and more abstract statements, trying 
none-the-less to encompass them entirely within a formal 
definition. An example of an expert system may help to clarify 
the nature of this process further, and for this purpose we may 
consider one developed to assist in the selection of equities 
suitable for investment by insurance companies (22). Like any 
expert system this one has two main components; a knowledge base 
containing the data and information to be processed, and an 
inference engine which is the formal statement of the reasoning 
to be applied to the knowledge base. In the equity system there 
are two major sources of knowledge; market statistics such as the 
current price of shares and their price/earnings ratio, and the 
opinions of the expert using the system on such matters as the 
quality of management in the company under consideration. The 
inference engine has been constructed by an expert in equity 
selection and a knowledge engineer whose function was to assist 
the expert to formalise the reasoning process involved. In this 
case the resulting system will be used by the expert and its 
function is not to replace him/her but to relieve some of the 
mundane calculation elements involved in equity selection and to 
bring them together with qualitative data and opinions to provide 
a consistent recommendation. This may always be overridden if 
there are other factors not taken into account by the system such 
as a possible take-over or the extent of current exposure to that 
particular market sector (23).
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The Contradictions in Artificial Intelligence 
In spite of the growing popularity of systems such as that 
described above, AI has its doubters and critics (2/i). One of the 
most persistent has been Hubert Dreyfus. In 1972, in 'What 
Computers Can't Do', he traced the faltering progress of AI 
research from its early grand claims to its (then) present state 
of knowledge. The difficulties being experienced at that time, he 
argued, resulted directly from the use of a mechanistic model of 
human intelligence. Even if it is possible to decompose knowledge 
into rules and logical relationships as the mechanistic model 
requires, he suggests:-
  once these elements have been taken
out of context and stripped of all 
significance it is not easy to give it back. 
The significance to be given to each logical 
element depends on other logical elements, so 
that in order to be recognised as forming 
patterns and ultimately forming objects and 
meaningful utterances each input must be 
related to other inputs by rules. But the 
elements are subject to several 
interpretations according to different rules 
and which rule to apply depends on the 
context. For a computer, however, the context 
itself can only be recognised according to a 
rule. (25)
Thus, it is being argued, a particular combination of rules and 
relationships only makes sense as a whole because it contains 
elements not derivable from any of the separate parts. Such a 
situation, as the discussion in chapter 3 showed, is not allowed 
for in mechanistic thinking. Hence, in a later book co-authored 
with his brother, Dreyfus suggests that the idea of human 
expertise being reduced to 'rules of thumb':-
296
  does fundamental violence to the real
nature of human intelligence and expertise 
[and] it is in this effort to create 
artificial intelligence that the nature, 
problems, and limits of mechanised reason are 
most clearly evident. (26)
To demonstrate the nature of this error in AI thinking a five 
stage model of the development of human expertise is 
constructed:-
1) NOVICE - the conscious application of context-free rules
2) ADVANCED BEGINNER - developing situational skills
3) COMPETENCE - the ability to select the critical features in
a situation
li) PROFICIENCY - apparently instinctive performance through the 
ability to relate current situations to previously 
experienced ones
5) EXPERTISE - direct personal involvement in the situation
If these stages are applied to a car driver learning to change 
gear in order to slow down, then the first stage would simply 
involve learning the sequence of actions necessary. In the second 
stage these actions would be related to particular situations and 
by the third stage the driver would be competent to distinguish, 
for example, between circumstances where a gear change and an 
emergency braking stop were appropriate. In the fourth stage, 
proficiency, the choosing and performance of the required action
297
would be done unconsciously on the basis of growing experience.
We would expect most drivers, over a period of time, to achieve 
this stage. The transition to expertise, however, requires not 
just additional experience or knowledge, but a different quality 
of performance. The expert is no longer driving the car but is 
part of it in a way which is not allowed for in the duality 
implied by the term 'driving'. Hence, whilst the distinction of 
the first four stages, and the movement between them, is 
developmental, the difference between those stages and the last 
is discontinuous.
One view of this model might be that the Advanced Beginner and 
Proficiency stages are simply transitional. However, we will 
better understand the special nature of expertise if we emphasise 
the significance of the change in quality between the fourth and 
fifth stages (27). In examining these stages and the nature of 
this difference, we can also come to a better understanding of 
the nature of technicality. The first state, novice, is rule 
based and therefore entirely 'rational' in the mechanistic sense. 
The transition through advanced beginner to competence leads to 
the application of contextual knowledge, and therefore requires a 
more sophisticated rationality. This difference is not unlike 
that between data and information discussed above. Proficiency 
still applies the same form of rationality but its application is 
unconscious so that the driver may not be able to verbalise 
accurately the actions taken. Expertise however is arational, 
that is beyond rationality in the positivist sense. According to 
the Dreyfuses it occurs where:-
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  experience-based holistic recognition
of similarity produces deep situational 
understanding ..  (28)
The process of developing expertise suggested by this model is 
the reverse of that described by Piaget and adopted by Habermas 
(29). For them intelligence starts with physical involvement as a 
child and progresses to the abstract reasoning of an adult. 
Expertise, however, requires a blurring of the distinction 
between self and context which is more typical of child-like 
action (30). AI research adopts the Piagetian model because it 
matches the way in which people reflect consciously (31). The 
alternative is branded as irrational, unscientific or mystical. 
The key to the Dreyfuses argument, however, is that rationality 
is not opposed to irrationality but to arationality which is the 
mode of expertise (32).
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RESPONSES TO THE CONTRADICTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
In terms of the five-stage model, the early research into AI did 
not progress far beyond the novice stage. In effect, it adopted a 
behaviourist model which assumed that human intelligence consists 
of simple rule-based transformations whose output provides a 
measure of intelligence. It will be seen that this is similar to 
the mechanistic/engineering model based on the concept of 
algorithms and we will not be suprised that Turing conceived of 
both the 'universal' machine and the behaviourist definition of 
AI discussed above. In a second edition of 'What Computers Can't 
Do' in 1976 Dreyfus sees nothing in AI research since 1972 to 
question his original criticism of its fundamental principles. 
However, most AI workers, he suggests, have themselves come to 
recognise the over-simplicity of their earlier model.
Looking back over the past ten years of AI 
research we might say that the basic point 
which has emerged is that since intelligence 
must be situated it cannot be separated from 
the rest of human life, (33 - author's 
emphasis)
In other words, the need for an element of contextual relevance 
has been recognised and AI researchers are now seeking to achieve 
a level of intelligent performance which is more advanced than 
novice and possibly up to the level of proficiency. In terms of 
the discussion above, we would interpret this change as being the 
consequence of contradictions arising from the unexpected 
complexity of the domain which has forced researchers to broaden 
the area of rationalisation in order to encompass the sources of 
those contradictions. Quite clearly, the realisation of its early
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shortcomings has not led to AI research being abandoned, so there 
has not been a revolutionary change. Rather AI workers have 
chosen to interpret their experience as an indication that the 
realisation of their objective will more difficult to achieve, 
and the model of intelligence they must use is more sophisticated 
than they had originally envisaged. Essentially, therefore, the 
difficulties and contradictions experienced so far have been 
interpreted as identifying the need for more complex sets of 
rules. It represents a move away from behaviourist concepts, 
through the recognition that what is essential to intelligence is 
not so much what is done but how it is done (3^ ).
The result of this re-evaluation is illustrated in the work of 
David Hawkins on expert systems. The critical feature of 
expertise, he suggests, is not knowledge in the form of rules or 
formulae, but knowing when that knowledge applies. In terms of 
the Dreyfuses model, therefore, we might say that he recognises 
the situational skill which translates the novice into a 
competent or proficient performer. Thus he:-
  does not build systems around a set of
heuristic rules in no particular structure as 
in traditional systems. Instead he builds 
around a deep causal model of the domain in 
question, incorporating all the physical laws 
that determine its behaviour. (35)
He has applied his ideas to the development of an expert system 
for use in oil exploration. His system incorporates the 
theoretical models underlying the various disciplines involved in 
the decision to sink a well including those concerned with both 
its physical and economical aspects. These should identify 
potential wells which will be both physically feasible and
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economically viable. Each part of the model analyses its own data 
and then, in an effort to replicate the human process, the 
results are shared between the other models in a form of 
negotiated evaluation. Hawkins acknowledges the limitations of 
this approach. It relies on the degree to which the models 
replicate the real world which they are simulating, and, as they 
do not generate knowledge themselves, they have to be updated as 
new knowledge about those worlds is discovered from other 
sources. Hawkins is also aware of the extent to which his model 
assumes the oil exploration context and doubts whether any 
generalised model of expertise can be created.
In the terms of reponses to contradiction, this approach may be 
described as repressing the difficulties experienced in the 
practice of developing intelligent models. He has adjusted his 
own concept of expertise to account, as he sees it, for the 
contradictions arising from the early simplistic models. However 
his method is still firmly grounded in mechanistic principles 
and, in practice, he has simply widened the boundaries of the 
knowledge domain he is incorporating and moved one layer deeper 
into the mechanistic process. At the same time, there is an 
element of accommodation in Hawkins' admission that a general 
model of reasoning is an unlikely possibility.
Whilst Hawkins is involved in the practicalities of usable 
systems, others are researching at a more abstract level. One 
such researcher is Douglas Lenat whose early work resulted in 
some significant 'successes' in AI research (36). One program, 
for example, working from a set of concepts and heuristics, made
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a series of 'discoveries* in mathematics. However, whilst it 
could develop new concepts, it could not extend the heuristics 
being applied, Lenat therefore developed a new program which was 
able both to define new concepts and develop new heuristics. In 
Durham's words:-
Its triumphs were many. It won the TCS war 
game, which is taken very seriously by 
America's top naval brass. One of its many 
original tactics was to blast out of the 
water any damaged and limping members of its 
own fleet. This ruthless stategem, outlawed 
in subsequent competitions, allowed the rest 
of Eurisko's fleet to cruise round at speed, 
unhampered by lame ducks.
Another time, Eurisko stopped in the middle 
of the night and asked a question. It was 
allowed to be as inquisitive as it liked by 
day, but had been told expressly that 
programs do not get their programmers out of 
bed in the small hours. It turned out that 
Eurisko had decided it was no longer a mere 
program. It had redefined itself to be a 
person. (37)
In spite of these 'successes', Lenat found that there was also a 
point beyond which this program could not develop from within its 
own resources. In seeking to explain these limitations, he has 
acknowledged that some of the success of his earlier models was 
unintentionally built in, for example by the use of a 
mathematically based programming language. But he explains their 
real limitation as being a lack of commonsense. Even so, 
according to Durham:-
Lenat has not abandoned his faith in machine 
learning. But the dream has faded somewhat. 
(38)
For the present, therefore, he has abandoned his earlier work in 
favour of a long term exercise to;-
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  equip a computer program with the
200,000 to 500,000 items of commonsense 
knowledge that he believes are possessed by 
every normal four-year-old. (39)
This idea is not new, in 1968 Minsky commented:-
I therefore feel that a machine will quite 
critically need to acquire the order of a 
hundred thousand elements of knowledge in 
order to behave with reasonable sensibility 
in ordinary situations. (40)
In 1983, Foder described Minsky's idea as 'embarrasingly like a 
Sears catalogue' (41). Sartre characterises it more graphically 
in his novel 'Nausea* where:-
  the Autodidact, a pathetic and
hopeless figure, devotes himself to the 
mastery of the whole of knowledge by reading 
alphabetically through a provincial library 
  (42)
If we were to label Lenat's response according to the three 
categories, we would say that, like Hawkins, it is repressive.
Both have ignored the underlying reason for the contradictions 
experienced in earlier work and sought to match their efforts 
more closely to what they now perceive the correct model of human 
intelligence to be. Thus, although they have recognised the 
practical limitations of their original work, they have not 
recognised any fundamental incompatibility between 
intelligence/expertise and the proposition that it can be 
represented by computers. Consequently, the continued, if 
cautionary progress of their work leads to fears that the 
exaggerated claims made for AI in the 1970's will continue to be 
given credence and its products relied on to make crucial 
decisions.
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While researchers are forced to acknowledge the limitations of 
their systems, the dangers may appear to be held at bay. However 
we should not believe that they can occur only in the future or 
that, as yet, we are undamaged by them. For example, a report on 
a sharp slide in share prices on the American stock exchange 
during 1986 puts the blame almost entirely on the use of computer 
systems.
Computer generated selling of shares was 
estimated to account for almost 50% of the 
transactions ...... But it is believed that
the effect of the computers involved was to 
exaggerate the underlying movement in the 
market, so that many shares were sold 
unecessarily ...... In particular, many
systems are triggered by a drop in share 
price to instruct a dealer to sell, and he 
will often do so, even against his better 
nature, for fear of being caught out ......
Ian Reid, a director of Data Logic's finance 
division, said that although shares will 
often recover their price within a short 
time, some of the computer systems in the US 
do not have the intuition to see this. (43)
This example illustrates three consequences of the mechanistic 
approach in AI. Firstly, it reinforces the argument developed in 
chapter 6 that this approach is vulnerable to complexity and to 
the difficulties of identifying and properly accounting for every 
possible situation. Secondly, it demonstrates the typical 
repressive and rationalising reaction to contradiction which we 
have already seen in Hawkins and Lenat. This identifies the 
cause, and hence the basis for a solution, as being a lack of 
sophistication in the system rather than its unsuitability for 
what it is being used to do. Finally, it illustrates a typical 
human reaction to computer systems whereby people attribute less 
value to their own, possibly intuitive and 'expert', judgement
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than that of a computer». In other words, they are prepared to be 
assimilated into the computer system's rationality and take the 
corresponding opportunity to evade responsibility by 'obeying' it 
(44).
This last aspect is perhaps the most ominous tendency revealed by 
AI. Its logical conclusion is the assimilation of human 
intelligence rather than its replication. Specifically, AI tends 
to impose its limited model of intelligence onto humans so that 
they conform to the systems expectations. This is not only a 
feature of AI, it pervades all mechanistic thinking. However its 
application in AI adds a new dimension, the assimilation not only 
of human physicality (45) but mentality as well. As the Dreyfuses 
argue:-
The assumption of calculative rationality 
implies that society can be improved by 
teaching children to think more analytically 
and by requiring adults who wish to advise us 
to justify their thoughts and actions in a 
supposedly rational manner. (46)
They illustrate the implications of this logic with research into 
the way pilot instructors teach novice pupils. The latter were 
told by their instructors to scan an aircraft's instruments in a 
particular order. The instructors assumed that they also followed 
this sequence, albeit unconsciously. However evidence of their 
eye-movements when flying showed that this was not the case and 
indeed there was no set order in which they scanned the 
instruments. The explanation offered by the Dreyfus's is that the 
order of scanning is intimately related to context and therefore 
to factors not articulated in the rules. Indeed, for the 'expert' 
pilot, the action is not rule governed and cannot be articulated.
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Clearly if pilots were examined by a computer program, according 
to the 5-stage model of expertise it would fail the expert 
pilots. At best, therefore, human skill would be limited to the 
level of proficiency.
Another misunderstanding of the significance of the 
contradictions in AI is illustrated in a recent article about an 
expert system to value residential property for mortgage 
purposes. The authors have selected this area to gain experience 
in expert system methods. They recognise a 'fundamental problem' 
in eliciting an expert's knowledge and discuss the merits of 
various methods of doing so. It is acknowledged that:-
Most of the knowledge inside an expert's head 
is experimental and uncertain, good guesswork 
rather than facts and rigour and so its 
extraction is problematic. (47)
However, as the article develops, it becomes clear that this lack 
of rigour is seen as a failing of the experts whoi-
  will often be hard pressed to describe
their expertise in a systematic manner, let 
alone in a rationally structured form. (48)
Thus the authors conclude:-
"Experts" it appears, tend to state their 
methods and subsequent conclusions in terms 
that are too abstract for effective computer 
analysis and resynthesis. Valuers are no 
different. They make complex decisions 
rapidly without exhaustively re-examining and 
restating each step in their reasoning 
process.
Basic background knowledge (the current state 
of the housing market for instance), is 
assumed, and items of it combined so quickly 
that it is difficult to dissemble the process 
into its component parts. (49)
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The article, therefore, describes a basic contradiction between 
the objective of expert systems and the authors* experience of 
developing one. Their conclusion, however, is not that the 
concept of expert systems and its representation of knowledge 
should be questioned, but that the methods used by the "experts" 
(note the very term is being questioned by the use of quotation 
marks) is somehow inadequate and irrational. They do not ask 
whether it should be possible to divide knowledge into 'component 
parts', only why it is proving so difficult.
Another researcher who has come to a very different conclusion as 
a result of his contradictory experiences is Terry Winograd. He 
has followed their logical implications to the point where he 
rejects his earlier belief in the possibility of AI. The impact 
of his criticism is reinforced by the significance of his earlier 
contribution to AI research which is indicated by one description 
of his seminal work as:-
...... probably the key synthesising document
in the field, the cornerstone on which much 
of the AI edifice has been built. (50)
Winograd's work concerned the understanding of natural language. 
He was highly acclaimed for a program which appeared to solve 
problems in a micro-world of variously shaped blocks (51). 
However Winograd's current opinion is that this work:-
...... was based on an over-simple theory of
meaning in which words and sentences refer 
literally to objects and properties and 
actions. Winograd now believes this approach 
excludes the possibility of intelligent 
behaviour. (52)
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A recent book which Winograd co-authors (53)» is described as 
launching:-
...... a methodical attack on ways of
thinking that are common among people who 
work with computers. (54)
His change of direction follows a realisation that symbolic 
logic, on which these ways of thinking are based, assumes a 
context in which some factors are considered normal. However deep 
attempts to articulate these assumptions go, other assumptions 
are always required to explain them. This infinite regression 
makes it impossible to fully articulate the context of any 
statement in a form suitable for mechanistic processing (55). 
Language is only made possible therefore by shared, but 
unarticulated understandings.
Winograd's misgivings about the possibility of analysing natural 
language are not shared by everyone. One commercially available 
product is decribed as follows:-
Intellect [the product] contains a dictionary 
of basic common words in the English 
language, plus a lexicon of words and phrases 
identified with a particular application plus 
grammatical rules of the English language. 
"These features", says Bramley [Managing 
Director of the company marketing 
'Intellect'], "allow the user to converse 
with the computer as though it were another 
intelligent being". (56)
The same approach is reflected in the manufacturer's description 
of a systems analysis tool.
309
...... the lEW/WS doesn't store diagrams as
pictures. Instead it stores the meaning of 
each diagram you create in a knowledge base 
we call the Encyclopaedia ...... The expert
system in the lEW/WS uses hundreds of 
structured logic rules to check the 
correctness of your analysis. If you attempt 
to violate the rules of any of the common 
diagramming methods this tool offers, the 
lEW/WS immediately alerts you to the error. 
(57)
Even more bold is a brief article on another product which 
describes AI as leading:-
  to systems which surpass human
capabilities in reasoning, problem solving, 
sensor analysis and environmental control.
The product is described as:-
  an Intelligent Knowledge Based System
(IKBS), a computer system which effectively 
mirrors human expertise by applying the 
techniques of logical inference to a 
knowledge base. The knowledge base itself 
being an organised body of information, held 
within a computer memory, which holds 
information about how to carry out a task, 
just like the rules learned by a human 
through experience. (58)
The significance of these phrases is not simply what they imply 
about the products which they are describing, but that in the 
context of competitive marketing, they both indicate and reaffirm 
the underlying acceptance of the mechanistic model of human 
intelligence. They are further evidence of both the repression of 
the contradictions in AI research and the assimilation of human 
capacities to those which a computer system can match, and 
surpass.
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SUMMARY
This chapter began by categorising responses to the 
contradictions experienced in applying mechanistic thinking to 
the development of commercial computer systems. It has argued 
that these categories, used within the framework of the synthetic 
concept of technology, provide a basis for understanding the 
direction and consequences of technological change. A discussion 
of prototyping was used to illustrate the use of these categories 
and potential complexity of responses in practice. However, 
whilst the three categories of response offered an initial 
appreciation, it was recognised that they had limitations. In 
particular, it was shown that a wider perspective will reveal 
parallel factors which contribute to the specific implementation 
of a change. Continually widening the focus of attention led to 
an appreciation of how these different factors are related to a 
common paradigm. Having developed this broader appreciation, 
reverting to the more detailed level of analysis was then seen to 
add a new depth of understanding in specific cases. The 
development of knowledge, therefore, has been represented as an 
iterative process whose results are as contingent as the subject 
to which it is applied.
In order to develop this analysis of responses to contradiction, 
and to reaffirm the arguments about complexity and the process of 
rationalisation inherent in positivist logic, another field of 
computer application, artificial intelligence, was examined. The 
basic contradiction between the objectives of AI and the nature 
of human intelligence were discussed and different responses to 
that contradiction identified. The most significant contributions
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of this discussion are that it illustrates the consequences of 
the rationalising tendency of positivist logic, and highlights 
the potentially serious consequences of assimilation which result 
from the adaptation of human and social characteristics into a 
form suitable for mechanistic processing. Hence, I would suggest, 
the contradictions in artificial intelligence represent a 
significant addition to the critique of the dominance of 
mechanistic thinking in technology. The ecology debate is already 
making the case that the 'irrationality' of mechanistic thinking 
is in danger of destroying the balance of the earth's resources 
and hence threatening the physical environment. Artificial 
intelligence is now questioning the commonly accepted definition 
of what it is to be human (59). In Athanasiou's words:-
Still, science gives us a troubled 
epistemology, and AI makes its weaknesses 
obvious ...... It is AI's task to extend the
scientific project from the realm of 'nature* 
to the realm of 'mind'. And AI has yet to 
demonstrate that science's formal procedures 
are adequate to the task. (60)
The momentum created by technology, as we noted above, is to 
rationalise; it;-
 .. succeeds through the conquest of
disorder and the imposition of form. (61)
Artificial intelligence is taking this to its logical conclusion 
and we are experiencing a new dimension in the pervasiveness of 
positivism, a direct challenge to the intuitive element of human 
thinking. In the final chapter the broader implications of this 
tendency will be discussed.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7
1. Winograd T. & Flores F. 'Understanding Computers and
Cognition', 1986, Ablex Publishing Corp., Norwood 
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engineering paradigm.
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Techniques', 1979, Yourdon Press, New York
6. see Chapter 3*
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Medicine', in Krohn W et al (Eds.) 'The Dynamics of 
Science and Technology', 1978, D Reidel, Dordrecht.
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agriculture and taxation could be so 
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the sovereign and his subjects ..
Political economy acquired a distinctive 
naturalist methodology from its 
absorbtion in the Enlightenment - a 
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into a system of connected principles.
(Winch D. 'The Emergence of Economics 
as a Science' in Cipolla M. (Ed.)
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3% 1971. Fontana, London, pp. 514 &
516.)
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and complex. Some of the issues raised for sociology 
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Sociology of Machines? The Case of Sociology and 
Artificial Intelligence' in Sociology Vol. 19 No. 4,
Nov. 1985
18. It should be noted that the explanation of expert
systems being offered here is very simplistic. It is 
sufficient to develop the argument being presented and 
any additional detail would almost certainly be out of 
date within a few months.
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One is the development of hardware to provide for the 
enormous processing power required by AI. Changes in 
this area are seeking to overcome the limitations of 
the von Neumann architecture and are therefore looking 
more closely at the cybernetic ideas of Wiener. 
Similarly, the algorithmic languages suited to other 
forms of computer development are proving inadequate 
and new ones are being developed to express 
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description of the process whereby mechanisation is a 
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21. Like many analogies, this one is superficially useful
but begs rather too many questions if explored at any 
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Computers Can't Do - The Limits of Artificial 
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The Free Press, New York, pp. xi-xiii
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the global, but undefinable and intuitive nature of 
transcendental knowledge.
28. Dreyfus H.L. & Dreyfus S. 1986 op cit., p. 32
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the result of a developmental process involving each 
stage of the Dreyfuses model. This may be true for some 
types of learning, but for others, such as the 
acquisition of a mother tongue, knowledge of rules will 
normally follow proficiency.
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scope of this discussion, to explore the implications 
of this notion of expertise for the definition of 
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R.D. 'The Divided Self, 1969, Penguin, Harmondsworth.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
THE PROBLEM OF 'TECHNOLOGY* REVISITED 
The Problem
The purpose of original project from which this thesis is derived 
was to explore the development of knowledge about computer 
technology and its use. This work was halted and redirected by 
difficulties with the methodological possibilities available to 
it. At the practical level it suffered from a lack of facilities 
for collecting data on such topics as the educational background 
and professional training of computer staff. This led to a 
reconsideration of the available resources and thence to the 
adoption of expert participation as the principal research 
method. This not only overcame the original difficulty but also 
offered the opportunity to explore an unusual perspective in 
sociological studies. Furthermore, it brought into focus the 
second methodological difficulty of the original project, the 
lack of an adequate definition of technology. This difficulty had 
emerged from background reading on organisations and their uses 
of technology. Attempts to resolve it in order to provide a 
framework for analysis by expert participation quickly showed 
that the problem was not simply a result of the variations in 
emphasis found in different uses of 'technology', but arose from 
inconsistencies and conflicts which could not be resolved within 
any existing conceptual framework. As a result, the starting
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point of the thesis as it has now been developed became the 
resolution of this difficulty through the reconceptualisation of 
technology in a way which could resolve these contradictions (1).
This process of reconceptualisation has developed in two main 
phases. In the first phase, the nature of the problem of 
definition described above was demonstrated and was seen to 
reveal a fundamental schism between uses of 'technology' based on 
positivist principles, which typically emphasised its concrete 
aspects, and other uses based on non-positivist principles which 
typically emphasised its abstract characteristics. These 
alternative conceptualisations provided the main avenues of 
exploration in the search for a new concept of technology which 
could synthesise their differing orientations and thus encompass 
all the facets identified by the many other uses of the term. 
Positivism was found not to have that potential, but a new 
conceptualisation derived from a selective reading of various 
non-positivist writers was thought to provide the necessary 
synthesis. This gave rise to the two main themes which were 
developed in the second phase of the thesis; one concerning the 
limitations of positivism as a means of expressing complex 
relationships and consequently as an appropriate model for 
technology, and the other, the greater viability of the concept 
of technology constructed in this thesis. The empirical 
demonstration of the new concept was provided by a discussion of 
selected aspects of computer technology. These showed how both 
past and present technological developments can be re-interpreted 
in a way which achieves a deeper understanding of the process of 
technological change; its conditions and consequences.
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In this final chapter these arguments and the evidence to support 
them will be reassessed in terms of their own validity and that 
of the research methodology from which they have emerged. Like 
the computer systems it has discussed, this thesis has had a 
career circumscribed by the conditions of its development and 
leading, through a series of decisions, to its present form (2).
As a first step in this evaluation, therefore, the arguments and 
evidence of the thesis will be restated and some consequences of 
this career path identified in terms of the questions it has left 
outstanding. This reassessment will focus in particular on the 
question of whether there is any reason to believe that the 
results of exploring the limited empirical domain of computer 
technology are anything but the consequence of a special case 
which has been exaggerated by the use of expert participation as 
the principal research method. Consequently it will also ask why 
meanings of ’technology* grounded in positivist principles still 
dominate everyday and formal uses of the term when the case 
against them is apparently so strong. Finally, on the basis of 
this discussion, some further directions for research will be 
identified.
The Development of a Solution
Faced with the problem that meanings given to ’technology* are so 
variable, the search for an adequate conceptualisation began with 
a survey representing its existing use in formal and academic 
studies. Although not comprehensive, this survey demonstrated the 
variety of meanings acquired by ’technology’ and the tendency of 
each to emphasise either its concrete or abstract facets. This
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identified both the scope which the new concept would have to 
encompass and the need for a synthesis of the two basic 
orientations. It was an examination of the potential of the 
concepts underlying these orientations, in the form of positivist 
and non-positivist principles, which provided a starting point in 
the search for that synthesis.
As might be expected at this early stage in the career of the 
thesis, a number of decisions were taken which fundamentally 
defined its scope and direction. One question raised by these 
decisions is whether the survey undertaken to establish the 
problem of definition was truly ’representative* of the meanings 
ascribed to technology and consequently, whether it excluded a 
use of ’technology’ which already met the criteria specified for 
the new concept. In view of the pervasive use of the term 
’technology’, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect a definitive 
answer to this question. It must also be remembered that the 
principal object of the survey was to demonstrate the problem of 
variability and contradiction for which purpose its sample was 
clearly sufficient. However the question raised here does draw 
attention to the growing sophistication of discussions of 
technology since that survey was completed. As a result the 
problem addressed by this thesis may not appear as novel as it 
was when the work began and one possible direction for further 
research would be to relate its conclusions to these more recent 
uses and meanings of ’technology*. Even so the issues it raises 
remain critical and essentially unresolved in terms of their 
broader social consequences.
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A second question raised by this first phase of the thesis 
concerns the adequacy of the positivist/non-positivist dichotomy 
as the principal means of directing the search for a new concept 
of technology. The pragmatic basis of such categories has been 
discussed elsewhere but its consequences are no more keenly 
illustrated than in this case. The question which arises, 
therefore, is not about the absolute validity of the categories, 
rather it concerns the value of this distinction for furthering 
our understanding of technology. As a result, any judgement must 
not be made on the basis of the decision to use these categories 
but on the evidence of their success in developing that 
understanding.
In pursuing the directions indicated by the dichotomy between 
positivist and non-positivist principles, the next stage of the 
thesis was to examine the possibility that the former could 
provide the basis for a new concept of technology. Those 
principles were found to consist of a number of mutually 
supporting ideas predicated on the assumption that any whole must 
consist only of the aggregate of its parts to which it can be 
reduced and from which it can be reconstructed. This assumes in 
turn that each part, and the relationships which they share, can 
be precisely and discretely defined. These ideas are the basis 
for particular notions of efficiency, rationality and control, 
and encourage action based on analysis and quantification. It was 
argued, however, that this model of reality has significant 
limitations in dealing with some types of complexity and the 
relationships to which they give rise. As it stands, it cannot 
embrace some features of technology identified by those writers
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who have concentrated on its abstract rather than concrete 
aspects. Furthermore, because the principles of positivism are 
assumed to be the only measure of scientific validity, they 
exclude the possibility of integration with other perspectives to 
broaden their application and so account for the facets of 
technology they now exclude.
In terms of the long and complex debate on positivism and its 
various implementations, this discussion represented a limited 
exploration of the subject confined essentially to the immediate 
need to construct a concept of technology. It therefore 
highlighted two aspects of positivism which played a key role in 
the subsequent explanation of developments in computer 
technology; a tendency to progressive rationalisation and the 
possibility of contradiction resulting from attempts to resolve 
complexity. The adequacy of this treatment of positivism must be 
judged on the understanding which has been achieved by that 
explanation. At the same time it leaves open the possibility of 
extending the case by a more thorough analysis of positivism at 
the theoretical level.
The consequence of rejecting positivism as a basis for a new 
concept of technology was that the search moved on to an 
examination of non-positivist principles. In this context, the 
term non-positivst was taken to embrace a range of theoretical 
positions rather then a single coherent view. The object of 
examining them was not to comment in detail on the potential of 
their individual contributions to a new concept of technology. 
Instead, the work of a number of writers was used selectively to
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construct an independent concept to meet the specific objectives 
of this project. The initial grounding for that concept was found 
in the work of Marx with its implicit assertion that technology 
cannot be treated as a separate pareimeter of the social equation 
but must be seen as an integral part of a dynamic process in 
which it is both defined and defining. The key to understanding 
technology was shown to be the changes mediated through that dual 
relationship which therefore provides a medium in which to 
synthesise the concreteness of technology in action and its 
abstract presence within the social whole. However, there are 
difficulties with this concept of technology as it is derived 
directly from Marx. In essence these are the result of his 
failure to fully escape the positivist framework. The 
consequences of applying his ideas without recognising these 
limitations were illustrated by reference to the work of 
Althusser and Sumner. On the other hand, a failure to retain the 
integrity of his fundamental insight into the relationship 
between technology and society was seen to result in new 
dichotomies such as that between work and social interaction 
created by Habermas.
The means to overcome the dificulties in Marx’s work were derived 
from an examination of three other writers. Sartre and Giddens 
were used to explore further the duality of the relationship 
between action and institutions with an emphasis on the part 
played by individual actions. This was balanced by the work of 
Foucault which minimises the role of individual action through 
the significance it assigns to autonomous institutional 
development and the consequent constraints on people to act in
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certain ways. The various ideas and possibilities identified in 
the work of these different authors was then used to 
reconceptualise technology in a way which would meet the need for 
a synthetic and comprehensive concept identified in the first 
part of the thesis.
The concept which emerged did not provide a static definition of 
technology; rather it was described in terms of the relationships 
through which it develops and changes. In this way, technology as 
an abstract phenomenon was shown to reside in the rules and 
resources which make technological action possible. The 
constitution of those rules and resources was shown to be 
modified as a result of experience in applying them to concrete 
situations. Thus, it was argued, neither the abstract nor the 
concrete aspects of technology could fully define the 
multiplicity embodied in this relationship, nor embrace all its 
possibilities. Consequently, technology could only be understood 
through an intuitive understanding of this dual relationship and 
through an iterative process of focusing and refocusing at 
different levels of detail in order to use knowledge gained at 
one level to enlighten the others. The synthetic concept of 
technology, therefore, was essentially a pragmatic construction, 
concerned with understanding and not attempting a precise 
definition which it did not accept as being possible on a global 
scale. Hence the value of the concept could only be demonstrated 
finally through its use. This would indicate the possibilities it 
had created and any limitations it imposed.
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The development of this concept raises two related questions, the 
validity of the concept itself and the adequacy of the method 
used to develop it. The method is once again grounded in the 
pragmatic approach inherent in this thesis. It relies on an 
intuitive understanding of technology derived from expert 
participation to draw on the work of others for ideas which can 
be incorporated into the new concept. This single-minded 
approach, as in the examination of positivsm, has no reverence 
for the complexity of the original work nor for the integrity of 
the context in which its ideas are expressed. The selection of 
the work examined is itself a consequence of the circumstances in 
which the thesis has been developed, for example the scope of my 
undergraduate course. The result is not, therefore, presented as 
a detailed analysis or critique of non-positivist principles but 
as a working hypothesis, the validity of which must be determined 
by its empirical usefulness. It leaves open the question of the 
relationship of the new concept to the issues raised and the 
resolutions offered by its sources. The resolution of this 
question and a similar examination of other non-positivist 
theorists both represent directions for further research.
To demonstrate and test the utility of the new concept of 
technology empirically, it was applied to three different aspects 
of computer technology. As a first step in this process two 
interpretations of the historical development of computers were 
contrasted; one imputed from the synthetic concept of technology 
and the other based on the positivist principle of causal 
analysis. This comparison demonstrated the value of the synthetic 
view which portrayed technology in the context of a complex
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social whole whose integrity was not compromised by the need to 
fit any developmental assumptions. In particular it exposed the 
inadequacy of interpretations of history which assume the social 
context of the interpreter rather than that in which the events 
ocurred and which see the present as an inevitable consequence of 
a series of past events. It also showed the value of the concept 
of discontinuity derived from Foucault and implied, but not fully 
implemented, in Marx’s concept of revolutionary change. The 
synthetic interpretation emphasised, therefore, the pragmatic 
nature of technological change and the integrity of the social 
whole which enabled it to develop a more comprehensive and 
flexible understanding of the past.
The advantages of the synthetic concept for historical 
understanding were also seen to apply to the interpretation of 
changes in contemporary methods of developing commercial computer 
systems. The process of developing a system, it was suggested, is 
typically taken to consist of the application of objective, 
technical principles in pursuit of a fully defined requirement 
with known consequences. It was shown, however, that in practice, 
each stage of a development entails a socially constrained 
process of negotiation and decision-making in which its final 
outcome is the fruit of the progressively limited possibilities 
this makes available. Furthermore, far from being the predictable 
technical process which the mechanistic model assumes, it was 
seen that difficulties were being encountered in controlling both 
the development process and its results. In the technical 
literature these were typically being explained as the 
consequences of the complexity of computer systems compared with
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other types of technology and with this perception of the 
problem, the search for solutions entailed finding means for 
controlling this complexity. It was demonstrated, however, that 
academic and commercial research was still constrained within 
mechanistic principles and was, therefore, treating the surface 
appearances of the problem but not the deep contradictions it 
revealed.
By applying the synthetic model to this process, the difficulties 
being experienced were explained not in terms of the mechanistic 
model but as a consequence of it. Those difficulties, it was 
argued, revealed the contradictions arising in practice between 
mechanistic assumptions and the reality to which they were being 
applied. The changes resulting from attempts to overcome these 
contradictions were shown to maintain the integrity of the 
mechanistic precepts and not to address their fundamental nature. 
This interpretation of techological change as a consequence of 
the dual moments of contradiction and institutional momentum was 
reinforced through its application in more detail to one 
particular development method, prototyping. This example 
demonstrated the potential complexity of responses to 
contradiction and the importance of understanding technological 
change through an examination of its manifestations at different 
levels of detail. In this way the understanding acquired at each 
level informs the investigation of the others replicating the 
dual relationship through which technological change itself 
occurs.
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The final aspect of computer technology examined in the empirical 
part of the thesis was artificial intelligence. This provided an 
opportunity to apply the lessons of the previous empirical 
investigation to another and potentially fruitful area. In so 
doing, it highlighted the implications of assimilation as a 
response to contradiction, and thus began to address some of the 
broader social issues which arise from the themes developed in 
this thesis. It also brings us to the point where we must 
consider the value of the conclusions it has reached by 
developing those themes. The justification for a number of the 
decisions made in the career of this thesis has been left to the 
evidence of their successful empirical application. These 
questions must now be resolved. I propose to do that in the 
remainder of this chapter by looking at three further questions 
arising directly from the empirical evidence offered; whether the 
synthetic concept of technology does indeed enhance our 
understanding of technology, whether the empirical evidence 
offered represents an adequate test of that concept, and whether 
it enhances our understanding of the broader social domain in 
which technology exists.
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THE WIDER CONTEXT
Do Computers Represent a Special Case?
A key question in evaluating the conclusions of this thesis, is 
whether they have a wider relevance than their immediate 
empirical object; computer technology. The value of computer 
technology as an area for research has been to stretch the 
positivist concept of technology to the point where its 
limitations are clearly exposed. A similar situation was 
identified in physics where the complex relationships made 
apparent by studies of matter close to the speed of light could 
not be explained within the framework of Newton’s laws. In 
Capra’s words:-
The mechanistic world view of classical 
physics was based on the notion of solid 
bodies moving in empty space. This notion is . 
still valid in the region that has been 
called the ’zone of middle dimensions’, that 
is, in the realm of our daily experience 
where classical physics continues to be a 
useful theory. Both concepts - that of empty 
space and that of solid material bodies - are 
deeply engrained in our habits of thought, so 
it is extremely difficult for us to imagine a 
physical reality where they do not apply. And 
yet, this is precisely what modern physics 
forces us to do when we go beyond the middle 
dimensions. (3)
In this case the result has not been a fundamental reassessment 
of earlier physics, but the creation of a special category, a new 
paradigm appropriate to atomic physics which does not intrude on 
the concepts of time and space used in Newton’s mechanistic model 
of Nature. As a result of this accommodation, the lessons of
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atomic physics do not have significant consequences from the 
perspective of Newtonian physics and have largely been ignored.
My purpose here is not to debate that particular accommodation, 
but to identify it as a possible response to the contradictions 
in computer technology and to argue that as such it is 
inappropriate. The foundations of that case lie in the argument 
that positivism demonstrates a persistent tendency to impose its 
own rationality and formality in pursuit of predictabilty and 
control. The progress of the Industrial Revolution in nineteenth 
century Europe, it was suggested, could be understood in these 
terms. Machines were invented to increase control over natural 
resources, whilst the factory system and the division of labour 
increased the ’efficiency* of the labour process, and new 
financial and governmental institutions created a compatible 
social infrastructure. These various moments in the 
rationalisation of a society cannot be described in a linear and 
causal fashion, they fed off each other’s contradictions in a 
complex working out of the mechanistic concept which had become 
established in the principles of social cohesion. It is the 
contention of this thesis that the development and use of 
computers is part of this same and continuing process of 
rationalisation and that computer technology should not be 
treated as a special case but as one which can throw a new light 
on the earlier consequences of the autonomous logic of which it 
is a part. The progress of this rationalisation was charted in 
the last chapter in terms of the increasing complexity signified 
by the terms data, information and knowledge processing. These 
stages are not separate from those represented by the Industrial
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Revolution, but part of the same escalation of rationality which 
epitomises technological societies and which, in the development 
of expert systems and other artificial intelligence applications, 
is threatening to assimilate all forms of social interaction to 
the mechanistic model. This does not imply that computers are the 
necessary consequence of an inevitable development in mechanistic 
logic, less still of any fundamental progression. However, they 
are part of the same continuity, and as such they can be used to 
increase understanding of it and, within that context, to provide 
a fruitful illustration of its contradictions.
How Positivist Technology Survives the Contradictions 
If computer technology has the potential for such a powerful 
critique of positivist technology, we must explain why the latter 
style continues to dominate industrial societies. This can be 
done, once again, by adopting the synthetic perspective. In this 
way, it is possible not only to identify the nature of 
technological change but to understand the power of positivism to 
survive, thus far, its own contradictions. The key to the 
explanation is that fundamental technological change only takes 
place when existing institutional resources are no longer able to 
respond to the contradictions occuring in action and within the 
institutional logic itself. At this time, a crisis is 
precipitated which brings about not simply a change of expression 
in the institutional logic but its replacement by an alternative 
form (ll), Marx describes the crisis which brings about this 
change in terms of modes of production.
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At a certain stage of their development, the 
material productive forces of society come in 
conflict with the existing relations of 
production, or - what is but a legal 
expression for the same thing - with the 
property relations within which they have 
been at work hitherto. From forms of 
development of the productive forces these
relations turn into their fetters ... No
social order ever perishes before all the 
productive forces for which there is room in 
it have developed; and new, higher relations 
of production never appear before the 
material conditions of their existence have 
matured in the womb of the old society 
itself. (5)
Habermas sees it rather as a failure of legitimation.
A rationality deficit in public 
administration means that the state apparatus 
cannot, under given boundary conditions, 
adequately steer the economic system. A 
legitimation deficit means that it is not 
possible by administrative means to maintain 
or establish effective normative structures 
to the extent required. (6)
The consequences, however, are substantially the same. The 
principles on which the society is based are no longer able to 
maintain cohesion and give way to an alternative form. The simple 
explanation of why positivism still dominates the conception of 
technology, therefore, is that the contradictions described in 
this thesis have not yet exhausted its potential to respond to 
them or to retain its normative legitimacy. The explanation of 
why this should be has a number of elements.
Consider one of those elements, the institutional logic of 
technology, we must firstly remind ourselves of the close 
relationship between a society and the technology which sustains 
it. This relationship is not simply one of association, but of
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mutual dependence which does not consist of one causing change in 
the other but of each changing in sympathy with the other. Any 
fundamental challenge to technology, therefore, represents a 
contradiction to the principles on which the whole society is 
based and implies a similarly fundamental change in them. In the 
case of modern industrial societies, this link is especially 
strong because the principles of social cohesion are themselves 
derived from the mechanistic implementation of positivism. It is, 
perhaps, in recognising the strength of this bond that Marx may 
be mistaken for a technological determinist. But his argument is 
not that technological change causes social change. Rather, he is 
saying that they are both parts of the same process, but that 
technology, in the sense of being the means by which humans 
interact with their environent to meet their basic physical 
needs, is an important and identifiable element of that process 
which provides a suitable measure of change between historical 
epochs.
The principles in which social cohesion is grounded are not 
pertinent only to the meeting of physical needs they are also the 
basis of the emotional and psychological stability of a society’s 
members. They underlie the everyday assumptions and the shared 
meanings which make social interaction possible. In a modern 
industrial society, therefore, a challenge to the fundamental 
viability of the mechanistic model of reality questions the 
normal mode of being for its members. If the basis of that model 
was entirely illusory, of course, its inability to survive the 
evidence of daily experience would quickly undermine it. However, 
one of the strengths of positivism is that it is grounded in what
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would seem to be a necessary feature of the human mode of making 
a way in the world. In Capra’s words:-
In ordinary life, we are not aware of [the] 
unity of all things, but divide the world 
into separate objects and events. This 
division is, of course, useful and necessary 
to cope with our everyday environment, but it 
is not a fundamental feature of reality. It 
is an abstraction devised by our 
discriminating and categorizing intellect. To 
believe that our abstract concepts of 
separate ’things’ and ’events’ are realities 
of nature is an illusion. (7)
The basic flaw of positivism is the assumption that this illusion 
is reality. The application of positivist principles formalises 
the creation of categories (scientific method) and ossifies the 
categories themselves (scientific knowledge) which are then 
claimed to have special validity. The strength of positivism is 
derived from its appeal to an essential element of the human mode 
of being-in-the-world, a sense of stability and predictability.
What is lost as a consequence is the flexibility necessary to 
explore beyond those categories and understand the process by 
which they change.
This claim to undue legitimacy is not only of relevance to events 
occurring in the present. A belief in the traditional validity of 
technology is also a necessary justification for the machines and 
methods which have been the source of relative prosperity and 
power since the industrial revolutions in Europe. As Braverman 
argues, there is:-
...... ”a product cycle” which invents new
products and services, some of which become 
indispensible as the conditions of modern 
life change to destroy alternatives. (8)
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Braverraan’s discussion is directed at the specific implementation 
of industrialism in capitalist societies, but its alternative 
implementations are no different in this respect. In each case, 
positivism offers the same justification for this dependence by 
claimimg that it is part of a progressive and natural development 
(9). Even though this claim is not justified, the powerful 
inertia and dependence resulting from the application of 
positivism has given its principles a mass which is very 
difficult to divert. It is not that the contradictions 
experienced in practice have had no effect. In the case of 
computer technology they have clearly resulted in significant 
changes, but they do not, as yet, constitute a strong enough 
challenge to the underlying principles of technological society 
to undermine the letter’s dominance.
This dependence on positivsm, however, is not only a generalised 
phenomenon of industrial societies, but is continually reinforced 
by the pervasivness of its direct relevance to individuals, 
groups, organisations and institutions. At the individual level, 
for example, an unemployed person might perceive their own 
interests to lie in the construction of a new factory regardless 
of its effect on the ecological balance of the area it will 
occupy. For others positivism is a source of privilege. Experts 
and professionals rely on the status it gives to their knowlege 
so that, for example, the members and servants of government draw 
legitimation from their role as arbiters of the complex social 
and economic structure of modern societies. The benefits need not 
be personal to this extent. In market economies many companies
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base their profits on goods marketed by an appeal to ’scientific* 
qualities. A more subtle form of privilege is identified by 
Paczuska who suggests that male domination is predicated on the 
assumed superiority of the masculine characteristic of 
rationality, by which is meant positivist rationality. This she 
believes reaches into classrooms in the formal principles 
embodied in some computer languages. Hence she reports one 
researcher’s assertion that:-
...... the culture of BASIC is itself male,
even macho. ’’Computer languages don’t have 
learning styles, but the culture that grows 
up round them does.” (10)
Some social institutions, notably science and technology, derive 
their very raison d’etre from the positivist principle on which 
society is based. Thus, in asking why artificial intelligence 
researchers do not recognise the inherent contradictions in their 
assumptions, the Dreyfuses suggest:-
The answer is that the spokesmen for the AI 
community have a great deal at stake in 
making it appear that their pure science of 
artificial intelligence and its engineering 
offspring, expert systems, are solid, 
established, and non-controversial. They will 
do whatever is required to preserve that 
image. (11)
Although brief, this discussion clearly indicates the substantial 
resources which positivism, as the epistemology of industrial 
societies, can marshall in its defence. We should not be 
suprised, therefore, that it is able to respond to the 
contradictions to which it gives rise without compromising its 
essential nature. It is firmly embedded in the traditions and the 
present of those societies and has become essential for the
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physical and psychological well-being of their members. The 
contradictions exposed by computer technology can only be one 
form of action among many if sufficient momentum is to be 
generated to substitute an alternative set of social principles. 
The final part of this chapter will assess how far this thesis 
has gone in establishing the viability of that action as a means 
of exposing the questions raised by the dominance of positivism 
and in identifying what further can be done to strengthen its 
case.
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FURTHER DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
What Has Been Done?
It has not been an objective of this thesis to deliver a polemic 
against the use of computers or the implications of artificial 
intelligence. No more is it a critique of the technology of 
modern industrial societies. It does not reject analytical 
thinking, indeed it recognises the pragmatic necessity of 
analysis in everyday praxis. Also the synthetic concept of 
technology has itself benefitted from analysis both in its 
construction and in its demonstration. What it does offer is an 
alternative means for understanding technology and the way it 
changes and hence the possibility of re-evaluating both its 
products and the principles on which they are based. This does 
not constitute a rejection of analysis, but an attempt to 
establish a new context for its use. Thus it is not simply a 
question of doubting the final certainty of knowledge as Popper 
does, it requires that we recognise both the limitations of 
analysis and, within those limitations, the contextual and 
pragmatic nature of the knowledge which it produces. In essence, 
therefore, this thesis seeks to demystify the nature of 
’technological* knowledge. Winograd and Flores reflect a similar 
motive in the concluding words of their own bookî-
  we can work towards unconcealment, and
we can let our awareness of the potentials 
for transformation guide our actions in 
creating and applying technology. In 
ontological designing, we are doing more than 
asking what can be built. We are engaging in 
a philosophical discourse about the self - 
about what we can do and what we can be.
Tools are fundamental to action, and through 
our actions we generate the world. The 
transformation we are concerned with is not a 
technical one, but a continuing evolution of 
how we understand our surroundings and 
ourselves - of how we continue becoming the 
beings we are. (12)
This thesis, through its interpretation of technological change, 
offers its own contribution to that process of revealing. It 
recognises that positivist technology, through its rationalist 
logic, has created expectations for its own success which are now 
being brought into question by the experience of its application. 
This does not imply that this technology is wrong (within the 
terms of its own paradigm), or that there exists a conspiracy to 
conceal its inadequacy. Rather it indicates that there is a 
fundamental flaw in the positivist logic, a flaw which this 
thesis has shown to have two main elements. Firstly, positivist 
principles are unable to account for all types or degrees of 
complexity, and secondly, they do not have the potential to 
overcome this inadequacy from their own resources.
Other writers have recognised the limitations of the positivist 
concept of technology, but usually been unable to see a process 
by which they may be overcome (13). Winograd and Flores also 
appear to reflect this pessimism.
Computers, like every technology, are a 
vehicle for the transformation of tradition. 
We cannot choose whether to effect a 
transformation; as designers and users of 
technology we are already engaged in that 
transformation, independent of our will. We 
cannot choose what the transformation will 
be: individuals cannot determine the course 
of a tradition. Our actions are the 
perturbations that trigger the changes, but 
the nature of those changes is not open to 
our prediction or control. We cannot even be 
fully aware of the transformation that is 
taking place: as carriers of a tradition we 
cannot be objective observers of it. Our 
continuing work toward revealing is at the 
same time a source of concealment. (14)
In formulating its case, this thesis seeks to provide not only an 
explanation of how ’tradition* reacts to ’perturbations’ but also 
a realistic framework for action. Identifying the central role of 
positivist/mechanistic principles in maintaining the social 
cohesion of industrial societies does not lead to a denial of the 
role of human action in change. Nor does it assume that action 
against individual forms of technology is ineffectual. Instead, 
recognising that there will be greater moment in changes occuring 
at the institutional level, it offers a means of identifying the 
most effective forms of action. Similarly, it directs critique to 
where it will expose the internal contradictions within 
institutional technology in order to exploit them much as did 
Marx with capitalist economic principles. At the same time there 
is a realistic assessment of the potential and consequences of 
such actions in view of the resilience of positivism at both 
social and institutional levels. It also highlights, therefore, 
the need to persist in action and critique against the new, and 
perhaps unintended forms of technology that may emerge as a 
result of previous action. This is helped by the basis it
provides for exposing and criticising responses to 
contradictions; identifying the existence of repression, the 
dangers of assimilation and the inadequacy of accommodation. It 
also recognises that sympathetic change in other institutions is 
necessary for the most effective accumulation of contradictions. 
Finally it shows the requirements for the development of an 
alternative position, what it must account for and what it must 
avoid to create a viable alternative. In all this, the synthetic 
perspective does not claim to provide the means to ’engineer* the 
future, that is clearly alien to its own logic, but equally, it 
does not require simple acquiescence in an inevitable future of 
domination.
None-the-less, when we see the massive resources of resistance 
available to positivism, we can appreciate that a challenge which 
can be relegated to the extremes of experience is unlikely to 
have a major impact. Hence the importance for the critique 
offered by this thesis to locate itself in the mainstream of 
technology and not allow itself to be relegated to the fringes.
As the synthetic model itself makes clear, technology is a 
pragmatic institution. If the contradictions exposed by computer 
technology can be accommodated in a separate paradigm or 
assimilated into the existing one, it is unlikely that they will 
be taken into account in debates on other forms of technology. It 
is the argument of this thesis however, that to accept this 
response would be to accept significant dangers for society as a 
whole because the contradictions and logical momentum of 
mechanistic positivism exposed by computer technology are 
relevant to all forms of technology. It would also be a rejection
of the opportunity presented by computer technology, as an 
empirical domain, for reviewing and analysing society in its 
broadest sense.
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore other 
forms of technology, it has indicated some of the areas in which 
the synthetic concept offers a new perspective on them. For 
example, the ideas of contradiction and response provide an 
alternative explanatory framework for the phenomenon of 
’technological fix’. It need no longer be seen simply a 
consequence of the positivist reticulation of knowledge, rather 
it can be located in the complex within which positivism responds 
to contradiction without compromising its essential principles.
Of course, the synthetic concept of technology does not provide 
the only alternative perspective. Eastern philosophy, for 
example, was applied to this task throughout the 1960s and, as 
Capra suggests, may have much more to contribute yet. What the 
synthetic concept does offer however is an appraisal of the 
relationships within institutional technology in a form more 
easily identifiable in terms of their positivist origins. It goes 
some way, therefore, towards realising the possibilities offered 
by Foucault’s work whilst evading some of the obscurities and 
pessimism which his theoretical position forced him to adapt.
Poster (15) highlights this potential in Foucault’s work and 
characterises its advantages by contrasting a Marxist analysis 
based on the mode of production with one based on what Poster 
calls the ’mode of information’.
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The term ’mode of information’ designates the 
new language experiences of the twentieth 
century brought about for the most part by 
advances in electronics and related
technologies ... I employ the term mode of
information to designate forms of linguistic 
experience that have emerged in the course of 
the twentieth century ...... The language
form unique to the mode of information that 
receives most attention today is that of 
individual to computer. (16)
For Poster, computers signify much of what is different about the 
mode of information.
The line dividing subject and object is 
blurred, far more than it was in Marx’s 
analysis of labour. Which is the subject, 
computer or individual? Which has the 
capacity to generate knowledge, has greater 
mental powers? (17)
Foucault’s work, says Poster, highlights the changes in 
historical forms of domination which in feudal times were 
directed at the body, in early forms of capitalism at productive 
activity but which in modern industrial societies are concerned 
with language and communication.
Foucault’s category discourse/practice draws 
the attention of critical theory to systems 
of language as they are related to and shape 
experience. (18)
Poster’s argument is that the society which Marx analysed no 
longer exists and a new perspective is required to take account 
of the changes. The concept of mode of information provides this 
by supplementing Marx’s analysis based on the mode of production. 
This is not unlike the case made by Habermas, but whereas he, and 
Foucault, lose the basic insights of Marx, Poster sees the two as 
complimentary, although the category discourse/practice offers
the better framework for an analysis of domination through 
language. In tentatively exploring the new dimension represented 
in the interface between people and computers, this thesis may be 
considered as one contribution to such an analysis.
What Is Still To Do?
However successful this thesis may be judged to have been in 
achieving its objectives, its horizons are limited. At best, it 
can only make an initial inroad into the work required to 
establish the viability of its claims. Those claims may be 
categorised into four types, theoretical, empirical, 
methodological and practical. These final paragraphs will explore 
briefly the work still to be done to substantiate those claims. 
The claim to practical value is perhaps the most difficult to 
sustain or develop at this stage. Certainly it is unlikely to 
receive much support solely on the basis of the arguments 
presented above. For the present, therefore, this must remain a 
possibility whose realisation will be dependent on the directions 
in which the arguments can be developed by further theoretical 
and empirical advances.
The more immediate possibilities for development are a direct 
consequence of the methodology adopted in this thesis, in 
particular its claims for the validity and value of expert 
participation as a means of identifying, analysing and 
substantiating ideas about technology. This method, it has been 
argued has provided a special and valuable insight into the 
nature of computer technology. In doing so, it has adopted a 
pragmatic approach to both theory and empirical evidence.
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Consequently, the principal objective of its theoretical 
considerations has been to create a working hypothesis with which 
to investigate computer technology and the empirical discussion 
has aimed at providing a first test of the viability of that 
hypothesis. However, this methodology can only do so much and the 
limitations of expert participation as a method of research give 
rise to the opportunities for the further work which will 
establish its case more firmly.
Because the synthetic concept of technology was described as a 
working hypothesis, the emphasis in its use has been on its 
pragmatic value for understanding an empirical subject. Its 
success in this venture does not necessarily endow absolute 
validity on that hypothesis, but then such an accolade would be 
contrary to the principles on which this thesis has been 
developed. However it does open posiibilities for further 
theoretical development and the clearest direction this can take 
is to turn the brief excursions into the work of other theorists 
into a sustained analysis. This will mean returning to the 
original authors, and their commentators, in order to examine 
their positions more rigorously, to identify how the synthetic 
concept of technology addresses the various issues they raise and 
to demonstrate how its own case can be validated by comparison 
with theirs. A similar exercise could also be undertaken with 
theoretical work not considered in the original development of 
the synthetic concept.
Valuable as this will be, the potential for expanding the 
empirical case is perhaps even greater. It has been argued in
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this chapter that although computer technology is operating at 
the limits of mechanistic principles, it is not a special case. 
However, evidence from that domain alone cannot establish the 
value of the synthetic concept or the validity of its claim to 
general relevance. Instead it must be applied to a broader base, 
in particular to other, more traditional types of technological 
practice (19). Only in this way will it be made clear that the 
arguments presented in this thesis are relevant to all forms of 
technology. With the additional support of greater theoretical 
rigour, the synthetic concept of technology will then be equipped 
to offer a broad critique and a basis for action in the 
technological domain.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8
1. Although it never became an issue for this thesis, it is
likely that a similar dificulty would have been 
experienced with the concept of knowledge; see for 
example Hamilton P. ’Knowledge and Social Structure*, 
197&# Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Certainly it 
seems to apply to other concepts; see for example 
Larrain J. *The Concept of Ideology*, 1979,
Hutchinson, London.
In resolving its own problems with technology, the 
thesis also explains the disorientation which Winner 
identified as characterising commonsense uses of the 
term (see chapter 1).
2. The first decision process was, of course, the
identification of a ’problem*.
3. Capra F. ’The Tao of Physics’, 1983, Flamingo, London,
p. 74
4. The extent and forms of the violence which accompanies
such a change depend on a number of contextual 
influences, for example the extent to which the new 
social principles have already been established in the 
society.
5. Marx K. ’Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy’, in ’Karl Marx and Frederich Engels 
- Selected Works’, 1968, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 
pp. 181-2
6. Habermas J. ’Legitimation Crisis’, 1976, Heinemann,
London, p. 47
7. Capra F. 1983 op cit. p. 142
8. Braverman H. ’Labour and Monopoly Capitalism’, 1974,
Monthly Review Press, London
9. Recognition of this dependence is not new, see for
example Berg M. ’The Machinery Question and the Making 
of Political Economy 1815-1848’, 1980, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge
10. Paczuska A. ’Getting the Girls to Come Out to Play with
the Boys’ in Computing 4/9/86, p. 30
11. Dreyfus H.L. & Dreyfus S. ’Mind Over Machine’, 1986,
The Free Press, New York, p. 13
12. Winograd T. & Flores F. ’Understanding Computers and
Cognition’, Ablex Publishing Corp., Norwood N.J., p.
179
13. This pessimism was found to be a feature of other
non-positivists, see chapter 2.
14. Winograd T. & Flores F. 1986 op cit. p. 179
15. Poster M. ’Foucault, Marxism and History’, 1984, Polity
Press, Cambridge
16. Ibid. pages x., 164 and 166
17. Ibid. p. 167
18. Ibid. p. 163
19. This does not mean, of course, that the potential of
computer technology as an empirical subject has been 
exhausted. For example, recently released material 
about British computers in World War II might reveal a 
great deal about the adoption of the von Neumann 
architecture and the origins of artificial 
intelligence.
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